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Executive Summary
Outer space and issues pertaining to outer space are inherently international. The
designation of outer space as the province of all mankind, the focus on cooperation
between states and the recognition of the common interest of all mankind in the
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes included in
various space law instruments illustrate the inherent international nature of space
matters. The mandate given to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1472 (XIV)
stipulates that it should focus on the peaceful uses of outer space and the legal
problems that arise from the exploration of outer space. Through UNGA Resolution
S-10/2, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was given the mandate to discuss the
prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Even a cursory glance at the stipulated mandates reveals that the mandates do not
necessarily encompass all uses of outer space. Rather, depending on the interpreta-
tion of the mandates, the military use of outer space can be discussed in either forum
or in neither forum, leaving an apparent gap as to which forum is the locus for
international discussion of the military uses of outer space. This question is the focal
point of this publication. To answer this question, this book first determines the
mandates given to COPUOS and the CD at their respective establishment. The initial
mandates, however, leave ambiguity about the discussion of space matters interna-
tionally. Depending on the interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’, divergent interpre-
tations of the mandates of the forums arise. This leads to a void in the discussion of
space matters internationally, specifically about the ‘non-arms military’ use of outer
space.
Thereafter, the development of the mandates is analysed from the establishment
of the forums until the present. This analysis illustrates that the interpretation of the
mandates has fluctuated. Divergent interpretations existed at the establishment of
COPUOS in the late '50s. During the deliberations on the five UN Space Treaties,
these interpretations seemed to change, with the interpretation that COPUOS was
mandated to discuss the military use of outer space and the limitation of the use of
outer space to ensure that it is used for exclusively peaceful purposes prevailing.
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However, following the adoption of Resolution S-10/2, the diverging interpreta-
tions reappeared. In practice, both COPUOS and the CD exceed their mandate.
COPUOS, on occasion, discusses military uses of outer space and disarmament
matters. The CD frequently deliberates on matters that are ‘non-arms military’ uses
of outer space and sometimes even peaceful uses of outer space (or at least have an
impact on the peaceful use of outer space). The overlap between the discussions in
both forums demonstrates the interrelated nature of space matters. The absence of
any real cooperation then leads to the question whether the current UN space-related
framework can effectively discuss these space matters.
The final chapter first briefly describes four space matters that are currently under
discussion in COPUOS and the CD: the ways and means of maintaining outer space
for peaceful purposes, space traffic management, space debris and the long-term
sustainability of outer space activities. These issues are described as examples of
space matters under consideration that cannot simply be divided into military and
non-military or peaceful and aggressive use of outer space. Instead, the issues
illustrate the interrelated nature of space matters. The interrelated nature of these
space matters and the conclusion that they need to be dealt with in a cooperative
effort between COPUOS and the CD is then used as the background for the
evaluation of the current UN space-related framework. It is argued that the current
UN space-related framework, in which space matters are discussed in the CD and
COPUOS separately despite the interrelated nature of space matters, is not effective,
first, because of the current deadlock in the CD that prevents the CD from making
any substantive progress and, second, because a result or outcome on an issue in one
forum affects the discussion in the other forum, which might lead to unforeseen
complications or consequences for the further discussion of the issue. Two possible
solutions are given to deal more effectively with space matters internationally,
namely closer and consistent cooperation between the two forums or giving
COPUOS a specific mandate to discuss the military use of outer space and disarma-
ment matters within a specific context.
However, two important notes are placed. First, cooperation between the two
forums can only effectively take place when the CD resolves its deadlock. Second,
both solutions run the risk of falling in the same pitfall as the CD, namely that states
cannot agree on how to proceed with the discussion of the disarmament aspects of
certain space matters, which will then lead to a deadlock. This is a reasonable
expectation because historic evidence indicates that the contentious and political
nature of the topic of the military use of outer space leads to discussions on the topic
coming to a standstill. The solutions are thus not without their problems. Neverthe-
less, one thing remains certain: space technology will continue to develop, and this
development will bring with it new legal problems that will need to be addressed in a
more timely and effective manner than is currently the case.
vi Executive Summary
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Annette Froehlich, Vincent Seffinga, and Ruiyan Qiu
Abstract An examination of the mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) reveals that
their individual mandates do not necessarily encompass all uses of outer space.
Rather, depending on the interpretation of their mandates, the military use of outer
space can be discussed in either forum or in neither. This begs the question in which
forum the military uses of outer space are discussed internationally. This question is
the focal point of this book. This introduction outlines the importance of this
question by describing the extent of the military use of outer space. Furthermore,
it lays out the structure of the research, which is divided into three parts. First, the
research will examine the initial mandates given to COPUOS and the CD. Second,
the research will analyse the further development and practical interpretation of
those mandates. Finally, the research will assess the effectiveness of the current UN
space-related framework to cope with near to medium future space matters that affect
both the military and non-military use of outer space.
1.1 The Setting
With the creation of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
in 1959, the international community established a forum for the discussion of issues
related to outer space activities. The name of the committee implies that the mandate
of COPUOS is limited to the discussion of issues pertaining to the peaceful uses of
A. Froehlich (*) · V. Seffinga
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outer space.1 This presumption is corroborated by the mandate stipulated in United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1472 (XIV), in which COPUOS
was established
(a) To review, as appropriate, the area of international co-operation, and to study practical
and feasible means for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful uses (emphasis
added) of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations
auspices, including, inter alia:
(i) Assistance for the continuation on a permanent basis of the research on outer space
carried on within the framework of the International Geophysical Year;
(ii) Organization of the mutual exchange and dissemination of information on outer
space research;
(iii) Encouragement of national research programmes for the study of outer space, and
the rendering of all possible assistance and help towards their realization;
(b) To study the nature of legal problems which may arise from the exploration (emphasis
added) of outer space;[. . .].2
This mandate is a reiteration of the mandate given to the ad hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in UNGA Resolution 1348 (XIII).3 Thus, a cursory
glance indicates that COPUOS focuses exclusively on the peaceful uses of outer
space and legal problems with respect to the exploration of outer space. Within the
United Nations (UN) framework, COPUOS reports to the Special Political and
Decolonization Committee of the UN General Assembly (Fourth Committee).
However, the use of outer space for military purposes has been, and still is, an
important part of the activities conducted in outer space.4 The military uses of outer
space that are lawful are limited through Article III OST,5 Article IV OST and
Article 3 MOON.6 Article III OST stipulates that activities in outer space need to be
carried on ‘in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations’. Therefore, both Article 2(4) UN Charter, stipulating on the prohibition on
the threat or use of force, and Article 51 UN Charter, stipulating on the right to self-
defence, are applicable to outer space.7 Although outer space or space-based assets
1Peter Jankowitsch, ‘The Background and History of Space Law’ in Frans von der Dunk & Fabio
Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 18.
2UNGA Res 1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959).
3UNGA Res 1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958).
4Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space’ in Frans von der Dunk &
Fabio Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 331 | David
A. Koplow, ‘The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (2018)
59 Harvard International Law Journal 331, 335–336 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal
Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 495–496.
5Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force
10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 [OST].
6Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted
18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984) 1363 UNTS 3 [MOON].
7Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945)
[UN Charter] | Steven Freeland, ‘In Heaven as on Earth? The International Legal Regulation of
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thus cannot be used in a manner that constitutes a ‘threat or use of force’, Article
51 UN Charter acknowledges that states can make use of outer space and space-
based assets in their self-defence.8 Of course, the applicability of these articles brings
with it the extensive discussion under general international law on the meaning,
scope, application of, and jurisprudence on, these articles.
Article IV OST and Article 3 MOON contain limitations more specific to outer
space. In essence, Article IV OST prohibits any objects carrying nuclear weapons or
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction to be placed in orbit, installed on celestial
bodies or otherwise stationed in outer space.9 Furthermore, Article IV OST forbids
establishing military bases, installations and fortifications; testing any type of
weapons; and conducting military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.10 Article
3 MOON expands on this by stipulating that ‘the Moon shall be used by all States
Parties exclusively for peaceful purposes’, which in accordance with Article
1 MOON extends to all celestial bodies within the solar system. Moreover, the
MOON prohibits any threat or use of force, or any hostile act or threat of hostile act
on the Moon. Nevertheless, these provisions merely stipulate a limited prohibition
on the military use of outer space; military satellites or conventional weapons, for
example, can still be placed into orbit.11
The fact that certain military uses of outer space are lawful but that the mandate of
COPUOS is explicitly limited to peaceful uses of outer space leads to uncertainty
with respect to where some of the military uses of outer space should be discussed
the Military Use of Outer Space’ (2011) 8 U.S.-China Law Review 272, 276–277 | Francis Grimal
& Jae Sundaram, ‘The Incremental Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold Analysis’ (2018)
17 Chinese Journal of International Law 45, 55 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges
Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer
Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 494–495.
8Steven Freeland, ‘In Heaven as on Earth? The International Legal Regulation of the Military Use
of Outer Space’ (2011) 8 U.S.-China Law Review 272, 276–277 | Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram,
‘The Incremental Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal
of International Law 45, 55 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the
Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’
(2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 494–495.
9David A. Koplow, ‘The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (2018)
59 Harvard International Law Journal 331, 348 | Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, ‘The Incremental
Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International
Law 45, 55.
10David A. Koplow, ‘The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (2018)
59 Harvard International Law Journal 331, 348 | Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, ‘The Incremental
Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International
Law 45, 55.
11Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space’ in Frans von der Dunk &
Fabio Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 338 | Anél
Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With
Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic
Law Journal 488, 495–496 | Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, ‘The Incremental Militarization of
Outer Space: A Threshold Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 45, 48.
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internationally. Historically, it has become clear that the discussion on the disarma-
ment of outer space takes place in the UN disarmament system. The Partial Test-Ban
Treaty (PTBT), for example, was (partially) negotiated in the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament (Eighteen-Nation Committee).12 Subsequently, the
Committee on Disarmament, as the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament
(CD), which reports to the Disarmament and International Security Committee of the
UN General Assembly (First Committee), put the prevention of an arms race in outer
space on its agenda ‘in accordance with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty’ per the
recommendation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General
Assembly.13 The CD has since then addressed the prevention of an arms race in outer
space through initiatives such as the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) and a general Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space (PAROS) Treaty. Although neither the PPWT nor a general PAROS Treaty
has been realised, the CD nevertheless aims to realise a legally binding international
instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.14
However, the inclusion of this agenda item on the CD agenda does not give
complete certainty as to where all military uses of outer space are to be discussed
internationally. The disarmament of outer space and the prevention of an arms race
in outer space are only aspects of the military use of outer space. There is a wealth of
non-arms military uses of outer space: telecommunications, remote sensing, GPS,
not to mention the inherent dual-use nature of much space technology.15
Moreover, there are efforts to increase the military use of outer space. The prime
example of such efforts is the U.S. plan for a U.S. Space Force.16 Furthermore,
although both COPUOS and the CD address issues pertaining to the use of outer
space, coordination and collaboration between the two forums has been minimal.
The matters discussed in the two forums are becoming increasingly more related. For
example, the long-term sustainability of outer space activities (LTS), space debris
12Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (adopted
5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963) 480 UNTS 43 [PTBT].
13UNGA Res S-10/2 (28 June 1978) UN Doc A/RES/S-10/2, par. 80 | UNGA ‘Thirty-Sixth Session
Report of the Disarmament Commission’ UN GAOR 36th Session Supp No 42 UN Doc A/36/42
(1981), par. 19.
14UNGA First Committee (72nd Session) ‘Draft Resolution: Further Practical Measures for the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (13 October 2017) UN Doc A/C.1/72/L.54.
15David A. Koplow, ‘The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (2018)
59 Harvard International Law Journal 331, 335–336 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal
Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI of
the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 495–496.
16Steven Freeland, ‘The US Plan for a Space Force Risks Escalating a “Space Arms Race”’ (The
Conversation, 10 August 2018) <http://theconversation.com/the-us-plan-for-a-space-force-risks-
escalating-a-space-arms-race-101368> accessed 6 December 2018 | Melissa de Zwart, ‘The Inter-
national Context of Trump’s Space Force’ (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 23 June
2018) <http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/international-context-trump-
space-force/> accessed 6 December 2018 | Babak Shakouri Hassanabadi, ‘Space Force and
International Space Law’ (The Space Review, 30 July 2018) <http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/3543/1> accessed 6 December 2018.
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mitigation and removal, and space traffic management (STM) will all need to be
addressed by both forums. This has been acknowledged by the UNGA through the
convening of a joint panel discussion of the First and Fourth Committees on possible
challenges to space security and sustainability.17 Nevertheless, further collaboration
or interaction has not been realised.
In light of the aforementioned, this research will examine the development of the
mandate of both COPUOS and the CD from a historical perspective. Furthermore,
the research will anticipate likely major space-related matters that will have to be
debated in both forums in the near to medium-term future and evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the current system to cope with these issues. The rationale behind the
research is thus to analyse the current system of discussing space matters interna-
tionally and to examine if and how this system can be improved. This report will
detail the history and development of the mandates of COPUOS and the CD and the
coordination and cooperation between the forums. Furthermore, it will have a future-
oriented perspective on the likely challenges that these forums, out of necessity, will
have to deal with, and conclude with observations on which way the current system
can change to be able to cope with the evolution of space matters. This is necessary
for the proper discussion of space matters because such space developments cannot
simply be divided between peaceful and disarmament matters—they are interrelated.
1.2 Approach of the Study
The research will be divided into three chapters, which will each have a specific
phase of the development of the current system as their focal point. The first chapter
will concentrate on the creation of the current system of the UN that features two
separate forums that each have a mandate to discuss different specific space-related
matters. Therefore, this first chapter will examine the establishment and the initial
mandates of COPUOS and the CD (as it relates to outer space) and how those initial
mandates could be interpreted. With respect to COPUOS, the chapter will examine
the period from the inception of the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space in 1958 until COPUOS was fully established through UNGA Resolution 1472
(XIV). Likewise, the chapter will examine the mandate of the CD to discuss the
disarmament of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It will
follow the development of this subject in the disarmament framework, including the
CD’s predecessors. Thus, the first chapter will discuss the responsibilities that have
been bestowed on COPUOS and the CD, i.e. which issues are discussed in which
forum, and the purpose and goal of the forums.
The second chapter will analyse the subsequent evolution and development of the
mandates of the forums from the moment that COPUOS was established and the CD
received the mandate to discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The
17UNGA Res 71/90 (6 December 2016) UN Doc A/RES/71/90, par. 15.
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period from the early 1960s (COPUOS) and the early 1980s (CD) until the present
will be examined. The analysis will be situated in the historical factors that contrib-
uted to the development of the forums and will include an assessment of the extent to
which the space-related UN framework has evolved—or has not evolved—along
with the changing global context of space issues. This analysis will assess the extent
to which the current arrangements for the discussion of space matters internationally
are different from the vision and expectations that were put forward during the
creation of COPUOS and mandating of the CD. Primary sources will be used as
much as feasible. For example, the statements made by states with respect to the
relevant resolutions or legal instruments, such as the resolutions specifying the
mandate of the committees and discussions on the articles in the UN Space Treaties
that deal with military/non-military issues, will be examined. Secondary sources,
such as scholarly contributions, will be used to complement the statements made by
states, when necessary.
The third chapter will have a forward-looking perspective. First, it will outline the
major space-related matters that are currently being debated in either of the forums
but are a concern for both forums, namely LTS, space debris and space traffic
management (STM). These issues will be briefly explained to create the required
context. Second, the adequacy of the current system to cope with these issues will be
evaluated. For example, can an issue such as the long-term sustainability of outer
space activities be adequately addressed when it is discussed in two separate forums,
instead of one centralised forum, or through a cooperative effort? It will then assess
the extent to which the rationale that prevailed at the time of the establishment of the
current framework for debating space matters internationally is still relevant. More-
over, it will examine whether changes to the status quo are necessary to ensure the
proper discussion of space issues in the light of the intertwined relationship between
military and non-military uses of outer space. The analysis in this chapter, both with
respect to anticipating the major space-related issues and the adequacy of the current
system, will be conducted on the basis of the findings in the previous chapter and
scholarly publications.
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Chapter 2
Initial Mandates of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) and the Conference
on Disarmament (CD)
Annette Froehlich, Vincent Seffinga, and Ruiyan Qiu
Abstract On a state level, space matters are discussed globally in two separate
forums: the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which
deals with the peaceful uses of outer space, and the Conference on Disarmament
(CD), which focuses on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and other
matters pertaining to the disarmament of outer space. COPUOS was established in
1959 through Resolution 1348 (XIII), while the CD was given the official mandate
to discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer space in 1981 through Resolution
S-10/2. This chapter examines the mandates established in these resolutions and the
various interpretations of those mandates over time. First, this chapter examines and
evaluates the mandate given to COPUOS, coming to the conclusion that the mandate
is ambiguous because the term ‘peaceful uses’ is not defined. Thereafter, this chapter
discusses the evolution of the disarmament framework, including the CD’s pre-
decessors, and the eventual mandate given to the CD, which appears better defined
and less ambiguous. Finally, the chapter considers the mandates given to the two
forums and determines the effect that this has had on the discussion of space matters
internationally within the United Nations (UN) space-related framework. It con-
cludes that there appears to be a void in the discussion of space matters internation-
ally, specifically with regard to the ‘non-arms military’ use of outer space, because of
divergent interpretations of the mandates of the forums by key spacefaring states.
This chapter will examine the decision to discuss, or rather the eventuality of having
to discuss, space matters internationally in two separate forums: the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which deals with the peaceful uses of
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outer space, and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which deals with the
prevention of an arms race in outer space and other disarmament of outer space
matters. Although COPUOS was established in 1958 as an ad hoc Committee
through Resolution 1348 (XIII),1 the CD was only given the formal mandate to
discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer space in 1981.2 The research will
assess developments during this period to accurately study the inception of the
current United Nations (UN) framework for the international discussion of space
matters. First, this chapter will describe and evaluate the initial mandate given to
COPUOS (Sect. 2.1). Thereafter, the evolution of the disarmament framework,
including the CD’s predecessors, and the eventual mandate given to the CD (Sect.
2.2), will be addressed. Finally, the chapter will consider the mandates given to the
forums and determine the effect that this has on the discussion of space matters
internationally through an analysis of the interpretation of the mandates (Sect. 2.3).
International discussion of space matters, at least within the UN framework,
started in earnest through United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution
1148 (XII).3 In paragraph 1(f), the resolution urges as follows:
(. . .) that the States concerned, and particularly those which are members of the
Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, give priority to reaching a disarmament
agreement which, upon its entry into force, will provide for the following:
(. . .)
(f) The joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the sending of objects
through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes; (. . .).
This reflects the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee in its
report, which was largely based on a draft resolution submitted by a large group of
co-sponsors, consisting of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Italy, Laos,
Liberia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines,
Tunisia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (U.S.).4 The
international discussion of space matters thus began as a part of the disarmament
agenda and was located in the disarmament commission. Considering that the
U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) held conflicting views
on how to approach disarmament, it is no surprise that most of the discussion with
respect to the resolution focused on other disarmament issues. Nevertheless, certain
statements referred to non-disarmament space matters. The Philippines, for example,
1UNGA Res 1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958).
2UNGA Res S-10/2 (28 June 1978) UN Doc A/RES/S-10/2, par. 80 | UNGA ‘Thirty-Sixth Session
Report of the Disarmament Commission’ UN GAOR 42nd Session Supp No 42 UN Doc A/36/42
(1981), par. 19.
3UNGA Resolution 1148 (XII) (14 November 1957).
4UNGA First Committee (12th Session) ‘Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All
Armed Forces and All Armaments; Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the
Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction’ (11 November 1957) UN Doc A/3792, 4–5.
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noted that space activities could cause international incidents and international
disasters.5 The Philippines also requested the Disarmament Commission, or the
UNGA, to explore how to protect the Earth in light of the scientific advances with
respect to outer space.6 Accordingly, international attention to these space matters
began in the Disarmament Commission.
It is important to note that Resolution 1148 (XII) already utilised the phrase
‘exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes’, thereby seemingly indicating a
limitation on the uses of outer space. Nevertheless, the initiative to have a separate
forum to discuss space matters internationally occurred promptly after the adoption
of Resolution 1148 (XII). Both draft resolutions submitted by the USSR and by the
Twenty-Powers stipulated the establishment of a committee on the peaceful uses of
outer space.7
2.1 The Initial Mandate of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
The push towards a specialised committee to address space matters internationally
started through the request of the USSR to include on the agenda of the 13th session
of the UNGA the question of ‘The banning of the use of cosmic space for military
purposes, the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other coun-
tries and international co-operation in the study of cosmic space’.8 During the same
session, the U.S. requested the inclusion on the agenda of an item called ‘Programme
for International Co-operation in the Field of Outer Space’.9
5UNGA ‘Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments;
Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the
Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction’ UN GAOR 12th
Session UN Doc A/PV.715 (14 November 1957), 449.
6UNGA ‘Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments;
Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the
Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction’ UN GAOR 12th
Session UN Doc A/PV.715 (14 November 1957), 449.
7UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Resolution’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc
A/C.1/L.219 and Rev.1 (7 November 1958) | UNGA ‘Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada,
Denmark, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden,
Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/C.1/L.220
(13 November 1958).
8UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of An Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3818
(17 March 1958).
9UNGA ‘United States of America: Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda
of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3902 (2 September 1958).
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The difference between the phrasing of the proposed agenda items is apparent,
with the USSR proposal focusing on the prohibition of military uses of outer space,
while the U.S. proposal only addressed international cooperation. This difference
becomes even more apparent in the explanatory memoranda attached to the requests.
The USSR referred to a statement made by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower
pertaining to the banning of the use of outer space for military purposes and
subsequently argued that this ban was merely focused on the prohibiting intercon-
tinental ballistic rockets.10 In addition, the USSR stated that the payload that a rocket
carries was the factor that determined whether it was used for peaceful or military
purposes. Therefore, the USSR argued that there should not be a ban on intercon-
tinental ballistic rockets but rather that atomic and hydrogen bombs should be
banned.11 An important aspect of the USSR request is that it not only focused on
the use of outer space, military or peaceful, but it connected the issue of the military
use of outer space to the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of
other states.12 The inclusion of this point related to the threat the USSR perceived
from U.S. bases in Europe and Northern Africa, going so far as to state as follows:
One cannot fail to see that, in raising the question of banning the use of cosmic space for
military purposes, the United States is making an attempt, through a ban of the interconti-
nental ballistic rocket, to ward off a retaliatory nuclear blow through cosmic space while
maintaining its numerous military bases on foreign territories intended for attacking with
nuclear weapons the Soviet Union and the peaceful States friendly to it.13
As the USSR had proposed a complete ban of military uses of outer space, the
request automatically concerned the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The
U.S. took a different approach, stating in its explanatory memorandum that outer
space could be used for both destructive and peaceful purposes and that urgent steps
were required to develop the peaceful uses of outer space, while parallel steps could
be taken to reach agreements on the disarmament aspects of outer space.14 There-
fore, the U.S. saw discussion on the disarmament of outer space and discussion on
the peaceful uses of outer space as distinct, stating as follows:
10UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of An Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3818
(17 March 1958), par. 6.
11UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of An Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3818
(17 March 1958), par. 7.
12UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of An Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3818
(17 March 1958), par. 15.
13UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of An Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3818
(17 March 1958), par. 12.
14UNGA ‘United States of America: Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda
of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3902 (2 September 1958), par. 3.
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The General Assembly, (. . .), should begin to make the necessary steps to further those
interests by declaring itself on the separability of the question of the peaceful uses of outer
space from that of disarmament, (. . .) and by preparing for further careful consideration of
this vital but complex matter through the establishment of a representative ad hoc committee
(. . .).15
Accordingly, the different approaches towards the handling of space matters
internationally were already apparent in the initial stages of the establishment of
COPUOS. The difference of opinion between the two states led to two separate draft
resolutions on how to proceed. The initial USSR draft resolution followed the
rhetoric employed in its request to add the item to the agenda, namely by including
the elimination of foreign military bases.16 However, in the revised draft, the USSR
removed this point and focused on the establishment of a committee for cooperation
for the study of outer space for peaceful purposes, recommended a preparatory group
to draft the rules and programme of the committee and proposed certain functions of
the committee.17 This revised draft resolution was the result of the discussions in the
First Committee, where the difference in approach was recognised. As stated by the
USSR:
Realizing that at the present time the United States and the other Western Powers refuse
altogether to discuss the question of banning the use of cosmic space for military purposes,
and seeking to meet the wishes of the many countries which are interested in the develop-
ment of international co-operation in matters concerning the peaceful conquest of cosmic
space, the USSR delegation took an important step in the direction of narrowing the gulf
between the different positions and achieving agreement on at least one question, namely,
international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space.18
This brought the revised draft resolution closer in line with the draft resolution
submitted by the group of 20 states, which did not attempt to ban the military use of
outer space.19 Instead, it emphasised the common aim that outer space should be
used for peaceful purposes only.
The draft resolutions submitted by the USSR and the Twenty-Powers also
differed in the mandate to be provided to the committee. The USSR resolution did
not establish a committee but tried to establish a working group to establish such a
committee. Therefore, the USSR draft resolution did not stipulate a mandate but
recommended that the committee should have the functions of continuing the space
15UNGA ‘United States of America: Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda
of the Thirteenth Session’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/3902 (2 September 1958), par. 4.
16UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Resolution’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc
A/C.1/L.219 (7 November 1958).
17UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Revised Draft Resolution’ UN GAOR 13th Session
UN Doc A/C.1/L.219/REV.1 (18 November 1958).
18UNGA ‘Report of the First Committee’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/4009 (13 December
1958), par. 120.
19UNGA ‘Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela’ UN GAOR
13th Session UN Doc A/C.1/L.220 (13 November 1958).
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research carried on within the framework of the International Geophysical Year, the
mutual exchange and dissemination of information on space research and the
coordination of national space research programmes.20 In contrast, the Twenty-
Powers Resolution sought to immediately establish an ad hoc committee that had
to report on the activities and resources of the UN relating to the peaceful uses of
outer space, study the area of international cooperation and the programmes in the
peaceful uses of outer space that could be undertaken, study the future organisational
arrangements to facilitate international cooperation and study the nature of legal
problems that may arise from the exploration of outer space.21
These competing draft resolutions were discussed in the First Committee, with
the result that the USSR resolution was not put to a vote, and the Twenty-Powers
Resolution was adopted by a large majority.22 The reason that such a large majority
of states favoured the Twenty-Powers Resolution partly lay in the fact that, as was
stated in the report, ‘Other representatives urged that these military aspects should be
considered within the framework of disarmament’.23
The subsequent discussion in the UNGA of the draft resolution adopted by the
First Committee once more saw the discussion focus on the different positions taken
by the U.S. and the USSR. The USSR referred to the discussion in the First
Committee and noted that ‘an overwhelming majority of the countries (. . .) quite
clearly expressed their interest in ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of outer
space’.24 However, the USSR further noted that ‘the United States flatly refused to
consider the military aspects of the problem of outer space’ and that ‘the United
States and the other Western Powers refuse altogether to discuss the question of
banning the use of cosmic space for military purposes’.25 The American delegate
responded to those points by stating that when the USSR ‘wishes to talk about
realistic measures to ban the use of outer space for military purposes, the United
States is ready’ but that such an attempt had not been made.26 Despite the different
20UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Revised Draft Resolution’ UN GAOR 13th Session
UN Doc A/C.1/L.219/REV.1 (18 November 1958), par. 3.
21UNGA ‘Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela’ UN GAOR
13th Session UN Doc A/C.1/L.220 (13 November 1958), par. 1.
22UNGA ‘Report of the First Committee’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/4009 (13 December
1958), par. 112–113.
23UNGA ‘Report of the First Committee’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/4009 (13 December
1958), par. 107.
24UNGA ‘Report of the First Committee’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/4009 (13 December
1958), par. 115.
25UNGA ‘Report of the First Committee’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/4009 (13 December
1958), par. 117 and 120.
26UNGA ‘Report of the First Committee’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/4009 (13 December
1958), par. 136.
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positions, the Twenty-Powers Resolution was adopted by the UNGA as Resolution
1348 (XIII).
In accordance with the discussions conducted in the First Committee and the
UNGA, Resolution 1348 (XIII) does not use the term ‘military’ but uses the term
‘peaceful’,27 thereby keeping the military use of outer space lawful. The content of
the resolution stipulates the mandate given to the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. In subparagraphs 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) the focus is on interna-
tional cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The ad hoc Committee is
requested to assess the then-current resources of the UN and international bodies
relating to the peaceful uses of outer space, the area of international cooperation and
programmes in the peaceful uses of outer space that could appropriately be under-
taken under UN auspices and the future organisational arrangements to facilitate
international cooperation. Furthermore, the ad hoc Committee is requested to report
on ‘The nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programmes
to explore outer space’ in subparagraph 1(d). In light of the aforementioned mandate,
and in light of the deliberations before the adoption of the resolution, the ad hoc
Committee was limited to the discussion of peaceful uses of outer space. The term
peaceful within this resolution was understood, at least by the states that sponsored
the initial draft resolution, to exclude disarmament issues.
As a result, the ad hoc Committee began deliberating on space matters under the
mandate stipulated under Resolution 1348 (XIII). In this discussion, it was reiterated
that Resolution 1348 (XIII) exclusively referred to the peaceful uses of outer space.28
The UK, for example, stated that ‘[COPUOS] was concerned only with the peaceful
uses of outer space; and that excluded questions relating to other than peaceful uses
and to disarmament’.29 This was supported by Belgium, which stated that ‘(. . .) the
matter being considered exclusively from the point of view of the peaceful uses of
outer space’.30 Accordingly, this view was reiterated in the report of the ad hoc
Committee.31
The discussion on establishing COPUOS continued in the First Committee,
wherein multiple states made statements with respect to the mandate of COPUOS.
First, the U.S. stated that matters relating to the peaceful uses of outer space and the
general problem of disarmament should be treated separately.32 Second, an
27UNGA Res 1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958).
28Ad hoc COPUOS ‘Report of the Working Group to the Legal Committee’ UN GAOR 14th
Session UN Doc A/AC.98/C.2/L.1 (9 June 1959), 2 | Ad hoc COPUOS (Legal Committee) ‘Report
of the Legal Committee’ UN GAOR 14th Sessions UN Doc A/AC.98/2 (12 June 1959), 1.
29Ad hoc COPUOS (Legal Committee) ‘Summary Record of the First Meeting’ UN GAOR 14th
Session UN Doc A/AC.98/C.2/SR.1 (30 June 1959), 5.
30Ad hoc COPUOS (Legal Committee) ‘Summary Record of the First Meeting’ UN GAOR 14th
Session UN Doc A/AC.98/C.2/SR.1 (30 June 1959), 9.
31Ad hoc COPUOS ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN
GAOR 14th Session UN Doc A/4141 (14 July 1959), 22.
32UNGA First Committee (14th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1079th Meeting’ (11 December
1959) UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1079, par. 6.
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interesting statement was made by India, which put forward that although COPUOS
might initially focus on certain matters, the ultimate matter to be considered is the
prohibition on the use of outer space for any military purposes whatsoever.33 In
addition, simultaneous progress would have to be made towards general disarma-
ment.34 Although India did not seem to question the mandate given to COPUOS, it
foresaw the possibility that COPUOS could still deliberate on a prohibition of the use
of outer space for military purposes.
These statements notwithstanding the draft resolution was adopted as Resolution
1472 (XIV), which states that the responsibility of COPUOS is as follows:
(a) to review, as appropriate, the area of international co-operation, and to study practical
and feasible means for giving effect to programmes in the peaceful (emphasis added)
uses of outer space which could appropriately be undertaken under United Nations
auspices, including, inter alia:
(i) Assistance for the continuation on a permanent basis of the research on outer space
carried on within the framework of the International Geophysical Year;
(ii) Organization of the mutual exchange and dissemination of information on outer
space research;
(iii) Encouragement of national research programmes for the study of outer space, and
the rendering of all possible assistance and help towards their realization;
(b) To study the nature of legal problems which may arise from the exploration (emphasis
added) of outer space.35
In light of Resolution 1472 (XIV) and the deliberations between states prior to the
adoption of the resolution, it can be unequivocally determined that the initial
mandate of COPUOS is limited to the peaceful uses of outer space. This means
that the disarmament of outer space is to be discussed outside of COPUOS. This
mandate was reiterated in Resolution 1721 (XVI) E.36
In accordance with its mandate, COPUOS has been serving as a central platform
for international cooperation in the field of outer space activities since its establish-
ment. COPUOS has two subcommittees: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
(STSC) and the Legal Subcommittee. These two subcommittees cooperate with each
other and meet annually. Each year, COPUOS submits a report to the Fourth
Committee of UNGA, which then adopts a resolution on ‘International cooperation
in the peaceful uses of outer space’. COPUOS aims at strengthening the international
legal regime governing outer space and improving conditions for expanding inter-
national cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. As a focal point of
international cooperation, the topics discussed in this forum include the following:
33UNGA First Committee (14th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1080th Meeting’ (11 December
1959) UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1080, par. 12.
34UNGA First Committee (14th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1080th Meeting’ (11 December
1959) UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1080, par. 12.
35UNGA Res 1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959).
36UNGA Res 1721 (XVI) (20 December 1961).
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• maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes;
• safe operations in orbit;
• space debris;
• space weather;
• the threat from asteroids;
• the safe use of nuclear power in outer space;
• climate change;
• water management;
• global navigation satellite systems; and
• questions concerning space law and national space legislation.
The membership of COPUOS has continuously expanded, rising from 24 in 1959
to 87 member states in 2018.37 This figure demonstrates the inclusivity of COPUOS,
which has led to its success and indicates that the international community is paying
increasing concern to the international governance of space activities.38
2.2 The Initial Mandate of the Conference on Disarmament
(CD)
As stated, the discussion of space matters internationally began as a disarmament
issue with Resolution 1148 (XII). The discussion of the peaceful uses of outer space
was promptly transferred to a separate forum, but the disarmament of outer space
still remained an issue to be discussed. The mandate to do this implicitly came to lie
with the UN disarmament framework: the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(Ten-Nation Committee), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(Eighteen-Nation Committee), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
(CCD) and finally the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Although none of these
committees had an explicit mandate to discuss the disarmament of outer space, they
became the de facto forums for this matter.
2.2.1 Ten-Nation Committee
The issue of the disarmament of outer space had already cropped up in 1960 in
discussions in the Ten-Nation Committee. France, for example, stated that the
Committee’s initial focus should be on nuclear disarmament as ballistic missiles
and operational satellites strengthened the power of nuclear weapons to such a
37UNGA Res 1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959) | UNGA Res 72/77 (29 December 2017) UN Doc
A/RES/72/77.
38Jessica West (ed), Space Security Index 2017 (Ploughshares 2017) 127.
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degree that conventional weapons and the strength of armed forces are secondary
considerations.39 The U.S. was even clearer, explicitly stating: ‘We must take
immediate action to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space.’40
Thus, a proposal that was put forward by Canada, France, Italy, the UK and the
U.S. explicitly referred to outer space. This proposal emphasised the goal of ensuring
the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.41 It was also more explicit about
the disarmament of outer space, as stated by the UK:
However, there are two points on which I have already touched to which I should like to
return because, to my mind, they are very striking and of considerable importance to us.
The first of these (. . .), provisions to ensure that weapons of mass destruction – particularly,
of course, nuclear weapons – are not placed in orbit above the earth. This may seem to be
legislating to the fantastic and to be more appropriate, perhaps, to a schoolboy’s space fiction
magazine than to serious international consideration, but I do ask my colleagues most
earnestly not to treat the matter lightly.
Today it is unquestionably possible to put very large weights, which could embrace nuclear
weapons, into orbit round the world. (. . .) We must ensure that nuclear weapons are never
put into orbit round the world by anyone. (. . .)
It is for this reason that we have attached great importance to measures dealing with outer
space and have introduced them at an early stage in our plan.42
In contrast, the USSR, and a number of like-minded states of the Warsaw
Pact—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania—specifically omitted men-
tioning outer space or the disarmament of outer space. Instead, their proposal was
focused on ‘general and complete disarmament’, which has as its goal the full
elimination of arms.43 Therefore, although not explicitly mentioned, the disarma-
ment of outer space was implicitly included in the proposal.
Eventually, however, the efforts in the Ten-Nation Committee collapsed, in part
due to space related issues, as stated by the USSR:
Unfortunately, instead of getting down to the drafting of a programme of disarmament in the
Ten Nation Committee, the Western Powers have put forward proposals directed towards the
establishment of control without disarmament; (. . .)
It is significant that they place special emphasis on the establishment of control over military
space rockets. It is easy to understand that the United States of America and its partners are
39UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
First Meeting’ (15 March 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.1, 16.
40UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
First Meeting’ (15 March 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.1, 35.
41UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Second Meeting’ (16 March 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.2, 7.
42UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Second Meeting’ (16 March 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.2, 12.
43UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Fifth Meeting’ (21 March 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.5, 32–43 | UN Conference of the Ten Nation
Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting’ (22 March 1960) UN
Doc TNCD/PV.6, 11–17 | UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final
Verbatim Record of the Seventh Meeting’ (23 March 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.7, 4–10.
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hoping thereby to obtain unilateral military advantages for themselves and for the military
blocs which they lead.44
This ultimately led to the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania
not attending the 48th meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee, which signalled the
end of these discussions in the Committee.45
2.2.2 Eighteen-Nation Committee
Discussions on disarmament, and on disarmament in outer space, resumed in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee. The deliberations included a proposal for a treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater,46
the proposal that eventually led to the PTBT.47 The co-chairmen also explicitly
recommended that the issue of ‘Measures on the use of outer space for peaceful
purposes only, together with appropriate control measures’, be dealt with by the
Committee.48
The inclusion of space matters in the discussion on general and complete disar-
mament also materialised in the draft treaties submitted by the USSR and the
U.S. The USSR Draft Treaty referred to ‘rocket devices’ in the preamble49 while
also addressing space matters more explicitly. For example, article 5 of the Draft
Treaty stated: ‘All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons, of any calibre and
range, whether strategic, operational or tactical (except for strictly limited numbers
of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses).’50 Article 5(4) of the Draft Treaty
expanded on this by allowing the production and testing of rockets for the peaceful
exploration of space provided there was supervision by the International Disarma-
ment Organisation (an organisation to be established in accordance with the Draft
Treaty).51 This supervisory role of the International Disarmament Organisation over
44UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Forty-Seventh Meeting’ (27 June 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.47, 4.
45UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament, ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Forty-Eight Meeting’ (28 June 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.48, 5.
46UNGA ‘Report to the United Nations of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament’ (18 September 1962) UN Doc A/5200, 5.
47Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (adopted
5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963) 480 UNTS 43.
48UNGA ‘Report to the United Nations of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament’ (18 September 1962) UN Doc A/5200, 13.
49UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 115.
50UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 117.
51UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 118.
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peaceful uses of outer space (or at least rockets to be used for peaceful uses) was
reiterated in article 15 of the Draft Treaty. First, article 15 stipulated that the
launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful
purposes.52 Second, the International Disarmament Organisation would have control
over the launch of rockets and space devices through inspection.53 In addition, the
USSR Draft Treaty included a provision that would later be included in the OST,
namely the prohibition of placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of any device
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.54
Likewise, the U.S. put forward an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on
general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. This outline also focused
on the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, which included rockets.55
Moreover, the outline contained certain provisions specifically addressing outer
space. The principles in this outline, like in its USSR counterpart, stipulated peaceful
cooperation in outer space, notification and pre-launch inspection of space vehicles
and missiles, limitation on the production of space vehicles and a prohibition on the
placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit.56 The provisions in the USSR
Draft Treaty and the principles in the U.S. Outline illustrate the interrelationship
between space matters, whether military or non-military. Both the USSR Draft
Treaty and the U.S. Outline would have a direct impact on the manner in which
peaceful uses of outer space would and could be conducted.
Concurrent with the discussion on a treaty on general and complete disarmament,
discussion also took place on a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, including
nuclear tests in outer space.57 Inclusion of the topic of banning nuclear tests in
outer space seems to have been uncontroversial because there was hardly any debate
on whether or not to include outer space in the scope of the treaty. Rather, the debate
focused on the level and manner of verification, as illustrated by a statement made by
the U.S. in which the USSR proposal was criticised for not including control staff,
control instruments or inspections.58 The USSR had a different view, stating that it
52UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 121.
53UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 121–122.
54UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 121.
55UN Disarmament Commission, ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 142.
56UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 146.
57UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 5, 11–14, 15–16.
58UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 18, 22–24 | Association for Diplomatic Studies, ‘Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History:
Negotiating the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)’ <https://adst.org/2016/12/negotiating-limited-
test-ban-treaty-ltbt/> accessed 23 June 2018 | Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
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was the policy of the Western Powers that prevented successful negotiations on a
treaty banning nuclear tests and that international monitoring and supervision was
sufficient.59 The debate concentrated on the inclusion of the banning of underground
nuclear tests. In contrast to the verification of nuclear tests in outer space, underwater
or in the atmosphere, verification of underground nuclear tests was deemed to
encounter serious technical difficulties.60
These points were heavily debated, but no real progress was made until the Cuban
Missile Crisis.61 The looming nuclear threat and close-call experienced during the
crisis led to an increased effort to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty. The discussions
resumed in June 1963 and led to an agreement between the USSR, the U.S. and the
UK in July 1963.62 Although these discussions took place within the context of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee, the substantive negotiations took place between the
aforementioned states as three of the four states that possessed nuclear weapons at
that time (France was officially a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee but
never took its position in the Committee).63
This agreement resulted in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which quite
simply stipulates in Article I as follows:
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any
nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its
jurisdiction or control:
(a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including
territorial waters or high seas; (. . .).
In addition to the PTBT, 1963 saw the adoption of another space-related disar-
mament instrument. The Eighteen-Nation Committee put forward a draft resolution
calling for a ban on the placement of nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of
Compliance, ‘Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water’ <https://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm> accessed 23 June 2018.
59UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 44 | Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, ‘Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water’ <https://www.state.gov/t/
isn/4797.htm> accessed 23 June 2018.
60UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962’ (31 March
1963), 43.
61Association for Diplomatic Studies, ‘Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Negotiating the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)’ <https://adst.org/2016/12/negotiating-limited-test-ban-treaty-
ltbt/> accessed 23 June 2018 | Office of the Historian, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962’
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis> accessed 23 June 2018.
62UNGA ‘Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’
(5 September 1963) UN Doc A/5488-DC/208.
63Association for Diplomatic Studies, ‘Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Negotiating the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)’ <https://adst.org/2016/12/negotiating-limited-test-ban-treaty-
ltbt/> accessed 23 June 2018.
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mass destruction in orbit in outer space.64 This draft resolution was a collaborative
effort between the USSR and the U.S.65 Resolution 1884 (XVIII) was adopted
without a vote, but both the USSR and the U.S. made statements about the resolu-
tion. The USSR stated that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was part of
its policy.66 A similar statement was made by the U.S., namely that the newly
explored environment of outer space should be kept free of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction.67
Mexico made two interesting points illustrating its vision of the use of outer
space. First, ‘It would be useless for nations to endeavour to disarm on Earth if they
were to arm in outer space, and it would be vain to try to denuclearise various zones
of the Earth if the nuclearization of outer space were not prevented’.68 Second,
Mexico stated: ‘Let us express, by means of our vote, our unanimous hope and
determination that the space ships of today, tomorrow and the future will always, and
solely, be messengers of peace.’69 Both these statements indicate a strong desire to
prohibit any kind of military use of outer space.
The result was Resolution 1884 (XVIII), which documents the will of the USSR
and the U.S. not to station nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in
orbit and calls on all states not to place into orbit, install on celestial bodies or station
in outer space such weapons.70 Eventually, this resolution was superseded by the
adoption of the OST, which in Article IV stipulates the same, but now legally
binding, prohibition.
After the adoption of Resolution 1884 (XVIII), the Eighteen-Nation Committee
continued its discussion on disarmament, however, without a particular focus on
64UNGA ‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 18th Session UN Doc A/5571
(17 October 1963), 1.
65UNGA ‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 18th Session UN Doc A/5571
(17 October 1963), 1.
66UNGA ‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 18th Session UN Doc A/5571
(17 October 1963), 1.
67UNGA ‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 18th Session UN Doc A/5571
(17 October 1963), 2.
68UNGA ‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 18th Session UN Doc A/5571
(17 October 1963), 2.
69UNGA ‘Question of General and Complete Disarmament: Report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 18th Session UN Doc A/5571
(17 October 1963), 2.
70UNGA Res 1884 (XVIII) (17 October 1963).
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outer space.71 Instead, the focus was on negotiating a treaty on general and complete
disarmament and a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,72 which became
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.73
2.2.3 Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
From 1969 onwards, the Eighteen-Nation Committee once more expanded. In
addition to the 18 states that were already participating, Japan, Mongolia, Argentina,
Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia joined to create a
better ‘geographic and political balance’, leading to the Committee being renamed
the ‘Committee on Disarmament’ and the Conference the ‘Conference of the Com-
mittee on Disarmament’.74 Once more, space matters were not explicitly specified in
the mandate. However, the provisional agenda that was adopted by the CCD
included ‘other collateral measures,’75 examples of which were the prevention of
an arms race on the seabed or similar measures.76 In light of the previous discussion
of space matters in the Ten-Nation Committee and Eighteen-Nation Committee, and
the example given in the provisional agenda, space matters were implicitly included
in the mandate of the CCD. This is further reinforced by the express mention of both
the PTBT and the OST as examples of then-recent disarmament negotiations.77
Nevertheless, space matters were sparsely discussed in the CCD. Instead, the
CCD focused on general and complete disarmament and a comprehensive test ban
treaty.78 In fact, negotiations concentrated on a treaty dealing with the prevention of
an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor, which resulted in the Seabed Arms
Control Treaty.79
71UNGA ‘Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(21 January - 17 September 1964)’ (22 September 1964) UN Doc A/5731-DC/209 | UNGA ‘Report
of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament’ (22 September 1965) UN Doc A/5986-DC/
227.
72UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for 1966’ (1967) UN Doc DC/228 | UN Disarma-
ment Commission ‘Supplement for 1967 and 1968’ (1969) UN Doc DC/230 & DC/231.
73Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (adopted 1 July 1968, entered into force
5 March 1970) 729 UNTS 161 [hereinafter: NPT].
74UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for 1969’ (1971) UN Doc DC/232, 2.
75UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for 1969’ (1971) UN Doc DC/232, 2.
76UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for 1969’ (1971) UN Doc DC/232, 2.
77UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for 1969’ (1971) UN Doc DC/232, 2–3.
78UN Disarmament Commission ‘Supplement for 1970’ (1971) UN Doc DC/233 | UN Disarma-
ment Commission ‘Supplement for 1971’ (1973) UN Doc DC/234 | UN Disarmament Commission
‘Supplement for 1972’ (1974) UN Doc DC/235.
79Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (adopted 11 February
1971, entered into force 18 May 1972) 955 UNTS 115.
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No similar negotiations were necessary for outer space because of the adoption of
the OST, which already contained a similar provision in Article IV. However, this
does not mean that the CCD did not consider space matters, at least as a part of
overarching issues. For example, space matters were discussed during the negotia-
tions on a treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, which included an
obligation not to develop, test or deploy such systems that are space based.80 In
addition, outer space was included in the negotiations on meteorological warfare as
one of the environments that shall not be modified for military or any other hostile
use.81 Ultimately, outer space was included under Article II of the Environmental
Modification Convention.82 No further discussion on outer space took place, except
for a number of references in the overarching discussions on disarmament.83
2.2.4 The Conference on Disarmament
Only when the Committee on Disarmament, which was renamed the ‘Conference on
Disarmament’ in 1984, was re-established in 1979 was an explicit mandate stipu-
lated. In general, the programme established in the first special session of the UNGA
devoted to disarmament, as laid down in Resolution S-10/2, has as its objective to
‘halt the arms race in all its aspects, to open a process of genuine disarmament on an
internationally agreed basis and to increase international confidence and relaxation
of international tension’.84 The long-term objective is then to ‘achieve general and
complete disarmament under effective international control, to avert the danger of
war and to create conditions for a just and stable international peace and security and
the full realization of the new international economic order’.85
In addition, Resolution S-10/2 recommended establishing a new negotiation
body, stating: ‘The Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a
single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on
80UNGA ‘Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GAOR 28th Session
Supp No 31 UN Doc A/9141 (1975), 42.
81UNGA ‘Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Volume I’ UN GAOR 31st
Session Supp No 27 UN Doc A/31/27 (1976), 87.
82Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modifica-
tion Techniques (adopted 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 October 1978) 1108 UNTS 151.
83UNGA ‘Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Volume I’ UN GAOR 32nd
Session Supp No 27 UN Doc A/32/27 (1977), 12 | UNGA ‘Report of the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament Volume II’ UN GAOR 32nd Session Supp No 27 UN Doc A/32/27
(1977), 18.
84UNGA ‘Report of the Disarmament Commission’ UN GAOR 34th Session Supp No 42 UN Doc
A/34/42 (25 June 1979), par. 8.
85UNGA ‘Report of the Disarmament Commission’ UN GAOR 34th Session Supp No 42 UN Doc
A/34/42 (25 June 1979), par. 9.
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the basis of consensus.’86 The general mandate of the negotiating forum, that is the
CD, is thus to negotiate multilateral disarmament decisions on the basis of consen-
sus; within this general mandate, the CD is free to adopt its own agenda taking into
account the recommendations made to it by the UNGA and the proposals presented
by the members of the Committee.87
The prevention of an arms race in outer space specifically became part of the CD
agenda because Resolution S-10/2 recommended that further measures should be
taken and appropriate international negotiations should be held in accordance with
the OST to prevent such an arms race.88 The recommendation to include the
prevention of an arms race in outer space on the CD agenda was subsequently
adopted and implemented by the Disarmament Commission.89 The mandate to
discuss space-related disarmament issues was affirmed by the UNGA in Resolution
36/97-C, which stated that the UNGA
1. Considers that further effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space
(emphasis added) should be adopted by the international community;
(. . .)
3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as from the beginning in 1982, the
question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms
race in outer space (emphasis added), taking into account all existing and future proposals
designed to meet this objective;
4. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of
negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems (empha-
sis added), as an important step towards the fulfilment of the objectives set out in paragraph
3 above; (. . .).90
In addition, in its Resolution 36/99, the General Assembly specifically requested
the CD to deliberate on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing
of weapons of any kind in outer space as follows:
1. Considers it necessary to take effective steps, by concluding an appropriate international
treaty, to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space;
2. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to
achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty.91
86UNGA Res S-10/2 ‘Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly’
(28 June 1978) UN Doc A/RES/S-10/2, par. 120.
87UNGA Res S-10/2 ‘Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly’
(28 June 1978) UN Doc A/RES/S-10/2, par. 120(e).
88UNGA Res S-10/2 ‘Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly’
(28 June 1978) UN Doc A/RES/S-10/2, par. 80.
89UNGA ‘Report of the Disarmament Commission’ UN GAOR 36th Session Supp 42 UN Doc
A/36/42 (2 July 1981), par. 19.
90UNGA Res 36/97-C (9 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/97-C.
91UNGA Res 36/99 (9 December 1981) UN Doc A/RES/36/99.
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In light of the aforementioned, the CD thus received a full mandate to discuss the
disarmament of outer space internationally.
The CD was established as a single multilateral disarmament negotiating a forum
of the international community in 1979. It addresses the disarmament of outer space
through initiatives. With 65 current member states, the CD works by consensus
under a rotating presidency.92 Its permanent agenda is known as the Decalogue and
includes the following issues:
• nuclear weapons in all aspects;
• other weapons of mass destruction;
• conventional weapons;
• reduction of military budgets;
• reduction of armed forces;
• disarmament and development;
• disarmament and international security;
• collateral measures;
• confidence-building measures;
• effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures,
acceptable to all parties; and
• comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete
disarmament under effective international control.
Similar to the working mechanism of COPUOS, the CD is requested to report to
the UNGA annually, or more frequently when it finds appropriate. As a negotiating
forum, the CD functions differently from the Disarmament Commission, for the
latter is a deliberative body. The CD and the Disarmament Commission constitute
the existing machinery in the field of disarmament to help the UN fulfil its role.
2.3 The Discussion of Space Matters Internationally Based
on the Initial Mandates of COPUOS and the CD
In light of the aforementioned, the conclusion might be drawn that COPUOS and the
CD have different but complementing mandates to discuss space matters interna-
tionally; COPUOS is mandated to deliberate on the peaceful uses of outer space,
while the CD encompasses all disarmament issues and therefore also has the
mandate to discuss the disarmament of outer space. This then suggests that the
discussion of space matters internationally is settled.
This is, however, not the case. The mandates bestowed upon COPUOS and the
CD are not without issues. On the one hand, the mandates presume that space matters
can be distinguished into separate categories, which can be discussed separately.
This perspective, however, is short-sighted and does not consider the reality of space
92Jessica West (ed), Space Security Index 2017 (Ploughshares 2017) 129.
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activities. Space technologies are intrinsically dual use in nature.93 Furthermore, it is
apparent that the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful uses can only be
achieved after an arms race in outer space is prevented. The interrelation between
the discussion of peaceful uses of outer space and the disarmament of outer space
also becomes apparent in the deliberations undertaken in the forums. It was the CD
that discussed the obligation in UNGA Resolution 1884 (XVIII) to refrain from
placing into orbit nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
After the adoption of this resolution, COPUOS discussed this issue further, which
eventually led to the inclusion of a similar obligation in Article IV OST.94 The
discussion, and subsequent adoption, of an obligation in one of the forums leading to
the further discussion of this obligation in the other forum illustrates that space
matters are interrelated and cannot be discussed separately as the given mandates
indicate. This is further illustrated by proposals submitted by both the USSR and the
U.S. in the discussions in the CD on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
Although these drafts never came to fruition, both contained provisions that would
limit the number of rockets that could be produced and used, even for peaceful
purposes.95
On the other hand, there is a question as to whether the mandates given to the
forums cover all space matters and whether there is a void in the discussion of space
matters internationally. COPUOS is limited to discussing peaceful uses of outer
space, with uncertainty as to what uses are actually considered peaceful. In contrast,
the CD does not discuss all military uses of outer space but is limited to disarma-
ment. Therefore, depending on the interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’, two con-
clusions could be drawn. First, ‘peaceful’ could be interpreted as ‘non-military’. This
would mean that the discussion of military uses of outer space would fall outside the
mandate of COPUOS. However, because the mandate of the CD limits itself to
disarmament, the ‘non-arms military’ uses of outer space,96 such as remote sensing,
telecommunications or GPS for military purposes,97 would then fall outside the
93Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space,
With Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom
Electronic Law Journal 488, 495–496.
94UN, ‘Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects’
(1976) UN Doc A/10027/Add.1, 12.
95UN Disarmament Commission ‘Official Records: Supplement for January 1961 to December
1962’ (31 March 1963), 117 & 142.
96Throughout this book reference will be made to the ‘non-arms military’ use of outer space. This
term is not based on an official term used in COPUOS or the CD. Rather, it is used in this
publication to make a distinction between the military uses of outer space that make use of arms,
which definitely fall within the scope of the disarmament of outer space, and military uses of outer
space that do not make use of arms, which depending on the interpretation of the mandates of
COPUOS and the CD could fall within the scope of the disarmament of outer space or within the
scope of the peaceful use of outer space. The use of the term ‘non-arms military’ aims to contribute
to the clarity of the research.
97David A. Koplow, ‘The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (2018)
59 Harvard International Law Journal 331, 335–336 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal
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mandate of both forums and would not have a forum in which they are to be
discussed internationally, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
The second option is that the term ‘peaceful’ is interpreted as ‘non-aggressive’. In
general, the ‘non-arms military’ uses of outer space would then fall within the
mandate of COPUOS, as illustrated in Fig. 2.2.
Even in this case, however, a lacuna still exists as it could be argued that there are
uses of outer space that are aggressive yet not related to arms or disarmament.
Indeed, there are few such uses, and it also depends on what definitions are used
for the terms ‘arms’, ‘aggressive’, and ‘disarmament’. Examples of uses that are not
necessarily arms but can be aggressive are kinetic interceptors and cyberattacks.98
Therefore, such uses could still be excluded from international deliberations.
Therefore, the question is whether the term ‘peaceful’ is equal to ‘non-military’,
or does it mean ‘non-aggressive’ and thus includes ‘non-arms military’ uses of outer
space. Because the term ‘peaceful’ has never been defined in any of the UN
instruments dealing with space,99 or indeed in any legal instruments at all, what
the term encompasses has long been discussed.100 In the early stages of the devel-
opment of space law, the discussion could be divided between the U.S. position and
the USSR position. The position put forward by the USSR was that of the ‘non-
Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI of the
Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 495–496.
98David A. Koplow, ‘The Fault Is Not in Our Stars: Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (2018)
59 Harvard International Law Journal 331, 339.
99Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, ‘The Incremental Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold
Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 45, 51 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected
Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI
of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 496.
100Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space’ in Frans von der Dunk &
Fabio Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 331.
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military’ interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’.101 This approach argues that the use of
outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes indicates that all military uses of outer
space are prohibited.102 This interpretation is based on the use of the term ‘peaceful’
in the Antarctic Treaty,103 which also further expands on the term, stating in
Article I:
There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the estab-
lishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well
as the testing of any type of weapons.104
This approach was initially also supported by the U.S., but the U.S. position
quickly shifted towards the ‘non-aggressive’ interpretation.105 This is best exempli-
fied in a released Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum that states:
In the context of outer space activities, the United States seeks to counter any efforts to
equate the distinction between ‘peaceful’ and ‘aggressive’ with that between ‘civilian’ and
‘military’. Though the United States does not view further definition of the terms ‘peaceful
uses’ or ‘peaceful purposes’ as necessary or appropriate at this time, our view is that these
terms clearly refer to activities consistent with international law, including the United
COPUOS
Outer Space Activities
‘Peaceful’ Activities = Non-Aggressive Aggressive Activities = Armed Military Activities
Non-Military Activities Non-Arms Military Activities
CD
Fig. 2.2 If peaceful is interpreted as non-aggressive
101Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space’ in Frans von der Dunk &
Fabio Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 339.
102Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space’ in Frans von der Dunk &
Fabio Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 339 | Anél
Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space, With
Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic
Law Journal 488, 497.
103Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space,
With Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom
Electronic Law Journal 488, 496.
104The Antarctic Treaty (adopted 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961) 402 UNTS
71.
105Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, ‘The Incremental Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold
Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of International Law 45, 51.
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Nations Charter. They refer to activities which do not constitute the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and are not in any
matter inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
(. . .)
Thus at present there are no restraints on military activities in peace (most likely a typing
error in the document, read: space) short of use or threat of the use of force.106
The interpretation has found large support in the practice of states107 as military
uses of outer space have been conducted, and more importantly accepted, since the
1950s.108
In light of the aforementioned, it is apparent that there are uncertainties when it
comes to the discussion of space matters internationally. First, space matters cannot
simply be divided between peaceful and aggressive or military and non-military.
They are inherently intertwined. Therefore, these matters cannot be adequately
discussed in separate forums. At the very least, there should be a continuous
collaboration between the forums to adequately discuss space matters. Second, the
mandates given to COPUOS and the CD create a potential void in the discussion of
space matters internationally. Depending on the favoured definitions of the terms
‘peaceful’, ‘arms’, ‘disarmament’ and ‘aggressive’, the scope of the given mandates
might vary. This can lead to certain ‘non-arms military’ uses of outer space going
without a forum in which they are to be discussed internationally. State practice
strongly indicates that ‘peaceful’ is interpreted as ‘non-aggressive’. In this case, the
void is non-existent or, at the very least, very narrow. However, this should also
mean that ‘non-arms military’ uses of outer space are actively discussed in COPUOS
as they are ‘non-aggressive’ and thus a peaceful use of outer space. A cursory glance
at the actual deliberations in COPUOS indicates that this is not the case. Therefore,
the next chapter will go through the deliberations in COPUOS and the CD to
determine the mandate of the forums as interpreted in practice and to determine
whether the outlined void exists.
106CIA, Definition of Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Document Type: Crest, Document Number:
CIA-RDP66R00638R000100160004-2 Approved for release 28 August 2001 <https://www.cia.
gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP66R00638R000100160004-2.pdf> accessed 29 June
2018, 1–2.
107Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to the Military Use of Outer Space,
With Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’ (2015) 18 Potchefstroom
Electronic Law Journal 488, 497.
108Fabio Tronchetti, ‘Legal Aspects of the Military Uses of Outer Space’ in Frans von der Dunk &
Fabio Tronchetti (eds), Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 339–340 | Steven
Freeland, ‘In Heaven as on Earth? The International Legal Regulation of the Military Use of Outer
Space’ (2011) 8 U.S.-China Law Review 272, 277 | Francis Grimal & Jae Sundaram, ‘The
Incremental Militarization of Outer Space: A Threshold Analysis’ (2018) 17 Chinese Journal of
International Law 45, 46 & 54–55 | Anél Ferreira-Snyman, ‘Selected Legal Challenges Relating to
the Military Use of Outer Space, With Specific Reference to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’
(2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 488, 488–489.
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Chapter 3
The Development of the Mandates
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS)
and the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) and the Collaboration Between
the Forums
Annette Froehlich, Vincent Seffinga, and Ruiyan Qiu
Abstract The respective mandates initially given to the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) leave a
possible gap in the discussion of space matters internationally, especially since the
discussion and deliberation of space matters internationally has evolved since the
establishment of the forums. The purpose of this chapter is to focus on this devel-
opment. In particular, it focuses on the evolution of the mandates of the two forums
from their respective establishment until the present and the relations and collabo-
ration between the forums. To frame the evolution of the discussion of space matters
internationally, this chapter first gives a basic historical background overview. This
overview is not meant to be exhaustive and all-encompassing but is intended to give
a better frame of reference for the analysis that will follow.
The overview discusses the USSR–U.S. cold war and space race, European
integration and space cooperation and the position of the People’s Republic of
China within the UN. Thereafter, it examines the development of the mandate of
COPUOS. This examination shows that just after the establishment of COPUOS,
three interpretations of the mandate existed: first, that all military uses of outer space
should be discussed in the UN disarmament framework and that non-military uses of
outer space should be discussed in COPUOS; second, that ‘arms military’ uses of
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outer space should be discussed in the disarmament framework but that ‘non-arms
military uses’ and non-military uses should be discussed in COPUOS; and third, that
pure disarmament issues should be discussed in the disarmament framework but
that, in addition to the ‘non-arms military uses’ and non-military uses, COPUOS is
also mandated to discuss the limitation of the use of outer space to ensure that it is
used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
During the deliberations on the five UN Space Treaties, these interpretations
seemed to change, with the last interpretation prevailing. This is illustrated by the
inclusion of Article IV OST and statements made by states. Following the adoption
of Resolution S-10/2, however, the diverging interpretations reappeared. In addition,
a fourth interpretation arose that called for close-knit cooperation between COPUOS
and the CD. These four interpretations are still the status quo on the mandate of
COPUOS. This chapter then examines the development of the mandate of the CD
with respect to the discussion of outer space and shows that the CD, just like
COPUOS, discusses ‘non-arms military’ uses of outer space and even exceeds its
mandate by discussing certain peaceful uses of outer space. Lastly, the chapter
reflects on the interaction and collaboration between the two forums, concluding
that such interaction and collaboration is nearly non-existent.
The previous chapter set out the mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at the time of
their respective establishment and has shown that there is a possible void in the
discussion of space matters internationally, depending on the interpretation of the
term ‘peaceful’ in the mandate of COPUOS. Since the establishment of the forums,
the discussion and deliberation of space matters internationally have evolved. The
purpose of this chapter is to focus on this development. In particular, it will focus on
the evolution of the mandate of the two forums from their respective establishment
until the present and the relation and collaboration between the forums.
To frame the evolution of the discussion of space matters internationally, this
chapter shall first give a basic historical background overview (Sect. 3.1). This
overview is not meant to be exhaustive and all-encompassing but meant to give a
better frame of reference for the analysis that will follow. The overview will discuss
the USSR–U.S. cold war and space race, European integration and space cooperation,
and the position of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) within the United Nations
(UN). Thereafter, this chapter shall examine the development of the mandate of
COPUOS (Sect. 3.2) and the mandate of the CD with respect to the discussion of
outer space (Sect. 3.3). The research will examine a 50-year period. Due to the large
number of documents produced in this period, it will not be feasible to examine them
all. Instead, the research will focus on the major resolutions and instruments that have
been discussed by the forums. Therefore, with respect to COPUOS, the research will
examine the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
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Exploration and Use of Outer Space,1 the Five UN Space Treaties2 and the other
major resolutions adopted.3 It will also deal with relevant deliberations and initiatives
that have not (yet) resulted in an instrument, such as the deliberation on the long-term
sustainability of outer space activities (LTS). In contrast, fewer major instruments
were adopted by the CD in the aforementioned time period. Thus, the resolutions,
reports and other documents relevant to the discussion of the prevention of an arms
race in outer space in the CD will be considered, as well as initiatives such as the
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).
Lastly, the chapter will discuss the interaction and collaboration between the two
forums and the evolution of the mandates of COPUOS and the CD to discuss such
issues (Sect. 3.4).
3.1 Historical Background
Discussion of the further development of the mandate of both COPUOS and the CD
cannot be detached from the overall historical political-diplomatic and socio-
economic developments. This paragraph will therefore examine the most important
of these developments to frame the subsequent analysis of the development of the
mandate of COPUOS and the CD. It will not attempt an exhaustive historical recount
but merely a general overview to give a more complete understanding of the
1UNGA Res 1962 (XVIII) ‘Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space’ (13 December 1963) UN Doc A/RES/18/1962.
2Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force
10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205 | Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (adopted 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972) 961 UNTS 187 |
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (adopted 12 November 1974,
entered into force 15 September 1976) 1023 UNTS 15 | Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space (adopted 22 April 1968,
entered into force 3 December 1968) 672 UNTS 119 | Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (adopted 5 December 1979, entered into force 11 July
1984) 1363 UNTS 21.
3UNGA Res 37/92 ‘The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting’ (10 December 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/92 | UNGA
Res 41/65 ‘The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space’ (3 December
1986) UN Doc A/RES/41/65 | UNGA Res 47/68 ‘The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear
Power Sources in Outer Space’ (14 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/68 | UNGA Res 51/122
‘The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and use of Outer Space for the
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing
Countries’ (13 December 1996) UN Doc A/RES/41/122 | UNGA Res 62/101 ‘Recommendations
on Enhancing the Practice of States and International Intergovernmental Organizations in Regis-
tering Space Objects’ (2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/101 | UNCOPUOS, ‘Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (2007) UN Doc A/62/20,
endorsed by UNGA Res 62/217 (22 December 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/217.
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subsequent discussion. Specific topics include the USSR–U.S. Cold War and the
space race, European integration and space cooperation, and the position of the
People’s Republic of China in the UN. These topics illustrate the political-diplomatic
and socio-economic developments of the major spacefaring states from the estab-
lishment of COPUOS and the CD to the present day.
3.1.1 The USSR–U.S. Cold War and Space Race
Much of the discussion of international matters after the Second World War has been
dominated by the tension and conflict between the USSR and the U.S., which
affected nearly every state in the world.4 In essence, the Cold War between the
USSR and the U.S. (or the ‘East’ and the ‘West’) was both a struggle for power
(resulting in an arms race between the two powers and proxy wars in Korea,
Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.) and an ideological struggle between the communist
USSR and the capitalist U.S.5 Although the USSR and the U.S. were allies during
the Second World War, their opposing ideologies quickly turned them into adver-
saries in the closing stages of the war.6 The defeat of Germany and Japan led to a
power vacuum, which was then filled by the USSR and the U.S., with the U.S. in a
stronger position.7
Although both the U.S. and the USSR quickly demobilised,8 Soviet pressure on
Turkey and the Greek Civil War prompted President Truman to state: ‘It must be the
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures (. . .) we must assist free
peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.’9 This statement ushered in
an era of U.S. involvement in global affairs, specifically against communist govern-
ments and regimes, for example in Asia and Latin America. At the same time, the
USSR sought to increase and solidify its own security: domestically, in its satellite
states, and globally.10 Both superpowers interfered and intervened in many conflicts
around the globe, the most well-known being the Korean War, the Vietnam War and
the Afghanistan War.
This tension could be seen throughout discussions on practically all security-
related international matters. In the previous chapter, the example was given of the
4Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (2nd
Edition Routledge 2005) 1.
5Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 41, 51–57.
6Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 37–38.
7Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (2nd
Edition Routledge 2005) 3.
8Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (2nd
Edition Routledge 2005) 3–4.
9John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (The Penguin Press 2005) 73 | John Lamberton
Harper, The Cold War (Oxford University Press 2011) 64.
10Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 49–57.
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Ten-Nation Committee, which collapsed due to the U.S.–USSR power struggle. The
USSR saw the U.S. and Western European position on disarmament as a way for the
‘Western Bloc’ to gain a unilateral military advantage over the USSR and its allies.11
This ultimately led to the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania not
attending the 48th meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee, which signalled the end of
the discussions in the Committee.12
This tension continued until the dissolution of the USSR and realistically still
continues into the present day. It should be noted that the tension between the USSR
and the U.S. varied throughout the Cold War, with moments of extreme tension,
such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, and moments of reduced tension or détente,13 for
example during Khrushchev’s Thaw.14 Correspondingly, the level of tension
between the two superpowers influenced and guided the discussion of international
matters. In general, both states held to their ideological position at moments of
extreme tension, while reduced tension allowed for compromises. In contrast, times
of extreme tension could also serve as such a strong warning that compromises were
made to avoid worst case scenarios. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
fact that the world had been very close to a nuclear war led to progress in the
negotiation and subsequent conclusion of the PTBT.15
This tension naturally also influenced the development of space technology. Both
the first satellite launched into orbit by the USSR, Sputnik 1 in 1957, and the U.S.,
Explorer 1 in 1958, were launched as part of the International Geophysical Year, a
remarkable feat of scientific cooperation during the Cold War.16 However, the fact
that both the USSR and the U.S. now had independent access to outer space resulted
in a competition for supremacy over this new domain.17 This competition, however,
focused heavily on the civilian aspect of space technology.18 That is not to say that
neither the U.S. nor the USSR started developing military space technology (the first
11UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Forty-Seventh Meeting’ (27 June 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.47, 4.
12UN Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament ‘Final Verbatim Record of the
Forty-Eight Meeting’ (28 June 1960) UN Doc TNCD/PV.48, 5.
13Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (John
Hopkins University Press 1997) 274.
14Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 93–95.
15Association for Diplomatic Studies, ‘Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Negotiating the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)’ <https://adst.org/2016/12/negotiating-limited-test-ban-treaty-
ltbt/> accessed 23 June 2018 | Office of the Historian, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962’
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis> accessed 23 June 2018.
16Iina Kohonen, ‘The Space Race and Soviet Utopian Thinking’ (2009) 57 The Sociological
Review 114, 114 | Rip Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy
(Macmillan 1991) 104–122.
17Peter Jankowitsch, ‘The Background and History of Space Law’ in Frans von der Dunk and Fabio
Tronchetti (eds) Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 2–3.
18Peter Jankowitsch, ‘The Background and History of Space Law’ in Frans von der Dunk and Fabio
Tronchetti (eds) Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 3.
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spy satellite was launched within 2 years of Sputnik19), but outer space remained
relatively free of an arms race and the achievements that were celebrated in the early
years were predominantly civilian.
Following the launch of Sputnik 1 and Explorer 1, the USSR was once more
ahead of the U.S. with the Luna 2 and Luna 3 missions, hitting the Moon and
photographing the dark side of the Moon for the first time, respectively. Thereafter,
the U.S. was nearly the first to achieve human spaceflight, but the Freedom 7 mission
that would launch Alan Shepard into a sub-orbital trajectory was postponed and
would only be successfully launched 1 month after Vostok 1.20 Instead, the USSR’s
Vostok 1 mission achieved the next feat in the space race by successfully putting
Yuri Gagarin into orbit around the Earth for a total duration of 108 min. Moreover,
Valentina Tereshkova (Vostok 6) became the first woman in outer space and Alexey
Leonov (Voshkod 2) conducted the first extravehicular activity (spacewalk).21 Both
the USSR and the U.S. achieved further ‘firsts’, such as the first Venus and Mars
fly-by’s, but the aforementioned are some of the most iconic ‘firsts’. Ultimately, the
most iconic feat during the space race was the Apollo 11 mission. Neil Armstrong
and Buzz Aldrin became the first humans to land and walk on the Moon (with
Michael Collins as the third astronaut of the Apollo 11 mission orbiting the Moon).
This accomplishment was seen as the culmination of the space race.
Although many more ‘firsts’ would be achieved after the Moon landing, the
thawing of the Cold War led to a new development in U.S.–USSR space exploration,
namely cooperation. In 1975, they cooperated on the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, or
Soyuz-Apollo, docking an Apollo module and a Soyuz module.22 The finest exam-
ple of cooperation between the two space powers, however, is the International
Space Station (ISS). Originally a cooperation between the U.S., Europe, Japan and
Canada, Russia joined the ISS after the dissolution of the USSR.23 Article 1 of the
ISS Intergovernmental Agreement stipulates the objective of the agreement:
to establish a long-term international cooperative framework among the Partners, on the
basis of genuine partnership, for the detailed design, development, operation, and utilization
of a permanently inhabited civil international Space Station for peaceful purposes, in
accordance with international law. This civil international Space Station will enhance the
scientific, technological, and commercial use of outer space.24
19Hannes Mayer, ‘A Short Chronology of Spaceflight’ in Christian Brünner and Alexander Soucek
(eds) Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law (SpringerWienNewYork 2011) 22.
20Mike Wall, ‘Space Race: Could the U.S. Have Beaten the Soviets into Space?’ (Space.com,
8 April 2011) <https://www.space.com/11336-space-race-united-states-soviets-spaceflight-
50years.html> accessed 6 November 2018.
21James Andrews and Asif Saddiqi (eds), Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet Culture
(University of Pittsburgh Press 2011) 195, 237.
22Edward Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, The Partnership: A NASA History of the Apollo-Soyuz
Test Project (Dover Publications 2010).
23John Krige, Fifty Years of European Cooperation in Space: Building on its Past, ESA shapes the
Future (Beauchesne 2014) 319–338.
24Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of the European
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the
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The ISS thus exemplifies international cooperation between nearly all major
space powers for peaceful purposes. However, it does not mean that all tension
between the U.S. and Russia has dissipated. Apart from the obvious tension in
general international affairs (Crimea, election hacking allegations, etc.), the
U.S. and Russian positions in COPUOS often clash. Russia, for example, heavily
protested the U.S. position on the exploitation of natural resources in outer space and
the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015.25 Therefore,
although the Cold War has ended, tension between the U.S. and Russia still remains,
both in the CD and in COPUOS.
3.1.2 European Integration and Space Cooperation
The Second World War left Europe devastated and divided. Germany and Eastern
Europe in particular had suffered enormous loses in population and destruction of
infrastructure, manufacturing and economy.26 France was faced with its own recon-
struction, and the financial burden of the war had depleted the exchequer of the UK
(as exemplified when the UK could not financially support Turkey during the
Turkish Straits Crisis or the Greek Government in the Greek Civil War).27 The
power vacuum left by the defeat of Germany was filled by the U.S. and the USSR,
both establishing their respective spheres of influence.28 As a result, Europe was
separated by an ‘Iron Curtain’, so called by Winston Churchill,29 with the Warsaw
Pact in the east and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the west.30
Only a few states in Europe, i.e. Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and Ireland,
remained neutral. While the USSR began consolidating Eastern Europe into a
communist bloc, the U.S., concerned about the communist ideology taking hold in
Western Europe, started supporting the reconstruction of the Western European
economies through the Marshall Plan.31
As the Marshall Plan helped the Western European economies recover, the
Western European states started looking towards integrating facets of their
Government of the United States of America Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International
Space Station (adopted 29 January 1998, entered into force 27 March 2001) TIAS 12927.
25U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, H.R.2262—114th Congress
(2015–2016), Public Law No. 114-90.
26Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An International History (2nd
Edition Routledge 2005) 3.
27John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford University Press 2011) 4 | Melvyn Leffler, For
the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union and the Cold War (Hill and Wang 2007)
61 | Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 42–43.
28John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford University Press 2011) 63–81.
29John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford University Press 2011) 60.
30Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 45–47.
31Jeremy Black, The Cold War: A Military History (Bloomsbury 2015) 45–46.
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economies to achieve peaceful cooperation.32 The Schuman Plan (named after
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman) initially focused on applying the same
policy for both the French and German coal and steel sectors but extended an open
invitation to other states to participate in the project. This led to the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which included Germany,
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.33 Another two commu-
nities to further European cooperation and integration were created within the
decade, namely the European Economic Community (EEC), establishing the com-
mon market and harmonising economic policies between member states, and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), dealing with common policies on
nuclear energy.34 These communities were brought under a single administration by
the so-called Merger Treaty in 1967.35
To achieve even further integration of the European states, economically and
monetarily, the European Union (EU) was created through the Maastricht Treaty.36
However, due to continuous enlargement of the membership of the EU, further
changes were needed to the institutions and the framework. This resulted in the
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, which created a new EU, with legal
personality, to replace the communities (with the exception of the EAEC) and the
EU created through the Maastricht Treaty.37 Although the EU has recently been
challenged by the European debt crisis and Brexit, among others, for the time being
European integration remains the status quo and may increase.
Alongside the European integration that would eventually lead to the EU,
European states began collaborating on space science and technology. Following
the launch of Sputnik and the American response thereto, European states
recognised that they were falling behind in the development of such technologies.38
Europe responded by establishing the Groupe d’études européen pour la collabo-
ration dans la domaine des recherches spatiales (GEERS), whose work led to the
establishment of the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO), while the
32Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edition Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 4.
33Athina Zervoyianni, George Argiros and George Agiomirgianakis, European Integration (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2006) 2–3 | Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edition
Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 8.
34Athina Zervoyianni, George Argiros and George Agiomirgianakis, European Integration (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2006) 4 | Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edition
Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 12–16.
35Athina Zervoyianni, George Argiros and George Agiomirgianakis, European Integration (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2006) 5.
36Athina Zervoyianni, George Argiros and George Agiomirgianakis, European Integration (Pal-
grave Macmillan 2006) 7–9 | Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edition
Sweet and Maxwell 2011) 39–42.
37Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edition Sweet and Maxwell 2011)
65–67.
38John Krige, Fifty Years of European Cooperation in Space: Building on its Past, ESA shapes the
Future (Beauchesne 2014) 15.
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European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) was established in parallel
negotiations.39 As the names of the organisations already suggest, ESRO was
responsible for space research and ELDO for launcher development. That these
activities were separated and conducted by separate organisations was for both
financial and political reasons: the costs of launcher development might have cut
into the budget of space research, the costs would have been too high for smaller
states and the launchers could have jeopardised the neutrality of Switzerland and
Sweden.40
Early in the existence of ESRO and ELDO, however, it became clear that a more
coordinated effort was necessary.41 The need for a more coordinated effort led to the
creation of the European Space Agency (ESA).42 This idea of a more coordinated
effort and stronger collaboration found its way into the ESA Convention.43 The
preamble, for example, reiterates an earlier resolution: ‘that the aim would be to
integrate the European national space programmes into a European space
programme as far and as fast as reasonably possible’. This aim is also explicitly
stipulated in Article II ESA Convention, along with the means to achieve the purpose
of ESA:
to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation (emphasis
added) among European states in space research and technology and their space applica-
tions, with a view of their being used for scientific purposes and for the operational space
applications systems.
It is important to note that where the EU is an integration project, ESA is a
cooperation project. This distinction brings a very different dynamic to the organi-
sation and the position of Member States within it. Historically, ESA was created as
an independent institution.44 Interaction between ESA and the EU was thus limited.
The Lisbon Treaty, however, made drastic changes by explicitly specifying EU
39John Krige, Fifty Years of European Cooperation in Space: Building on its Past, ESA shapes the
Future (Beauchesne 2014) 19–21.
40John Krige, Fifty Years of European Cooperation in Space: Building on its Past, ESA shapes the
Future (Beauchesne 2014) 20.
41John Krige, Fifty Years of European Cooperation in Space: Building on its Past, ESA shapes the
Future (Beauchesne 2014) 169 | Thomas Hörber, ‘Chaos or Consolidation? Post-war Space Policy
in Europe’ in Thomas Hörber and Paul Stephenson (eds) European Space Policy: European
Integration and the Final Frontier (Routledge 2016) 27.
42Thomas Hörber, ‘Chaos or Consolidation? Post-war Space Policy in Europe’ in Thomas Hörber
and Paul Stephenson (eds) European Space Policy: European Integration and the Final Frontier
(Routledge 2016) 21–23.
43Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (adopted 30 May 1975, entered
into force 30 October 1980).
44Thomas Hörber, ‘The European Space Agency and the European Union’ in Thomas Hörber and
Paul Stephenson (eds) European Space Policy: European Integration and the Final Frontier
(Routledge 2016) 53–54.
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competency on European space policy.45 Article 189 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union stipulates:
1. To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the imple-
mentation of its policies, the Union shall draw up a European space policy (emphasis
added). To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, support research and technological
development and coordinate the efforts needed (emphasis added) for the exploration
and exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the European
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European space
programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States (emphasis added).
3. The Union shall establish any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency
(emphasis added).46
The emphases added to the article illustrate the extent of the competency of the
EU pertaining to space policy. Although the EU is to draw up a European space
policy through promotion, support and coordination, it is to do so without
harmonisation of laws or regulations of member states. Furthermore, the article
explicitly refers to the relationship with ESA.
Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, EU space policy has been, and still is,
under development, but the distribution of the work and responsibilities remains
uncertain.47 This leaves Europe with two vastly different organisations, ESA as an
intergovernmental organisation and the EU as a supranational organisation involved
in creating and steering European space policy. Although ESA member states have
declared that ESA should not undergo changes to its intergovernmental nature or
approach to space research,48 it remains to be seen how the role of the EU in space
develops. European cooperation in space science and technology naturally will have
had an effect on the position of European states on some issues in COPUOS and the
CD. As the European states have increased their cooperation and pursued common
goals together, their views on issues naturally have become more aligned. The
impact of ESA perhaps might have been minimal and limited to space matters that
fall within the competency of ESA, but Article II(a) ESA Convention stipulates that
ESA implements a long-term European space policy, and Article II(c) ESA Con-
vention stipulates the coordinating function of ESA. The creation of an EU space
policy has an even stronger potential to further align European stances. Although
harmonisation of laws and regulations is excluded in the pursuit of creating a
45Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel, European Union Law (3rd edition Sweet and Maxwell 2011)
420–421.
46Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) OJ C202/1.
47Lucia Marta and Paul Stephenson, ‘Role of the European Commission in Framing European
Space Policy’ in Thomas Hörber and Paul Stephenson (eds) European Space Policy: European
Integration and the Final Frontier (Routledge 2016) 105.
48Lucia Marta and Paul Stephenson, ‘Role of the European Commission in Framing European
Space Policy’ in Thomas Hörber and Paul Stephenson (eds) European Space Policy: European
Integration and the Final Frontier (Routledge 2016) 105.
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European space programme, an EU space policy and a European space programme
will still coordinate the positions taken by EU member states on space matters. The
extent of conformity among EU member states, however, remains to be seen.
3.1.3 The People’s Republic of China’s Position in the UN
The end of the Second World War saw the creation of the UN through the adoption
and ratification of the UN Charter.49 However, during the deliberation on the UN and
UN Charter, China was not a unified state. Rather, both the nationalist and commu-
nist governments claimed authority over China.50 However, the Nationalist govern-
ment led by Chiang Kai-shek had jurisdiction over most of mainland China and
Taiwan and was recognised as the representative for China by the major powers; the
U.S., USSR and UK.51 This led to Article 23 UN Charter stipulating that the
Republic of China (ROC) was one of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council (UNSC). However, the Chinese civil war between the Nationalists
and Communists continued, which culminated in the victory of the Communists and
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, while the ROC
established itself in Taiwan but maintained its claim in mainland China. In the same
year, the prime minister of the PRC, Chou En-lai, sent a telegram to the UN
Secretary-General, demanding that the UN should transfer the Chinese seat on the
UNSC to the PRC ‘according to the principles and spirit of the Charter’.52 This
request did not result in any further action by the UNSC.53 In 1950, Chou En-lai sent
another telegram in which he protested the failure to expel the representative sent by
the Chiang Kai-shek government.54 Subsequently, the first proposal, which was
rejected after deliberation, to reject and expel the Chinese Nationalist representatives
in the UN was proposed by the USSR.55
49Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), see the
preamble, which states: ‘Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assem-
bled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due
form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an
international organization to be known as the United Nations’.
50Adriana Erthal Abdenur, ‘Emerging Powers and the Creation of the UN: Three Ships of Thesus’
(2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 1171, 1174.
51Adriana Erthal Abdenur, ‘Emerging Powers and the Creation of the UN: Three Ships of Thesus’
(2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 1171, 1178–1179.
52Evan Luard, ‘China and the United Nations’ (1971) 47 International Affairs 729, 729.
53Evan Luard, ‘China and the United Nations’ (1971) 47 International Affairs 729, 730.
54Evan Luard, ‘China and the United Nations’ (1971) 47 International Affairs 729, 729.
55Evan Luard, ‘China and the United Nations’ (1971) 47 International Affairs 729, 729.
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In 1961, the UNGA through the adoption of Resolution 1668 (XVI) recognised
China’s representation in the UN as an important issue, which remained to be
solved.56 Despite the establishment of a committee to consider the issue,57 the
ROC maintained the Chinese seat and delivered speeches on behalf of China. For
example, in 1959 during the 1080th meeting of the First Committee, the ROC
stressed that it was imperative to use outer space for peaceful purposes, by making
an analogy to the use of atomic energy.58 Furthermore, the ROC stated that the
primary objective of the UN in outer space was to ensure free and orderly use for
peaceful purposes only and for the benefit of mankind.59 Lastly, the ROC voted in
favour of the establishment of the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.60
It was not until 1971, through the adoption of Resolution 2758 (XXVI),61 that the
PRC was recognised as ‘the only lawful representative of China to the United
Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent
members of the Security Council’ and thus took up the Chinese seat. Resolution
2758 (XXVI) at the same time stipulated the expulsion of ‘the representatives of
Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations
and in all organizations related to it’.62
The year before, the PRC had launched its first satellite, becoming only the fifth
state to successfully demonstrate having independent access to outer space.63 This
event also tremendously increased incentives of the PRC to participate in the
international dialogues and discussion of space matters. Up until that moment, the
PRC had not played an active role in the discussion on space matters because of the
legitimacy issues within the UN and also internal issues within the PRC government
and its relative underdevelopment in the technological field and economy before
1971. The PRC thus did not make any statements in COPUOS (including on its
mandate) until it joined the Committee in 1980.64 In 1980, the PRC made a statement
with the intention of gaining membership of COPUOS. However, COPUOS did not
56UNGA Res 1668 (XVI) (15 December 1961).
57Evan Luard, ‘China and the United Nations’ (1971) 47 International Affairs 729, 731.
58UNGA First Committee (14th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1080th Meeting’ (11 December
1959) UN Doc A/C.1//SR.1080, par. 52.
59UNGA First Committee (14th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1080th Meeting’ (11 December
1959) UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1080, par. 55.
60UNGA ‘Record of the 792nd Plenary Meeting’ UN GAOR 13th Session UN Doc A/PV.792
(13 December 1958), par. 175.
61UNGA Res 2758 (XXVI) (25 October 1971).
62UNGA Res 2758 (XXVI) (25 October 1971).
63Yun Zhao, ‘National Space Legislation in Mainland China’ (2007) 33 Journal of Space Law
427, 427 | UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 18th
Meeting’ (6 November 1980) UN Doc A/SPC/35/SR.18, par. 17.
64UNGA Res 35/16 (3 November 1980) UN Doc A/RES/35/16.
40
take a decision on the matter because it determined that such a decision fell outside
its own mandate; instead, it was to be determined by the UNGA.65 Subsequently, the
PRC transmitted an official letter to the Special Political Committee to request
admission to COPUOS.66 The substantive part of the official letter reads as follows:
I hereby formally communicate to the General Assembly that the Chinese Government
wishes to apply for admission to membership in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space. Your kind co-operation and assistance in this respect would be greatly
appreciated.67
This request was reiterated in the 18th meeting of the Special Political Commit-
tee.68 China’s request was taken up and resulted in a draft resolution entitled
‘Admission of new members to the COPUOS’, which addressed the need to expand
the membership of COPUOS.69 Although the U.S. requested a separate vote on
section II of the Draft because of its negative attitude towards admitting Vietnam into
COPUOS, the U.S. did reiterate its support for the PRC to become a member of
COPUOS.70 The request for a separate vote notwithstanding, draft resolution
A/SPC/35/L.12 was adopted71 and resulted in Resolution 35/16,72 which officially
recognised the PRC as a member of COPUOS.
The deliberations on the membership of the PRC illustrate that by 1980, the
international community had recognised PRC’s space capacity, for example through
the statement of the U.S. that the PRC was an important space power.73 Furthermore,
the position of the PRC was quite exceptional because it was one of the few
developing states that possessed independent access to outer space and had space
capabilities. The following statement made by Argentina illustrates the importance
of having a spacefaring developing state involved in the deliberations in COPUOS:
65UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GAOR 35th Session
Supp 20 UN Doc A/35/20 (1980), 14.
66UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Letter Dated 9 October 1980 from the
Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General
Assembly’ (27 October 1980) UN Doc A/SPC.35/4.
67UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Letter Dated 9 October 1980 from the
Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General
Assembly’ (27 October 1980) UN Doc A/SPC.35/4.
68UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 18th Meeting’
(6 November 1980) UN Doc A/SPC/35/SR.18, par. 17.
69UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 17th Meeting’
(7 November 1980) UN Doc A/SPC/35/SR.17, par. 4.
70UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 19th Meeting’
(10 November 1980) UN Doc A/SPC/35/SR.19, par. 35.
71UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 19th Meeting’
(10 November 1980) UN Doc A/SPC/35/SR.19, par. 33–34.
72UNGA Res 35/16 (3 November 1980) UN Doc A/RES/35/16.
73UNGA Special Political Committee (35th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 19th Meeting’
(10 November 1980) UN Doc A/SPC/35/SR.19, par. 35.
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The developed countries are carrying out approximately 95 per cent of all research and
development, whereas the developing countries, which make up 70 per cent of the world’s
population, have only 5 per cent of the world’s capacity to conduct research and develop-
ment activities and only the tiniest fraction of this small capacity is devoted to space
activities and space applications.74
The enormous disparity between the developed and developing states emphasised
the importance of the inclusion of the PRC in COPUOS.
Since the PRC started its reform policy in 1978, it has experienced strong
economic development. Nowadays, the PRC’s economy ranks as the second largest
economy by nominal GDP and has the largest purchasing power according to the
statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).75 This has also had its ramifi-
cations with respect to the PRC’s space capabilities. In 2003, Shenzhou V was
launched, which made the PRC the third country in the world to have independent
human spaceflight capability.76 Furthermore, the PRC has built its own navigation
satellite system, namely the Beidou Navigation Satellite System.77
The foregoing demonstrates why the PRC historically has had a smaller role in
the discussion of space matters internationally. This smaller role will be reflected in
the smaller number of statements made, and thus included, in the research.
3.2 The Development of the Mandate of Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)
Although Resolution 1348 (XIII) and Resolution 1472 (XIV) defined the mandate of
COPUOS, the subsequent deliberations in COPUOS demonstrate the practical
interpretation of this mandate. They also illustrate the further development and
evolution of the interpretation of that mandate since its initial formulation. Accord-
ingly, this section will examine, chronologically, the instruments discussed in
COPUOS to delineate the evolution of the mandate of COPUOS and the discussions
on the peaceful/military uses of outer space and the disarmament of outer space. By
presenting this evolution, the conclusion of this chapter can delve into the interaction
between COPUOS and the CD, the possible lack thereof and the need therefor.
74UNCOPUOS ‘Verbatim Record of the Two Hundred and Twelfth Meeting’ (14 July 1980) UN
Doc A/AC.105/PV.212, 11.
75IMF, ‘IMF Staff Completes 2018 Article IV Mission to China’ (IMF, 29 May 2018) <https://
www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/05/29/pr18200-imf-staff-completes-2018-article-iv-mission-
to-china> accessed 30 July 2018.
76Zheng Zhongyang, ‘The Origins and Development of China’s Manned Spaceflight Programme’
(2007) 23 Space Policy 167, 170.
77Chunhao Han, Yuanxi Yang, Zhiwu Cai, ‘BeiDou Navigation Satellite System and its Time
Scales’ (2011) 48 Metrologia 213.
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3.2.1 The Development of the Mandate of COPUOS During
the Negotiations of the UN Space Treaties
The development of international space law is usually divided into three distinct
stages: the first stage consisting of non-legally binding resolutions, the second stage
consisting of the development of international space law through the negotiation and
adoption of international treaties and the third stage consisting of a return to
non-legally binding ‘soft law’ resolutions and instruments.78 This paragraph will
discuss the development of the mandates during the second stage but will also
include the negotiation of Resolution 1962 (XVIII). This resolution is included
because it is the first international instrument on principles governing the activities
of states in outer space, and the subsequent treaties are, for a large part, elaborations
of the principles established in this resolution.
3.2.1.1 Resolution 1962 (XVIII): Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space
Immediately following the establishment of COPUOS, discussions on the peaceful
and military uses of outer space resumed. This illustrates that certain military uses
were still discussed in COPUOS despite the fact that the mandate referred to
‘peaceful uses’. One of the primary goals of the Legal Subcommittee was to
‘agree on the fundamental principles and to establish definite rules’ applicable to
the governance of outer space.79 The USSR urgently embraced this task and
suggested that the subcommittee should aim to prepare a declaration of the principles
that should guide states in the exploration and use of outer space and a draft
international agreement on assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehi-
cles,80 which should be conducted ‘in a spirit of mutual understanding’ and ‘would
yield results which would promote international co-operation in the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes’.81 Thus, there was once more a focus on the
phrase ‘peaceful purposes’ without a clear definition. The U.S. clarified its interpre-
tation of the mandate of COPUOS, stating:
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was directly concerned
with international co-operation. That concern was separate from the subject matter of
78Frans von der Dunk, ‘International Space Law’ in Frans von der Dunk and Fabio Tronchetti (eds)
Handbook of Space Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 37–43.
79UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the First Meeting’ (12 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.1, 4.
80UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the First Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.1, 6.
81UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the First Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.1, 7.
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disarmament. Although ensuring that outer space was used solely for peaceful purpose was
bound to involve agreements and measures in the context of disarmament, the Committee
could nevertheless make significant collateral contributions to that end. [The U.S.] had
always supported the principle that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only
– a goal which it believed could be reached only through measures of disarmament
appropriately backed up by verification to ensure compliance (. . .).82
At first glance, the U.S. statement might seem to be inconsistent. First, the
U.S. states that it considers that the discussion on disarmament falls outside the
mandate of COPUOS, but then it recognises that ensuring the use of outer space
exclusively for peaceful purposes requires ‘agreements and measures in the context
of disarmament’. The crux of the statement lies in the third sentence, which in
essence states that the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes can only
be achieved through disarmament, but COPUOS can contribute to achieving that
goal, not in the form of disarmament agreements but in the form of international
cooperation. The statement, however, still leaves ambiguity as to whether other
military uses of outer space fall within the mandate of COPUOS. It does, however,
recognise that the issues are intertwined as it is acknowledged that disarmament is
necessary to ensure that outer space will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Other states were much clearer in their interpretation that military uses are to be
discussed in COPUOS. Italy, for example, posed the question ‘whether or not outer
space should be closed to military use’,83 considering the Legal Subcommittee of
COPUOS as the appropriate forum to discuss the issue. India then answered the
Italian question in the affirmative, stating:
First, it would welcome a declaration by all Powers, and particularly by the two great Powers
concerned, that outer space should be kept free from any military use. (. . .) The ultimate
objective should be the conclusion of a convention aimed at the exclusively peaceful
utilization of outer space for the benefit of man.84
The fact that India raised this issue in COPUOS indicates that it considered
COPUOS the appropriate forum to discuss the military uses of outer space, or rather
the prohibition of any military use of outer space.
Brazil took the complete opposite position. Not only should disarmament be
discussed in the appropriate disarmament forum but so should ‘The use of outer
space for military purposes, the execution of nuclear tests in outer space, and the use
of satellites for reconnaissance purposes’.85 Brazil based this argument on ‘the
82UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the First Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.1, 7.
83UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Second Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.2, 2.
84UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Second Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.2, 4.
85UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.4, 2–3.
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political realities of the time’, further stating that it would be useless ‘to try to prevent
such uses outside a disarmament agreement implemented under effective interna-
tional control’.86 The interpretation that even non-arms military uses of outer space
fell within the competence of the disarmament forums was supported by Australia.
Australia gave the examples of the use of outer space for war propaganda and a
general prohibition on any military use of outer space as issues that fell outside the
mandate of COPUOS.87 Moreover, Australia considered the issue of the military use
of outer space as political rather than legal, which would make the Legal Subcom-
mittee the wrong forum to discuss the issue regardless.88
The statements illustrate the ambiguous nature of the mandate given to COPUOS
and the different interpretations of that mandate. Italy and India clearly interpreted
the mandate to include a discussion of military uses of outer space, whereas Brazil
and Australia regarded the disarmament framework as the appropriate forum to
discuss such uses. The U.S. interpretation seems to favour the latter approach but
is not clear enough to unequivocally put it in that bloc. Nevertheless, military uses of
outer space were substantively discussed in COPUOS, for example, through the
discussion, prompted by the USSR, of high-altitude nuclear tests.89 This is further-
more evident from the USSR draft declaration of the basic principles governing the
activities of states pertaining to the exploration and use of outer space.90 The
inclusion of a prohibition on military uses of outer space in the declaration was
deemed as essential by the USSR, having already put forward such proposals in the
Eighteen-Nation Committee,91 despite the USSR stating:
The United States representative had said realistically that a decision on that matter could be
reached only as part of controlled disarmament. He agreed that prohibition of the use of outer
space for military purposes did not come within the competence of the Sub-Committee,
which should concentrate on other important matters.92
86UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.4, 2–3.
87UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.4, 4–5.
88UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.4, 4–5.
89UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.4, 8–14.
90UNCOPUOS, ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles
Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space’
(10 September 1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/L.2.
91UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7, 4.
92UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7, 4.
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Thus, although the USSR deemed a prohibition on the military uses of outer space
essential, it did agree with the U.S. that such a prohibition should be part of
controlled disarmament and that it did not fall within the mandate of the COPUOS
Legal Subcommittee. The USSR position on the mandate of COPUOS is therefore
hard to gauge, particularly because the earliest USSR drafts included two substantive
provisions on the military uses of outer space—a provision that ‘the use of outer
space for propagating war, national or racial hatred or enmity between nations shall
be prohibited’93 and a provision prohibiting the use of satellites for collecting
intelligence information (spy satellites).94
These paragraphs met strong resistance from the U.S. With respect to paragraph
5, the U.S. referred to a similar principle that had already been agreed upon by the
USSR in the Disarmament Committee but was eventually repudiated by the USSR.95
Therefore, the U.S. felt that it was disingenuous to include the principle in the draft
declaration. The opposition towards paragraph 8 stemmed from the idea that ‘inter-
national law imposed no prohibition on the observation of the earth from outer space,
which was peaceful and did not interfere with other activities on earth or in space’,
adding that ‘indeed any other observation which the USSR might be conducting in
outer space, were peaceful and that Major Titov’s military status and the intent of his
observations were irrelevant’.96 The U.S. thus did not view the collection of infor-
mation from outer space as inherently military. In contrast, the USSR made a
distinction between the military use of Earth observation (EO) and civil use,
asserting that military use, or espionage, was undesirable, while the gathering of
scientific data should be allowed.97
Following the USSR draft declaration, two factions can be discerned. The first
agreed with the U.S. that in addition to the disarmament of outer space, military uses
of outer space should be discussed in the disarmament framework. This faction was
exemplified by statements made by France and Australia. France, for example,
stated:
93UNCOPUOS ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles
Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space’
(10 September 1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/L.2, par. 5.
94UNCOPUOS ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles
Governing the Activities of States Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space’
(10 September 1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/L.2, par. 8.
95UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee) ‘Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7, 8.
96UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7, 9 | Major Titov was the second human to orbit Earth and made
photos of the Earth from outer space. The ‘observations’ referred to by the U.S. are these photos.
The U.S. compared such observations, already conducted by the USSR to observations made by
satellites.
97UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7, 12.
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The reference to war propaganda in principle 5 and the use of satellites for the collection of
intelligence in principle 8 was out of place in such a declaration. Disarmament problems
were outside the competence of the Sub-Committee, whose task – laying the foundations of
the law of outer space – was already vast enough and should not be complicated by the
introduction of extraneous matter.98
This position, also supported by Canada and the United Kingdom,99 thus
interpreted the use of outer space for war propaganda or the collection of intelligence
information as a disarmament problem. Therefore, it was outside the mandate of
COPUOS to deliberate on these issues. Australia voiced support for this position
when considering the mandate of the Legal Subcommittee:
First, however, it was necessary to determine its proper tasks; [Australia] could not agree that
the Sub-Committee’s mandate was comprehensively legislative in the sense that it could deal
with any subject whatever and recommend what the law should be. Other organs were
responsible for considering some aspects of the regime of outer space. The Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee, for example, was dealing with matters of disarmament which
were outside the Sub-Committee’s term of reference (emphasis added). It was proper that
where relevant the Sub-Committee’s decisions should wait on those of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee.
(. . .)
On the other hand, some of the matters dealt with in principles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Soviet
draft declaration seemed to be plainly within the competence of other bodies, such as the
Disarmament Committee. (emphasis added) All four clauses included elements which
required decisions wholly political in character and which could not usefully be considered
by the Sub-Committee until the necessary political decisions had been taken by the appro-
priate organ of the United Nations.100
Australia thus strongly stated that the mandate of COPUOS and its Legal
Subcommittee did not extend to the discussion of disarmament issues. Furthermore,
by explicitly mentioning principles 5 and 8 in the context of the Disarmament
Committee, Australia implied that such uses of outer space fell within the discussion
of the disarmament of outer space.
The second faction, following the USSR interpretation, held that a distinction
should be made between true disarmament issues, which should be discussed in the
disarmament framework, and military uses of outer space that were not disarmament
issues, which should be discussed in COPUOS. The USSR based this interpretation
on the fact that Resolution 1721 (XVI) had recommended the application of general
principles of international law applicable to the exploration and use of outer space.
These principles, however, would need to be supplemented by further principles to
98UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.9, 3.
99UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.9, 7 | UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the
Tenth Meeting’ (21 August 1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.10, 3–4.
100UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Eleventh Meeting’ (21 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.11, 6–7.
3 The Development of the Mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses. . . 47
be discussed in the Legal Subcommittee.101 One of the general principles in Reso-
lution 1721 (XVI) was the applicability of general international law, including the
UN Charter, to outer space. The USSR thus saw it as the task of COPUOS to
elaborate on this principle, including the prohibition of military uses of outer space
as an extension of Article 2(4) UN Charter. This position is exemplified by a
statement made by Romania:
Doubts had been raised as to the Sub-Committee’s competence; it had been suggested that
the prohibition of aggression, for example, was more properly a topic to be discussed in the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Yet it was not impossible that that Committee
would fail to reach any conclusion on the matter. In any event, the ban on aggression did
not come within the context of disarmament; rather it was the subject of a rule of general
international law which was, moreover, enshrined in the United Nations Charter. (empha-
sis added) The Sub-Committee was not expected to frame new rules, but to apply existing
rules to outer space. He could not accept the argument that political and legal aspects should
be separated, and that before the Sub-Committee could act some other body should take a
political decision. The Sub-Committee was composed of acknowledged specialists sitting,
not as experts but as representative of sovereign States, members of the United Nations, and
therefore competent to establish principles of international law.102
The USSR position thus viewed the prohibition on the military use of outer space
not as a disarmament issue but rather as a matter of general international law. This
position was supported not just by the USSR and its Eastern European allies, but also
by Italy. Italy called for a complete ban on the use of outer space for military
purposes because it ‘was a special case needing careful consideration’.103 The
context surrounding this statement and the earlier statements made by Italy indicate
that Italy considered that the discussion on military uses should be included in the
deliberations of COPUOS. The general discussion on the need to adopt a declaration
on principles applicable to outer space activities, or rather the lack of agreement on
these issues specifically, eventually led to the conclusion of the 1962 session of the
Legal Subcommittee.104
Nevertheless, the discussion on whether or not to deny the use of outer space for
observation and photography, and the inclusion of a provision prohibiting war
propaganda, continued in the plenary meeting of COPUOS.105 The USSR held on
to its view that observation and photography had military dimensions and as such
101UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting’ (22 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.14, 2–3.
102UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting’ (22 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.13, 2.
103UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting’ (21 August 1962)
UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.7, 7 & 12.
104UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fifteenth Meeting’ (22 August
1962) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.15.
105UNCOPUOS ‘Verbatim Records of the Eleventh Meeting’ (21 February 1963) UN Doc
A/AC.105/PV.11, 6–7.
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should be prohibited and that war propaganda should be banned.106 At the same
time, the U.S. remained firm in its position. The conflict between the U.S. and USSR
positions, as well as the uncertainty about the USSR position, is exemplified by the
following Canadian statement:
The United States has taken the view, which is close to the view of [Canada], that problems
relating to the disarmament of or the exclusion of arms from outer space should be dealt with
in the eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee. The Soviet Union, however, appears to
believe that certain measures of a disarmament character can be secured through our
Committee. I say only ‘certain measures of disarmament character’ because, when the
issue was raised directly in the Legal Sub-Committee in Geneva, the Soviet delegation
maintained that substantial disarmament measures in outer space were the responsibility of
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.107
Therefore, Canada and the U.S. considered issues such as observation satellites,
high-altitude nuclear tests and war propaganda as having a disarmament character
and thus should be discussed in the disarmament framework.108 This position was
also embraced by France.109 The USSR responded by stating that the USSR draft
declaration did not impede the mandate of the Disarmament Committee; rather, the
contested issues in the draft declaration are included to ensure that peaceful inter-
national cooperation can occur.110 It was the USSR position that such peaceful
international cooperation cannot occur if outer space was misused by carrying out
nuclear tests, disseminating war propaganda and using satellites for espionage. In
essence, the USSR thus stated that disarmament issues belonged in the disarmament
framework but that certain military uses of outer space should be discussed in
COPUOS because they related to the peaceful use of outer space or were a prereq-
uisite for peaceful international cooperation. A further response from the USSR once
more reiterated that the USSR regarded the launch of military satellites (or spy
satellites) as inconsistent with the goal of having peaceful cooperation in the use of
outer space.111
Eventually, COPUOS reported to the General Assembly that with regard to the
work of the Legal Subcommittee, no agreement had been reached in the Legal
106UNCOPUOS ‘Verbatim Records of the Eleventh Meeting’ (21 February 1963) UN Doc
A/AC.105/PV.11, 38–41.
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Subcommittee or the Plenary.112 As a response, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1802
(XVII), which spurred COPUOS on to continue its work on the elaboration of basic
legal principles governing the activities of states in the exploration of outer space, on
liability for space vehicle accidents and on assistance to and return of astronauts and
space vehicles, as well as on other legal problems.113
Between the conclusion of the 1962 session of the Legal Subcommittee and the
start of the 1963 session, strides were made, which were reflected in U.S. opening
statement that it was ready to join in a further formulation of general principles of
space law.114 Although the USSR had submitted a new draft resolution on such
general principles, this draft resolution still contained a prohibition on the use of
outer space for war propaganda and a principle that the use of artificial satellites for
the collection of intelligence information in the territory of a foreign state was
incompatible with the objectives of mankind in its conquest of outer space.115
These issues were kept in the USSR draft because it considered the use of satellites
for telecommunication an effective means to propagating war and thus wanted it
banned in accordance with earlier UNGA resolutions.116
Furthermore, the banning of espionage through satellites was included in the draft
to convey the USSR understanding of norms of international law, maritime law and
air law that already banned espionage activities. According to the USSR, this
prohibition should be extended to outer space because the altitude from which
intelligence observations might be made was immaterial.117
The U.S. responded by submitting its own draft resolution for a declaration on
general legal principles.118 In contrast to the USSR draft, the U.S. draft did not
contain any reference to the banning of military uses of outer space, specific or
general. Likewise, and in accordance with the U.S. perspective, France and Australia
considered the issues of propaganda and information activities outside the mandate
of the Legal Subcommittee.119 The U.S. viewpoint found further support from the
112UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 17th Session
UN Doc A/5181 (27 September 1962), 5.
113UNGA Res 1802 (XVII) (14 December 1962).
114UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Sixteenth Meeting’ (27 June
1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.16, 4.
115UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting’ (27 June
1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.17, 6–7.
116UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting’
(26 April 1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 4.
117UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting’
(26 April 1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 4.
118UNGA First Committee (17th Session) ‘Letter Dated 8 December 1962 from the representative of
the United States of America to the Chairman of the First Committee’ (8 December 1962) UN Doc
A/C.1/881 | UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting’
(27 June 1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, 10.
119UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting’
(26 April 1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.22, 14 | UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Sum-
mary Record of the Twenty-Third Meeting’ (29 April 1963) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.23, 6–7.
50
UK, which agreed that the consideration of peaceful uses of outer space and the
implications of such a concept should be deliberated upon in the Eighteen-Nation
Committee.120 Just as the previous year, the Legal Subcommittee was divided, a
divide that was recognised by Australia:
Paragraph 1 of the United Arab Republic draft code (A/AC.105/L.5), in which it was
provided that the activities of Member States in outer space should be confined to peaceful
uses, had received some support in the Sub-Committee. On the other hand, it had been
commented on adversely by the delegations which held that the question of military
activities in outer space was not within the Sub-Committee’s terms of reference and that
general and complete disarmament was the only way to deal with the question.121
However, not all other members of COPUOS exactly adhered to the U.S. or the
USSR interpretation. Italy, for example, leaned toward the USSR interpretation by
maintaining the position that it had already taken in 1962, namely that all activities of
an aggressive nature in outer space should be banned.122 However, the term ‘aggres-
sive’ is distinct from ‘military’ and only includes uses of outer space that are
aggressive towards another state, such as the threat or the use of force,123 while
‘military’ generally encompasses more uses. Therefore, Italy seems to have put
forward a weakened position on this issue compared to its position in 1962.
This position was also supported by the United Arab Republic (UAR) draft
resolution and statements made by India, which called for a provision or principle
limiting the use of outer space to peaceful purposes.124 India recognised that such a
prohibition was connected to the question of disarmament but also considered it a
necessary step in the development of international space law and a stepping stone to
achieving general and complete disarmament.125 To support its interpretation, India
referred to the stance expressed by the USSR and the U.S. in earlier deliberations on
the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, concluding that the banning
of military uses of outer space and the issue of disarmament were distinct and could
be discussed in parallel.126 A similar view on the discussion of the peaceful uses of
outer space and disarmament was taken by Japan. On the one hand, Japan recognised
that the prohibition of military uses of outer space could only be achieved in the
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framework of controlled disarmament and that such an agreement should be delib-
erated upon in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. On the other, Japan stated that
COPUOS could guide such deliberations by giving guidance on the matter of the
peaceful uses of outer space.127 Finally, this stance, and the interpretation that
COPUOS was mandated to discuss such issues, was also supported by Lebanon,
which stated:
Activities of Member States in outer space should be confined solely to the peaceful uses. In
his opinion, that question was within the terms of reference of the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space and need not be handed over to the disarmament negotiators.128
The end result of the discussion in the Legal Subcommittee, however, was that no
real agreement was achieved and that further deliberations were needed to reach
agreement on the issues.129
Once more, the discussion moved to the Plenary of COPUOS. However, an
important shift occurred between the adoption of the report of the Legal Subcom-
mittee and the start of deliberations in the Plenary because the U.S., the USSR and
the UK adopted the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT). The adoption of this instru-
ment, which was also discussed in COPUOS, allowed for a different atmosphere in
the deliberations of COPUOS.130 Notwithstanding, the USSR initially held its
position on ‘the impermissibility of the use of satellites for collecting intelligence
information, for war propaganda, and for propaganda connected with national and
racial hatred and enmity among peoples’.131 Unsurprisingly, the U.S. did not change
its position either and maintained that such issues should be discussed within the
appropriate disarmament framework. Therefore, the deliberations in the Plenary did
not result in an agreed draft.132
Although neither the Legal Subcommittee nor the Plenary came to a result on a
declaration, continuing contacts and exchanges of views outside COPUOS eventu-
ally led to a draft declaration of legal principles governing the activities of states in
the exploration and use of outer space.133 This draft declaration omitted any refer-
ence to observation through satellites but did refer to war propaganda in a more
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general way in its preamble by making a reference to Resolution 110 (II), which
condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and considered that the aforemen-
tioned resolution is applicable to outer space.134
The USSR addressed the absence of a provision on satellite observation, stating
that there were still unsettled aspects for the law of outer space and that the USSR by
no means considered the draft declaration of legal principles as exhaustive.135 The
USSR was even more explicit with respect to the mandate of COPUOS, stating:
We cannot fail to observe that one group of the comments was directed towards prejudging
the solution of certain problems falling within the ambit of outer space which can and should
be solved within the framework of the problem of general and complete disarmament. As we
have pointed on numerous occasions, the Soviet Union is prepared positively to solve these
matters as well, but it cannot permit of their being divorced from the solution of other matters
connected with them and related to disarmament.136
Following this short discussion in COPUOS, the discussion of the draft declara-
tion proceeded in the First Committee. The inclusion of the preambular provision
that stipulated that Resolution 110 (II)137 on war propaganda was equally applicable
to outer space was specifically mentioned by the USSR in the discussion of the draft
declaration as an important concession.138 In addition, the USSR stated:
The draft declaration did not, and indeed could not, touch the use of outer space for
military purposes. (emphasis added) The Soviet Union had repeatedly declared that it was
prepared to destroy all types of armaments as part of a programme of general and complete
disarmament under strict international control, which would ipso facto solve the problem of
prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes. The USSR could not agree to the
separation of that problem from other disarmament measures directly related to it, such as the
elimination of military bases in foreign territories.139
This statement indicated a reversal of the USSR interpretation of the mandate of
COPUOS. Instead, it favoured the U.S. interpretation to keep the discussion of
military uses of outer space outside of COPUOS and contained within the appropri-
ate disarmament framework. However, it was also in contrast with the jubilation
about the concession on the inclusion of war propaganda in the draft declaration. The
USSR statements thus obfuscated the interpretation of the USSR on the mandate of
COPUOS. Together with the earlier USSR statements, the USSR seems to have kept
its distinction between non-arms military uses, such as war propaganda and satellite
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135UNCOPUOS ‘Verbatim Records of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting’ (22 November 1963) UN Doc
A/AC.105/PV.24, 51–55.
136UNCOPUOS ‘Verbatim Records of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting’ (22 November 1963) UN Doc
A/AC.105/PV.24, 52.
137UNGA Res 110 (II) (3 November 1947) UN Doc A/RES/2/110.
138UNGA First Committee (18th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1342nd Meeting’ (2 December
1963) UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1342, 161.
139UNGA First Committee (18th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 1342nd Meeting’ (2 December
1963) UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1342, 161.
3 The Development of the Mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses. . . 53
observation, and arms military uses of outer space. The former then should be
discussed in COPUOS, while the latter should be discussed in the disarmament
framework.
In contrast, Australia supported a stronger distinction between the mandate of
COPUOS and the disarmament forum or rather a stronger distinction about which
activities fall within the scope of the disarmament framework, namely non-arms
military uses such as espionage. Australia argued that although Resolution 1884
(XVIII) and the PTBT affected the work of COPUOS, it was not for COPUOS to
deal with such issues.140 Instead, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should deal with
those matters, but ‘it was only realistic to recognize that the spheres of interest of the
two Committees did touch upon each other, even if they did not actually overlap’.141
Nevertheless, the statements of other states still demonstrate that neither the
U.S. nor the USSR interpretation had a majority, nor were they the only interpreta-
tions. Austria, for example, stated that the draft declaration should have included a
provision acknowledging or reiterating the resolution on prohibiting the placing of
weapons of mass destruction in outer space.142 This statement indicates that under
Austria’s interpretation, COPUOS would be mandated to discuss military uses of
outer space. The UAR went further, referring to earlier statements of Japan, Leba-
non, India and Brazil, as well as its own draft code, stating that outer space should be
used solely for peaceful purposes similar to the Antarctic Treaty, which prohibited
any measures of a military nature.143 Therefore, the UAR also recognised COPUOS
as the appropriate forum to discuss the military uses of outer space. India echoed this
statement and referred both to confining the use of space to peaceful uses and to the
absence of a reference to Resolution 1884 (XVIII), which called upon states to
refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space.144 With respect to
the mandate, India made the following statement:
Although the question of the peaceful uses of outer space undeniably connected with that of
disarmament and it was sometimes difficult to distinguish peaceful from military uses
(emphasis added), the enunciation of [the principle that activities of states in outer space
should be confined to peaceful uses would constitute a significant step in the development of
the rule of law in outer space.
(. . .)
It had been argued at the seventeenth session by both the United States and the Soviet Union,
first, that [COPUOS] was not competent to deal with the question of reserving outer space
for peaceful uses, which was closely linked with the question of disarmament and therefore a
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matter for exclusive consideration by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament; and secondly, that the adoption of a legal principle relating to the military use
of outer space would be contrary to the accepted policy followed in disarmament negotia-
tions, inasmuch as there would be no provision for verification. [India] could not agree that
[COPUOS] was not competent in the matter, since the Committee had come into being
because of the space powers’ concern to avoid any misuse of outer space.145
This statement summarises the positions of the U.S. and the USSR on the
mandate of COPUOS but also demonstrates that other states had wholly different
positions on this mandate. India argued that because states had already agreed that
the exploration of outer space should be carried out through cooperation, it should be
possible for states to agree to limiting the use of outer space exclusively to peaceful
purposes and to agree to that outside the framework of general and complete
disarmament, pointing out that Resolution 1884 (XVIII) on placing weapons of
mass destruction in outer space had also been adopted without a verification mech-
anism.146 Therefore, after the negotiation of Resolution 1962 (XVIII), which in the
end did not contain any reference to military uses of outer space,147 the various
interpretations can be summarised as reproduced in Table 3.1 (the use of the U.S.,
the USSR and India to refer to the interpretations is a simplification to make a clear
distinction between the different interpretations; of course, there were other states
that also adhered to the various interpretations or variations of those interpretations).
3.2.1.2 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (OST)
Discussions in COPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee continued after the adoption of
Resolution 1962 (XVIII) with the deliberations on a legally binding international
instrument stipulating the principles governing activities conducted in outer space.
Table 3.1 Interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS in 1963
US USSR India
Armed military
uses
Disarmament
framework
Disarmament
framework
Disarmament framework (but
limiting the use for exclusively
peaceful purposes can be done in
COPUOS)
Non-arms
military uses
Disarmament
framework
COPUOS COPUOS
Peaceful uses COPUOS COPUOS COPUOS
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This discussion stemmed from Resolution 1963 (XVIII), which recommended ‘that
consideration should be given to incorporating in international agreement form, in
the future as appropriate, legal principles governing the activities of States in the
exploration and use of outer space’.148
In its opening statement at the Legal Subcommittee, the USSR stated that the
Legal Subcommittee was the only UN body that dealt with the legal problems of
outer space; therefore, it should consider the whole field of the law of outer space.149
The USSR did not specify whether this should include military uses and disarma-
ment or be limited to the field of the law of the peaceful uses of outer space instead.
The focus on the fact that the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee is the only UN body
dealing with legal problems of outer space and that it should consider the whole field
of outer space indicates that it is the former rather than the latter.
The same states that wanted to include the discussion on military uses of outer
space in the deliberations on Resolution 1962 (XVIII) brought up the subject again
in the further discussion on an international agreement dealing with general princi-
ples. Japan stated that the general principles should be expanded as soon as possible
to include the principle that outer space should be used for exclusively peaceful
purposes.150 Likewise, the UAR stated that the use of outer space for military
purposes must be prohibited, adding: ‘It was clearly the Sub-Committee’s duty to
press for the adoption of such a principle by the General Assembly’.151 This position
was further reiterated by Lebanon, which touched upon the necessity of a prohibition
of military activities in outer space as that was the only way, in their eyes, that the
exploration and use of outer space could be carried on for the benefit of mankind.152
When it came to drafting the report of the Legal Subcommittee, these same states
raised their concern when the revised draft made no mention of their statements with
respect to the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes.153 This point was
reiterated by India in the closing of the first part of the session of the Legal
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Subcommittee, stating that a binding declaration that stipulates that outer space
should be used for peaceful purposes only should be adopted.154 Although both
the U.S. and the USSR responded by stating that they were in favour of the use of
outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, both states also asserted that the
discussion on the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes could only
be achieved in the framework of general and complete disarmament and therefore
should be discussed in the appropriate disarmament forum; the Eighteen-Nation
Committee.155
In COPUOS, the deliberations continued, with the prohibition of the military use
of outer space being brought up once more. Austria stated that it strongly favoured
the principle that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.156
According to the Austrian position, the absence of such a provision meant that states
were still de facto free to conduct military uses in outer space, including the
possibility to launch arms into outer space.157 Therefore, Austria’s interpretation
of ‘peaceful’ excluded any military use and any placement of weapons into outer
space. The UAR,158 Japan,159 India160 and Lebanon161 again reiterated their under-
standing of ‘peaceful’. In its statement, Lebanon referred to the Cairo Declaration
from the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned
Countries of 1964, which specifically included a statement on the governance of
outer space and the necessity of an international agreement prohibiting the use of
outer space for military purposes.162 Importantly, Lebanon stated that it fell upon the
Legal Subcommittee to deliberate upon such an international agreement, thereby
implying that the mandate of COPUOS covered military uses, or at least the
prohibition thereof.
The following year, both the Legal Subcommittee and the Plenary had sessions,
but most of the discussions focused on the draft agreements on assistance to and
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return of astronauts and spacecraft and on liability for damage caused by objects
launched into outer space.163 With respect to a draft agreement on legal principles
governing activities in the exploration and use of outer space, the Legal Subcom-
mittee stated that work should start immediately, a recommendation that was
adopted in the Plenary session of COPUOS.164
The same states that had already put forward their position on military uses of
outer space reiterated their position in the First Committee.165 With respect to the
yearly UNGA resolution on international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer
space, Cameroon made the suggestion to amend the resolution to include the
following preambular paragraph: ‘Convinced that to benefit mankind the exploration
and use of outer space should be carried out solely for peaceful purposes.’166 The
U.S. supported this amendment, stating:
The United States had constantly endorsed the principle that outer space should be used for
‘peaceful purposes’. In that context, ‘peaceful’ meant non-aggressive rather than
non-military. The United States space programme had been notable for its predominantly
civilian character but military components and personnel had made indispensable contribu-
tions. There was no practical dividing-line between military and non-military uses of space:
United States and Soviet astronauts had been members of their countries’ armed forces; a
navigation satellite could guide a warship as well as a merchant ship; communication
satellites could serve military establishments as well as civilian communities. The question
of military activities in space could not be divorced from the question of military activities on
Earth. The test of any space activity must therefore be not whether it was military or
non-military but whether it was consistent with the [UN] Charter and other obligations of
international law.167
This statement illustrates the U.S. interpretation of the term ‘peaceful’. However,
the statement seems to contradict itself with respect to the U.S. position on the
mandate of COPUOS. As can be read in the statement, the U.S. considers the
question of military activities in space intertwined with the question of military
activities on Earth, thereby reiterating their position that military activities in space
should be discussed in the disarmament framework. However, stating that peaceful
means non-aggressive rather than non-military also implies that COPUOS has the
mandate to discuss the military but non-aggressive uses of outer space because it has
the mandate to discuss the peaceful uses of outer space. This contravenes the
position taken earlier by the U.S. with respect to the inclusion of provisions on
war propaganda and espionage satellites in the Declaration of Legal Principles. In
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addition, the U.S. asserts that activities in outer space are inherently dual use, which
means that the military and non-military uses of outer space are inherently
intertwined and cannot be discussed in separate forums without any sort of collab-
oration. This statement indicates that the U.S. interpretation shifted more towards the
USSR interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS.
Substantial progress on the Outer Space Treaty was made during the sessions in
1966. The U.S. submitted the announcement of President Lyndon B. Johnson on the
need for a treaty governing the exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies, in
which it was stated that the U.S. wanted to ensure that the exploration of the Moon
and other celestial bodies would be for peaceful purposes only, including a prohi-
bition on stationing weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body, weapon tests
and military manoeuvres.168
Two remarks should be made pertaining to this announcement. First, the
announcement specifically addressed celestial bodies, without mentioning outer
space. Second, the announcement was addressed to the UNGA in general and not
to COPUOS specifically. This means that the treaty envisioned by President Johnson
did not necessarily need to be negotiated by COPUOS. Therefore, no consequences
on the U.S. position on the mandate of COPUOS can be inferred from it. Following
this announcement, the USSR formally sent a request to include an item on the
UNGA agenda on the conclusion of an international agreement on legal principles
governing the activities of states in the exploration and conquest of the Moon and
other celestial bodies.169 This request, which stated that the ‘conquest of celestial
bodies should be carried out in the interests of peace and progress exclusively’ and
that it was necessary ‘to take steps to prohibit the use of the Moon and other celestial
bodies for military purposes’170 also only addressed the Moon and other celestial
bodies; no mention of outer space in general was made. The necessity for such
provisions, and the absence of a reference to outer space in general, was because
military use of celestial bodies (in contrast with the military use of outer space) could
not be justified by national security interests and would only serve the purpose of
aggression.171 Furthermore, the USSR clarified that such a prohibition would both
serve the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and
168UNGA ‘Letter Dated 9 May 1966 from The Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General’ UN GOAR 21st Session UN
Doc A/6327 (10 May 1966).
169UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of an Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Twenty-First Session’ UN GOAR 21st Session UN Doc A/6341
(31 May 1966).
170UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of an Item in the
Provisional Agenda of the Twenty-First Session’ UN GOAR 21st Session UN Doc A/6341
(31 May 1966), 2.
171UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of an Item in the
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serve international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space.172 This
rhetoric resulted in proposing the inclusion of the following principle:
The Moon and other celestial bodies should be used by all states exclusively for peaceful
purposes. No military bases or installations of any kind, including facilities for nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction of any type, should be established on the Moon or other
celestial bodies.173
Once more, the request was addressed to the UNGA as a whole rather than
COPUOS. However, the fact that both the U.S. and the USSR included military
uses of outer space in their respective announcements and requests, knowing that the
treaty would logically be discussed in COPUOS, means that neither was averse to
including military uses of outer space in the deliberations in COPUOS or its sub-
committees. The draft treaties submitted by the U.S. and the USSR support this
conclusion. In the Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies submitted by the U.S., this is exemplified by the following
provision:
Celestial bodies shall be used for peaceful purposes only. All States undertake to refrain from
conducting on celestial bodies any activities such as the establishment of military fortifica-
tions, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, or testing of any type of weapons. The use of
military personnel, facilities or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purpose shall not be prohibited.174
Likewise, the USSR Draft Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
contained the provision:
The Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and not to station such weapons on
celestial bodies or otherwise to station them in outer space. The moon and other celestial
bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes by all Parties to the Treaty. The
establishment of military bases and installations, the testing of weapons and the conduct of
military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.175
Therefore, both the U.S. and USSR drafts affirmed that despite both states having
taken the position in earlier deliberations that the military uses of outer space should
be discussed in the disarmament framework, the U.S. and USSR still included such
discussion, at least in some minimal form, in the deliberations in COPUOS. The
172UNGA ‘Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Request for the Inclusion of an Item in the
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(17 June 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/32, Article 9–10.
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provisions went one step further and even touched on a disarmament issue by stating
that no nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction may be stationed on
celestial bodies or stationed in outer space. Therefore, the U.S. and USSR interpre-
tations of the mandate of COPUOS seem to have shifted towards the interpretation
favoured by India, Lebanon, the UAR, etc., namely that the non-arms military uses
of outer space should be discussed in COPUOS and that COPUOS could at least
discuss limiting the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes, for
example through the prohibition of placing weapons on celestial bodies or in orbit.
Subsequently, these drafts were discussed in the Legal Subcommittee. The
similarity of the two drafts was mentioned, and with respect to the aforementioned
draft provisions, it was specifically stated that the conclusion of an agreement that
would rule out a possible arms race or territorial claim in space would help towards
keeping peace in space.176 The U.S. reiterated its position that the exploration of the
Moon and other celestial bodies should be for peaceful purposes only but added that
the central objective was to ensure that outer space and celestial bodies were used for
peaceful purposes exclusively.177 Unlike in the draft treaty, the U.S. did include
outer space in this statement, thereby broadening the scope of the area that should be
used for peaceful purposes exclusively. However, it should be borne in mind that the
U.S. interpretation of ‘peaceful’ meant non-aggressive and not non-military. Nev-
ertheless, the conclusion is that the U.S. included the discussion of military uses of
outer space in the deliberations in COPUOS, contrary to the position it had taken
previously. Likewise, the USSR clarified its draft treaty reiterating the statements
made when the request was made to include the item on the UNGA agenda,178
namely that the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies should not be used for
military uses and should be in the interest of peace and progress exclusively.179
Considering the earlier statements made by India, it is unsurprising that India
approved of the inclusion of the aforementioned provisions in the U.S. and USSR
draft treaties on the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes.180 Further
176UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Fifty-Seventh Meeting’
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statements made by Austria,181 Japan,182 Czechoslovakia183 and Hungary184 all
indicated an implicit acknowledgment of the mandate of COPUOS to discuss the
military uses of outer space, at least in the context of a treaty governing the activities
of states in outer space. Hungary even went so far as to state that COPUOS was
dealing with the demilitarisation of outer space,185 which would logically fall wholly
within the mandate of the disarmament framework. In a similar manner, the UAR
hoped that the deliberations of the Legal Subcommittee would lead to progress on
disarmament.186 Specifically, the UAR stated:
It was to be regretted that the two drafts provided for the non-militarization of the moon and
other celestial bodies but not for that of outer space.187
Both Hungary and the UAR therefore implied that when it came to the use of
outer space, the mandate of COPUOS extended towards disarmament matters. This
sentiment was echoed by Canada, which even stated that a treaty establishing an
international legal order in outer space would be a welcome addition to arms control
measures.188 Likewise, Argentina put forward that outer space and celestial bodies
should be used solely for peaceful purposes, which included prohibiting the place-
ment of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space, the testing
of any kind of weapons, establishing military fortifications or conducting military
manoeuvres.189 Therefore, Argentina followed an approach towards peaceful uses of
outer space as non-aggressive rather than non-military as it did not touch upon other
military uses of outer space, such as the use of satellites to guide military movements
on Earth, but an approach that allowed military uses of outer space to be discussed in
COPUOS. Similarly, Poland stated that the treaty governing the activities of states in
outer space would limit the arms race, thus seeing it as a means of disarmament.190
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Mexico even went so far as to state that it hoped the treaty would make states
accustomed to general and complete disarmament, which would then first be realised
in outer space and would lead to progress on general and complete disarmament on
Earth.191
The aforementioned statements of a wide array of states, and the fact that no
statements were recorded to the contrary, illustrate that disarmament and military
uses of outer space were discussed in COPUOS despite the fact that states indicated
that they should be discussed in the disarmament framework. Therefore, in contrast
to the formal statements, the actual practical mandate of COPUOS does seem to
include such matters. This is further substantiated through the discussions on the
specific articles that deal with the military uses of outer space, Articles 8 and 9 of the
U.S. draft and Article IV of the USSR draft. In these articles, the U.S. stipulated that
restrictions should be placed on military activities on celestial bodies.192 Likewise,
the USSR stipulated a limitation of the military use of outer space, including the
placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.193 Argentina, Hungary
and India requested the inclusion of the phrase ‘outer space should be used exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes’ in the articles but without questioning or debating the
mandate of COPUOS to discuss these matters.194
Although the Legal Subcommittee did not agree upon a complete text for the
treaty governing activities of states in outer space,195 the deliberations led to the
inclusion of an article in the draft treaty that stipulated the prohibitions to not place
nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, to
not establish military bases and fortifications and to not test any kind of weapons or
conduct military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.196 In addition, the provision
determined that celestial bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
but that the use of military personnel for scientific research or any other peaceful
purposes would be allowed.197
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In contrast with earlier remarks made by various states, the Legal Subcommittee
thus not just discussed military uses of outer space but also deliberated on disarma-
ment matters pertaining to outer space. Therefore, the mandate of COPUOS is wider
than just discussing ‘peaceful uses’ of outer space, especially considering that the
discussion even extended into the demilitarisation of outer space. At the very least,
the deliberations in the Legal Subcommittee support the idea that the term ‘peaceful’
uses includes non-arms military uses of outer space, which should then be discussed
in COPUOS.
The discussion continued when the deliberations on the treaty moved to the
Plenary sessions of COPUOS. Once more, states affirmed the fact that military
uses and disarmament matters could be discussed in COPUOS. As put forward by
the U.S.: ‘It has also been noted (. . .) that important advances can be made in arms
control through the medium of this treaty.’198 France even specifically described the
agreed upon articles as adopting the non-militarisation of outer space.199 Because
there were still a number of provisions on which no agreement could be reached,
neither in the Legal Subcommittee nor in the Plenary, the final report of COPUOS
gave an overview of the articles on which agreement had been found and on the
articles that were still contentious.200 The fact that no agreement had been reached
led the U.S. to request to include the treaty on the agenda of the 21st session of the
UNGA.201 Likewise, the USSR submitted a revised draft treaty for consideration at
the 21st session, taking into consideration the deliberations and consensus reached in
the Legal Subcommittee.202
However, before the treaty could be discussed by the First Committee, consulta-
tions between states had resolved the contentious articles, and a full draft treaty was
presented to the First Committee in a draft resolution supported by 37 states (which
later received support of another six states becoming the Forty-Three-Power draft
resolution).203 In the discussion on the draft treaty, the U.S. once more reiterated that
it dealt with disarmament and the regulation of arms, even referring to a statement by
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President Johnson that the treaty was the ‘most important arms control development
since the limited test ban treaty of 1963’.204 Likewise, the UK stated that Article IV
of the treaty was of great importance to the field of disarmament,205 while Brazil
referred to Article IV as a partial disarmament measure.206 Unsurprisingly, consid-
ering the wide support for the draft resolution, it was adopted without objection.207
Subsequently, the treaty was unanimously adopted by the UNGA.208 Resolution
2222 (XXI) commends the Outer Space Treaty and also stipulates the specific
mandate of COPUOS within the general mandate provided at the establishment of
COPUOS, namely that COPUOS should focus on agreements on liability and on the
rescue and return of astronauts and study questions on the definition of outer space
and the utilisation of outer space and celestial bodies.209
The discussions at every level of the UN framework illustrate that states had no
issue with deliberating on military uses of outer space or outer space disarmament
matters in the context of COPUOS. Therefore, it seems that a shift has occurred
during the negotiations of the OST on the interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS.
The U.S. and the USSR seem to have changed their interpretation and to have sided
with the interpretation favoured by India. The conclusion can then be drawn that this
gives an implicit mandate to COPUOS to discuss military uses of outer space and
outer space disarmament matters. However, such a conclusion would be hasty.
Indeed, the OST was largely negotiated in the Legal Subcommittee and the Plenary,
and it does touch upon military uses of outer space and the disarmament of outer
space as exemplified by the statements made by various states. However, the matter
of preparing a treaty on governing the activities of states in outer space was first
requested to be put on the agenda of the 21st Session of the UNGA. The fact that it
was first requested to be put on the agenda of the UNGA and was only subsequently
added to the agenda of COPUOS could be considered as COPUOS having been
given a special mandate to include a discussion of military uses of outer space and
the disarmament of outer space within the context of an all-encompassing treaty
governing the activities of states in outer space rather than an implicit mandate to
discuss any and all military uses of outer space and the disarmament of outer space at
any time. The further deliberations in COPUOS following the adoption of the OST
will demonstrate whether COPUOS had a special mandate to discuss military uses of
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outer space and outer space disarmament matters in the context of the OST or a
general mandate to discuss these matters in any context.
3.2.1.3 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (ARRA)
Simultaneous with the negotiations on the Declaration of Legal Principles and the
OST, COPUOS deliberated on an international agreement on the rescue and return of
astronauts and space vehicles (ARRA). The earlier deliberations on the ARRA
occurred during the deliberations on Resolution 1962 (XVIII). The interpretations
of the mandate of COPUOS are thus similar to the interpretations shown in the
section on Resolution 1962 (XVIII). Therefore, the USSR draft international agree-
ment on the rescue of astronauts and spaceships making emergency landings
contained a provision that pertains to the peaceful and military uses of outer space,
namely in Article 7:
Space vehicles aboard which devices have been discovered for the collection of intelligence
information in the territory of another State shall not be returned.210
This provision and the fact that the USSR wanted it included in the agreement led
to discussions on the mandate of COPUOS, specifically whether that mandate
extended to discussing such non-aggressive or non-arms military uses of outer
space. Essentially, the gathering of intelligence information, or espionage, is the
best example of a non-aggressive military use of outer space. In contrast, and similar
to the discussions held with respect to the Declaration of Legal Principles, the
U.S. draft proposal on assistance to and return of space vehicles and personnel did
not touch upon the military uses of outer space.211
As was the case with the discussion on the Declaration of Legal Principles, there
were divergent views on the mandate of COPUOS to discuss such issues. Czecho-
slovakia, for example, stated that a spacecraft that was launched for purposes
incompatible with peaceful co-existence and international cooperation would not
deserve the same humanitarian assistance as a spacecraft launched for peaceful
purposes.212 Canada exemplified the difference between the two drafts:
210UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GAOR 17th Session
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There appeared to be only one important difference between the drafts submitted by the
United States and the Soviet Union: Article 7 of the Soviet draft required the launching State
to give advance notice of each launching and placed in a special category space vehicles
engaged in the collection of intelligence.213
Canada further stated that such issues did not fall within the mandate of COPUOS
but ‘within the term of reference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee’.214 Therefore,
Canada took a strong position on the question of whether such matters fell within the
mandate of COPUOS. The UK also commented on Article 7, stating that such an
article could not be adopted by a Legal Subcommittee and should be a top-level
political decision but without asserting where such a decision should be taken, at the
level of COPUOS or in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.215 However, most of the
discussion on the ARRA centred around the form of the agreement—resolution
versus treaty—rather than the substance or whether COPUOS was mandated to
discuss uses of outer space such as espionage. These deliberations aside, neither the
Legal Subcommittee nor the Plenary made much progress on the discussion of the
ARRA, with no agreement emerging on the subject.216
The subsequent year, the USSR draft was unchanged and still contained Article
7, stipulating that those space vehicles that contained devices used for espionage
would not have to be returned.217 However, much of the debate during the 1963
session of the Legal Subcommittee focused on the negotiations on the Declaration of
Legal Principles, and as such the ARRA was discussed minimally. Likewise, much
of the discussion in the Plenary session of COPUOS dealt with the Declaration of
Legal Principles and resulted merely in a ‘rapprochement and clarification of
ideas’.218
Following the adoption of the Declaration of Legal Principles, the attention of
COPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee shifted back to the agreements on interna-
tional liability and on the rescue and return of astronauts and space vehicles. A
renewed proposal on the ARRA by the U.S. was submitted, much more detailed than
their previous draft.219 Nonetheless, the U.S. did not add any provision on altering
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the obligations of rescue and return with respect to space objects used for gathering
intelligence information or espionage. The USSR revised draft had been toned down
compared to the earlier version and had removed the explicit reference to intelli-
gence gathering or espionage. However, the USSR stressed that it still wanted to
impose an exemption on the obligation to return a space vehicle if that space vehicle
was not used for the peaceful exploration of outer space.220 The USSR draft did not
specify which uses would be considered to be peaceful and which uses would not.
The inclusion once more illustrates the split stance that the USSR had on the
mandate of COPUOS. On the one hand, it had made clear statements that military
uses of outer space and disarmament should be discussed in the appropriate disar-
mament forum; on the other, it did include certain military uses of outer space in its
drafts, thereby implying that COPUOS had the mandate to discuss those issues. The
rephrasing of the exemption on returning space vehicles did yield results, making it
more acceptable for other states.221 However, the further proposal made by Canada
and Australia based on the U.S. and USSR draft did not include an exemption on the
obligation to return the space vehicle.222 In the end, the combination of the removal
of the explicit reference to the gathering of intelligence information in the USSR
draft and the proposal submitted by Canada and Australia led to the discussion
drifting away from the use of outer space for military purposes.
The 1965 session of the Legal Subcommittee saw renewed efforts on the conclu-
sion of an international agreement on the assistance to and return of astronauts and
spacecraft. Although the USSR did not refer to gathering intelligence information
specifically, it did highlight that no agreement was found on the obligation to return
foreign spacecraft, stating;
In the opinion of the Soviet delegation and of many others, the contracting parties should be
obligated under the agreement only to return ships and crews launched in accordance with
the principles and objectives of the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles.223
In essence, the USSR thereby proposed that spacecraft not launched for peaceful
purposes and in accordance with the objective of international cooperation should
not be returned. The USSR made this even more explicit in the further discussion of
the draft stating that the limitation on the obligation to return a foreign spacecraft was
essential because otherwise a state would be obligated to fulfil its obligation under
the treaty even when a spacecraft was launched ‘with intentions hostile to its own
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interests’.224 The USSR saw the limitation as necessary because otherwise a state
would be required to return even an unexploded shell to the country that had fired
it.225 The UK, Austria and the U.S., however, pointed out that the USSR principle
would give room to subjective interpretations of one state on whether a spacecraft
was launched in accordance with the Declaration of Legal Principles.226
This same issue was present in the discussion of the obligation to return astro-
nauts. The USSR stated that it thought a state could not be obligated to return crews
of spacecraft launched for hostile purposes.227 The USSR position was elaborated by
Bulgaria’s statement that astronauts conducting military activities could not be
considered ‘envoys of mankind’.228 Nonetheless, the U.S. maintained its position
that the return of such a crew should be unconditional.229 Likewise, France stated
that military personnel should not receive any special advantages but should also not
be excluded from getting the assistance that others would be given.230 In the end, no
agreement was reached on an international agreement on the rescue and return of
astronauts and space vehicles.231 The deliberations show, however, that states had
no objections to discuss at least certain aspects of the military use of outer space in
COPUOS.
Once more, the discussion on the ARRA was interrupted by deliberations on a
different legal instrument (the OST) in the Legal Subcommittee and the Plenary
session of COPUOS. As stated in the section on the OST, the deliberations
pertaining to that instrument included a number of provisions that touched upon
the use of outer space for military purposes and thus the mandate of COPUOS to
discuss such issues. The further deliberations after the adoption of the OST will
illustrate whether this was deliberate, and has ramifications for the mandate of
COPUOS, or such matters were merely discussed in the context of the OST to
have an all-encompassing treaty governing activities in outer space. In addition,
Resolution 2222 (XXI) had specified the mandate of COPUOS for the subsequent
224UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the Forty-Second Meeting’
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year, namely that it should work on the international agreements on liability of states
and on the rescue and return of astronauts and spacecraft and study the question of
the definition of outer space and the utilisation of outer space and celestial bodies.232
With respect to the agreement on the return and rescue of astronauts and space-
craft, the USSR submitted a revised draft that removed any mention of the return of
astronauts and spacecraft altogether and merely focused on the rescue of astro-
nauts,233 while the revised Australian/Canadian proposal did include the return of
astronauts and spacecraft but made no exemption on the obligation to return space-
craft.234 The removal of the obligation to return astronauts and spacecraft led to a lot
of time being spent in the Legal Subcommittee on discussing the scope of the
agreement.235 Differences on the scope of the agreement made it impossible for
COPUOS to come to an agreement. Instead, COPUOS merely expressed the hope
that the Legal Subcommittee would be able to achieve more in its next session.236
This shift in the deliberations resulted in fewer relevant statements. Occasionally,
however, statements were made on the issue, such as that of the Netherlands in the
First Committee:
At the same time, the [Outer Space Treaty] is not a model of perfection and its shortcomings
point to the moral that international instruments of this kind can rarely reverse the course of
events which have already taken place. The best one can do, as is exemplified by the outer
space treaty, is to reconcile the ‘ideal’ with the prevailing ‘hard facts’ of the political and
military situation.
This statement does not directly refer to the perceived mandate of COPUOS.
Rather, it acknowledges the status quo of the use of outer space for military
purposes, namely that such uses were already part of the exploration and use of
outer space and that it would take further agreements to completely prohibit such use
of outer space. Nevertheless, the statement also acknowledges that the OST did
touch upon issues relating to the military use of outer space, which is exemplified by
the sentence ‘to reconcile the ‘ideal’ with the prevailing ‘hard facts’ of the political
and military situation’, without criticising or commenting on a COPUOS-negotiated
treaty stipulating such provisions. Therefore, and as described in the preceding, there
232UNGA Res 2222(XXI) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
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was an implied mandate for COPUOS to discuss such issues, at least when it was
considering the OST.
The stalemate on the ARRA in the Legal Subcommittee permeated into the
Plenary and the First Committee. The discussion in the First Committee led to the
adoption of Resolution 2260(XXII) by the UNGA, which urged COPUOS to
continue its work on the ARRA and the agreement on liability ‘with a sense of
urgency’.237 This resolution led to informal consultations in which further reconcil-
iation was found between the U.S. and the USSR on the provisions that should be
included in the ARRA.238 In turn, this led to a working paper consisting of a draft
agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts and the return of
objects launched into outer space.239 Unlike the previous USSR drafts, this working
paper did not include a reference to intelligence information or even to the need for a
spacecraft to be launched for peaceful purposes or in accordance with the Declara-
tion of Legal Principles or the OST.
However, this did not prevent other states from commenting on certain military
issues. As the preamble of the draft agreement referred to the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space, Japan stated that such a mention should not be hollow and
that the ARRA could not obligate the return of space objects used in violation of
Article IV OST.240 The statement did not lead to any responses by other states and
was not mentioned in the report of the Legal Subcommittee in which the draft
agreement was presented to COPUOS.241 In the end, the ARRA was adopted by
the UNGA without any mention of any use of outer space for military purposes other
than the preambular paragraph ‘wishing to promote international co-operation in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space’.242
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3.2.1.4 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (LIAB)
In the same period that the Declaration of Legal Principles, the OST and the ARRA
were discussed, negotiated and adopted, an agreement on the liability of states for
damage caused by objects launched into outer space was on the agenda of COPUOS.
This agreement was eventually adopted as the Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects (LIAB). For the purposes of this report, i.e. on
the collaboration between and mandate of COPUOS and the CD, the LIAB is of
limited interest. Unlike the aforementioned instruments, even in its earliest drafts243
the LIAB does not touch upon the use of outer space for military purposes. Although
the LIAB is also applicable to military satellites and military space vehicles causing
damage, it did not lead to any discussion on the mandate of COPUOS, nor did it
otherwise have any implications on that mandate. Moreover, because the negotia-
tions happened largely at the same time as the negotiations of the other instruments,
the statements and positions on the mandate of COPUOS and the developments
thereon have been sufficiently illustrated.
3.2.1.5 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space
(REG)
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space (REG), like the
LIAB, does not elucidate the mandate of COPUOS or its interpretation by its
member states. Other than an acknowledgement in the preamble of the drafts of
the REG, submitted by France,244 Canada245 and the U.S.,246 there is no reference to
the peaceful use of outer space or to any military aspect of the use of outer space.
None of the provisions in the draft attempted to make an exception to the obligation
to register military space objects launched into outer space.
Moreover, the drafts also did not specifically mention the registration of military
space objects. This is exemplified in the U.S. draft, which was the most precise in
stipulating the information that needs to be furnished during registration. In Article
IV of that draft, it is stipulated that the general function of the space object needs to
be furnished upon registration. This is similar to the other drafts except that it
243UNCOPUOS ‘United States of America: Draft Proposal on Liability for Space Vehicle Acci-
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72
exhaustively specifies the four possible categories of general function of the space
object: development of space flight techniques and technology, space research and
exploration, practical applications of space based on technology and non-functional
objects.247 The military use of outer space could fall under all of these four
categories, but no explicit mention is made of a military function in general. It is
therefore not surprising that the discussions on the REG did not pertain to the
mandate of COPUOS or the related issue of the peaceful or military use of outer
space or that the final version of the REG did not have any bearing on this matter
either.248 The deliberations on this treaty thus give no insight into the development
of the mandate of COPUOS or the development of the interpretation of the mandate
by the member states of COPUOS.
3.2.1.6 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (MOON)
The deliberations on the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (MOON) began as an extension and development of the
principles contained in the OST, analogous to the ARRA, LIAB and REG. In 1966,
even before the adoption of the OST, the U.S. had proposed a treaty concerning the
governance of the use of the Moon.249 The U.S. proposal regarded the ‘use for
peaceful purposes only’ as an essential element of a treaty governing the use of the
Moon, as well as the prohibition of the placement of weapons of mass destruction,
the establishment of military fortifications, the carrying out of weapons tests and the
carrying out of military manoeuvres.250 However, other deliberations in COPUOS
became more prominent (OST, ARRA, LIAB, REG), and the U.S. proposal shifted
to the background.
In 1969, a renewed proposal came from Poland, elaborating the OST principles
with respect to activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. The Polish draft was
followed by a similar proposal from Argentina (which made a proposal relating to
‘the legal status of substances, resources and products originating from the
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moon’).251 These proposals were combined, and with the addition of France, a
proposal was submitted to include on the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee
‘questions relating to the legal rules which should govern man’s activities on the
moon and other celestial bodies, including the legal regime governing substances
coming from the moon and from other celestial bodies’.252 In 1970, Argentina once
more submitted a proposal focused on governing the use of the natural resources of
the Moon and other celestial bodies.253 However, most of the focus during the ninth
session of COPUOS was on the LIAB, with the MOON receiving little attention.
Furthermore, the Argentinian proposal was fully focused on the use of natural
resources rather than matters related to the military use of outer space.
Instead, these issues once more came into play from the moment the USSR
submitted its draft treaty concerning the Moon.254 Most of the draft is focused on
the specific governance of the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies compared
to the general governance contained in the OST. The USSR draft contains provisions
on, inter alia, the Moon’s environment, non-appropriation of the Moon’s natural
resources and furnishing information on missions to the Moon. However, the draft
also specifically deals with the military use of the Moon. First, Article I reiterates
Article III OST on the applicability of international law and specifically the UN
Charter to the activities conducted on the Moon and in orbit around the Moon.
Moreover, it includes a prohibition on the threat or use of force (Art. 2(4) UN
Charter) explicitly applicable to the Moon, also in relation to the Earth or space
objects.255 Second, Article II reiterates the principles found in Article IV OST,
namely that the Moon shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the prohibi-
tion of the placement of weapons of mass destruction into orbit and the prohibition
on establishing any military bases.256
The drafts submitted by the U.S. in 1966 and by the USSR in 1971 once more
illustrate the willingness of both states to discuss the military use of outer space in
COPUOS or at least the limitation of the military use of outer space. The discussion
of this topic was supported by 10 other states, which in their draft resolution
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emphasised the need to use the Moon exclusively for peaceful purposes and ‘to
prevent the Moon of becoming a scene of international conflict’.257 This draft
resolution was adopted and became UNGA Resolution 2779 (XXVI), which called
for the consideration of a draft treaty concerning the Moon ‘as a matter of
priority’.258
In the discussions in the Legal Subcommittee following the USSR draft, the
USSR emphasised the importance of the two aforementioned provisions, stating that
the use of the Moon should be for only ‘purely peaceful purposes, for the good of all
mankind’.259 Furthermore, various delegations made statements in support of lim-
iting the military uses of outer space. Egypt and Lebanon, for example, discussed a
prohibition of the placement of all weapons on the Moon rather than just weapons of
mass destruction.260 Likewise, the UK commended COPUOS for its efforts and
success in limiting the placement of nuclear weapons in outer space.261 Moreover,
the UK discussed the proposed prohibition on the threat or use of force under Article
I of the USSR draft. Such a prohibition seemed redundant to the UK because the UN
Charter was already deemed applicable to the exploration and use of outer space.
The USSR draft and the subsequent statements thus illustrate the tacit agreement
that COPUOS is the appropriate forum to discuss these issues. This is further
exemplified by the U.S. proposals submitted in the Working Group on the MOON
that discuss Article I and Article II of the USSR draft and by the fact that the
Working Group kept most of the proposed Article I and Article II intact (as Article II
and Article III, respectively).262 The early deliberations on the MOON thus support
the conclusion drawn with respect to the negotiations of the OST: that COPUOS is
mandated to discuss the (limitation of the) military use of outer space. However, the
majority of the discussion on the USSR draft and the subsequent Working Group
draft was focused on the more contentious issues of the exploitation of the natural
resources on the Moon and sharing the benefit of that exploitation and whether the
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treaty should be applicable only to the Moon or to other celestial bodies as well.263
The discussion on these issues continued into the First Committee.264 The continu-
ing difference of opinion on these issues resulted in Resolution 2915 (XXVII)
calling on COPUOS to continue its deliberations on the MOON.265
These two elements are the main reasons why a large part of the negotiations on
the MOON do not give much input on the interpretation on the mandate of
COPUOS: first, because the provisions included in the draft were a repetition of
the provisions already included in the OST. Therefore, states were not opposed to the
inclusion of those provisions as they were merely a repetition, reinforcement and
extension of already existing international obligations. The only exception was the
explicit applicability of the prohibition on the threat or use of force. However, that
prohibition is already included in Article 2(4) UN Charter and therefore already
applicable to outer space through Article III OST. Therefore, the inclusion of that
provision did not lead to a lot of discussion other than whether it was necessary to
make it explicit or whether the reference to the UN Charter was sufficient. This is
exemplified by the Bulgarian draft treaty that included these provisions and even
extends the prohibition on the threat or use of force to any hostile act.266
Second, states were much more focused on the more contentious articles in the
draft on benefit sharing in the exploitation of natural resources, on the scope of the
treaty and on furnishing information before Moon missions. These provisions were
new compared to the OST and had much farther-reaching consequences for states. In
particular, the provision on benefit sharing, which is still heavily discussed today, is
regarded as the key provision that contributed to states not signing and ratifying
the MOON.
The focus of COPUOS during the negotiations of the MOON is exemplified by
statements made by the chairman. In 1977, the chairman stated: ‘The Group had
decided to give priority to the question of natural resources, since many delegations
felt that, if that issue were resolved, it would be easier to reach agreement on the two
remaining issues, namely the scope of the treaty and the information to be furnished
on missions to the moon.’267 Likewise, in 1978, the chairman stated:
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At its eleventh session in 1972, the Sub-Committee had approved the text of a preamble and
21 articles of the draft treaty, including its final clauses. (. . .) At its twelfth sessions the
following year, the Sub-Committee had taken note of the text of six provisions approved by
the Working Group. (. . .) Notwithstanding those substantial achievements, the
Sub-Committee had been unable to reach agreement on three main issues which still
remained unresolved: the scope of the treaty: the information to be furnished on missions
to the moon; and the natural resources of the moon.268
These two statements clearly show that the focus of the negotiations of the
MOON lay not with the mandate of COPUOS or the provisions on the limitation
of military uses of outer space. The second statement in particular illustrates that
states had found some measure of agreement on the other provisions in the draft and
that, since the twelfth session of the Legal Subcommittee in 1973, the three
remaining issues had been the focus of discussion.
In conclusion, the negotiations on the MOON do not show a development in the
interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS or of the interpretation of that mandate by
specific member states of COPUOS. Instead, and similar to the OST, the negotia-
tions illustrate that the member states of COPUOS did not see the mandate of
COPUOS as an obstacle to the inclusion of certain military aspects of the use of
outer space (or rather limiting the military use of outer space). In comparison to the
diverging interpretations on the mandate at the start of the negotiations of the OST,
the interpretations during the negotiations on the MOON appear to be more
harmonised and confirm the conclusion drawn after the adoption of the OST,
i.e. that COPUOS is the appropriate forum to discuss not only non-military uses of
outer space but also those military uses of outer space that are non-aggressive and
even the topic of limiting the use of outer space to ensure the exclusive peaceful use
thereof. In essence, the mandate corresponds to the interpretation given by India (and
a number of other states) in the negotiations of the Declaration of Legal Principles, as
displayed in Table 3.2.
The adoption of the MOON,269 through Resolution 36/68,270 signalled the end of
negotiations and deliberations on legally binding treaties in COPUOS. It also
coincided with the renewed focus on the prevention of an arms race in outer space
Table 3.2 Interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS in 1979
Armed military uses Disarmament framework (but limiting the
use for exclusively peaceful purposes can be
done in COPUOS)
Non-arms military uses COPUOS
Peaceful uses COPUOS
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3 The Development of the Mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses. . . 77
in the disarmament framework through the adoption of Resolution S-10/2.271 The
deliberations on the five UN Space Treaties, and the OST and ARRA in particular,
support the aforementioned interpretation of the mandate. However, the new and
clear mandate, stipulated in Resolution S-10/2, for the CD to discuss the prevention
of an arms race in outer space might have consequences for the interpretation of the
mandate of COPUOS. A clearer mandate to discuss outer space disarmament matters
in the CD might result in states altering their interpretation of the mandate of
COPUOS because another forum has gained competency to deliberate on space
matters. The following paragraph will discuss the major resolutions adopted by
COPUOS to determine whether such a change in the interpretation of the mandate
occurred.
3.2.2 The Development of the Mandate of COPUOS After
the Five Space Treaties
With the adoption of the MOON, a new era in the development of international space
law started, with a shift from binding international treaties to soft law resolutions.272
These resolutions were still the result of extensive deliberations and negotiations in
COPUOS and therefore still developed the mandate of COPUOS. In addition, the
mandate of COPUOS has been developed through the yearly resolutions on the
International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. These yearly reso-
lutions emphasise, reaffirm and note the concerns, interests and matters of impor-
tance to the UNGA and thus the international community. These concerns, interests
and matters can be expressed through the preambular paragraphs, such as those that
recognise the importance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They can
also be expressed through specific recommendations, such as stating which items
COPUOS should consider in its next session. This paragraph will discuss the yearly
resolutions on the International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
and some of the major resolutions adopted that developed the mandate of COPUOS
with respect to the issue of the discussion of military uses.
271UNGA Res S-10/2 ‘Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly’
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3.2.2.1 Resolution 37/92: Principles Governing the Use by States
of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television
Broadcasting (DBS Principles)
Concurrent with the negotiations on the MOON, COPUOS started deliberating on
the need for an international treaty governing the use of direct broadcasting satellites.
One of the earliest drafts of such a treaty was submitted by the USSR in 1972.273
This proposal included two provisions that related to the use of outer space for
military purposes. First, it required the consent of the receiving state before televi-
sion could be broadcasted to that state, which became the most controversial issue
during the negotiations because of the conflict between state sovereignty and the
freedom of information.274 Second, the USSR proposal tried to regulate the content
that could be broadcasted, prohibiting the broadcasting of television that would show
‘war, militarism, Nazism and racial hatred’.275 In a sense, these provisions were the
continuation of the earlier deliberations on the use of satellites for war propaganda
discussed with respect to Resolution 1962 (XVIII) and the OST because they tried to
prohibit the use of direct television broadcasting for propaganda purposes.
In the same year as the USSR draft, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2916
(XXVII), which specifically requested COPUOS to work on legal principles
governing the use of satellites for direct television broadcasting.276 Similar to the
USSR proposal, Resolution 2916 (XXVII) was ‘mindful of the need to prevent the
conversion of direct television broadcasting into a source of international conflict
and of aggravation of the relations among States and to protect the sovereignty of
States from any external interference’.277
Although the USSR proposal did not lead to anything concrete, it was discussed
in the Working Group on Direct Broadcasting Satellites.278 This Working Group
focused its initial efforts on five subjects, namely the applicability of international
law, rights and benefits of states, international cooperation, state responsibility and
the peaceful settlement of disputes.279 The discussion of the work of the Working
Group in the Legal Subcommittee saw several statements on the military use of outer
space. India, for example, stated that broadcasting should not be used for harmful
273Howard Anawalt, ‘Direct television Broadcasting and the Quest for Communication Equality’
(1984) 5 Michigan Journal of International Law 361, 363.
274Howard Anawalt, ‘Direct television Broadcasting and the Quest for Communication Equality’
(1984) 5 Michigan Journal of International Law 361, 363–365.
275Howard Anawalt, ‘Direct television Broadcasting and the Quest for Communication Equality’
(1984) 5 Michigan Journal of International Law 361, 363.
276UNGA Res 2916 (XXVII) (9 November 1972) UN Doc A/RES/2916(XXVII).
277UNGA Res 2916 (XXVII) (9 November 1972) UN Doc A/RES/2916(XXVII), preamble.
278UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Sub-committee on the Work of Its Thirteenth Session
(6 May–31 May 1974)’ (6 June 1975) UN Doc A/AC.105/133, 12.
279UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Sub-committee on the Work of Its Thirteenth Session
(6 May–31 May 1974)’ (6 June 1975) UN Doc A/AC.105/133, 13.
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propaganda.280 Czechoslovakia echoed this sentiment, connecting such a prohibi-
tion with the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and
submitted that the use of direct broadcasting should be coherent with the aim of the
UN to maintain international peace and security.281
While agreement was relatively easily found on other issues, such as state
responsibility and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the issues of prior consent,
state sovereignty and controlling of programme content remained the major focus of
the deliberations on the DBS principles and formed the barrier in achieving consen-
sus.282 The connection between these issues and the use of outer space for military
purposes was accurately stated by Chile:
Radio broadcasting had made it possible to transmit programmes designed to interfere
politically in the affairs of other countries, and direct television broadcasting by satellite
could be an even more powerful weapon for hostile propaganda. Consequently, broadcasts
which did not comply with the prior consent requirement should be considered unlawful and
inadmissible under international law.283
This position was supported by Venezuela, which stressed the importance of state
sovereignty, and identified the danger that unilateral broadcasting could lead to
‘autocratic control of information’ and ‘the use of information for political and
other purposes’ by those states that had broadcasting capabilities.284 This position
was also generally held by the USSR and the developing states because they
perceived the unfettered broadcasting of information into their state as impinging
on their sovereignty and violating the principles of the non-interference in the
international affairs of their state.285
The opposite position, held by mostly Western states, held that no prior consent
was necessary because Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
stipulates the principle of the freedom of expression and information for the indi-
vidual regardless of frontiers.286 Therefore, the prior consent requirement was
280UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Records of the Two Hundred and Eighth to
Two Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Meetings’ (4 October 1974) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.208–225,
53.
281UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Records of the Two Hundred and Eighth to
Two Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Meetings’ (4 October 1974) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.208–225,
54–57.
282UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Sub-committee on the Work of its Fifteenth Session
(3–28 May 1976)’ (28 May 1976) UN Doc A/AC.105/171 Annex II | UNCOPUOS, ‘Report of
the Legal Sub-committee on the Work of its Sixteenth Session (14 March–8 April 1977)’ (11 April
1977) UN Doc A/AC.105/196 Annex II | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space’ UN GOAR 33rd Session Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/33/20 (7 August 1978), 10–11.
283UNCOPUOS (Legal Subcommittee), ‘Summary Record of the 269th Meeting’ (22 March 1977)
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perceived as a violation of the freedom of information because it restricted that
freedom, or as put by the Netherlands:
The paramount importance of the universally recognized right of everyone to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas regardless of frontiers implied that international regulation
imposed no restrictions on such freedom other than those strictly required by technical
constraints. (. . .) it was possible to intensify international co-operation through appropriate
notification and consultations in order to prevent or settle disputes which might arise from
the lawful or unlawful behaviour of a particular State. But freedom of information, regard-
less of frontiers, should remain the governing principle.287
Although the discussion on state sovereignty and the freedom of information is
not directly related to the use of outer space for military purposes, the statements
illustrate how direct broadcasting can be used to achieve certain military goals and
how many states perceived the issues as related. The inclusion of these issues in the
deliberations on the DBS principles was not called into question by other states, nor
were there any statements that COPUOS was not the appropriate forum to discuss
such matters, which corresponds with the general trend observed during the nego-
tiations of the MOON.
This division remained the stumbling block in achieving consensus in COPOUS
on the DBS principles,288 as well as in the deliberations in the Special Political
Committee (SPC) of the UNGA. China, for example, took the position that state
sovereignty was of utmost importance:
International direct television broadcasting by satellites should be carried out on the basis of
such generally accepted principles of international law as respect for the sovereignty of
States, which was an indispensable condition for international co-operation.289
This position was shared by Brazil,290 Hungary,291 Bulgaria292 and the USSR,
among others.293 In contrast, the Netherlands, exemplifying the opposite position,
reiterated that the freedom of information should be the leading principle.294
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Although this discussion was partially related to the use of outer space for
military purposes, it does not inform us on how the mandate of COPUOS was
perceived because the discussion did not focus on this aspect. Other statements were
delivered, however, that did reflect on the mandate of COPUOS. Chile conveyed its
concern that the use of outer space for military purposes was increasing and
supported the idea of supplementing the existing rules on the peaceful use of outer
space, seeing a ‘decisive role’ for COPUOS.295 A similar view was expressed by
Austria, which considered one of the main responsibilities of COPUOS to be ‘to
further the elaboration of fundamental legal principles and norms governing outer
space activities’.296 In connection with the statement that ‘Each of those treaties was
designed to preserve space as a predominantly peaceful environment’,297 Austria
thus acknowledged that COPUOS could discuss legal principles and norms to
restrict the military use of outer space. This interpretation was reinforced when
Austria discussed recent developments in the USSR and the U.S. that indicated a
new phase in space militarisation. Sketching the two possible outcomes, an arms
race and conflict in outer space, or peaceful cooperation in outer space, Austria stated
that COPUOS ‘would have to pay increasing attention to preserving outer space as a
peaceful environment’.298 Sweden supported an Italian proposal that the CD should
develop a protocol to the OST on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.299
Although this seems to indicate that Sweden considered the CD as the appropriate
forum to discuss military uses of outer space, Sweden also stated that COPUOS
should pay proper attention to the question.300 Likewise, Brazil stated that negoti-
ations should be initiated within COPUOS to supplement the OST with a protocol to
‘preserve outer space as an area free from military activities’.301
Other states, such as Romania, the Philippines and the USSR discussed the
militarisation of outer space and efforts to limit the use of outer space for military
purposes without clarifying whether such efforts should be made in COPUOS or the
CD.302 The USSR also submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of
weapons of any kind in outer space but submitted it to the UNGA rather than a
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specific committee.303 This proposal was included in the UNGA agenda and was
allocated to the First Committee.304 Therefore, the discussion on the draft was
perceived to fall within the scope of the disarmament framework. Apart from the
USSR proposal being discussed in the First Committee, however, no state explicitly
stated that efforts to limit the use of outer space for military purposes should be
discussed outside COPUOS. The general consensus thus still seemed to be in favour
of discussing certain military uses of outer space and, in particular, limitation of the
military use of outer space in COPUOS.
The conflict between state sovereignty and the freedom of information was
resolved in 1982 through a duty to notify and consult with the receiving state. The
final result of the negotiations, Resolution 37/92, indicates that the commercial use
of Earth satellites for direct television broadcasting was one of the reasons for
adopting the principles and also referred to the potential of the technology to ‘have
significant international political, economic, social and cultural implications’.305
Furthermore, and in accordance with the negotiations, the resolution referred to
certain concepts that are typically perceived to fall within the military sphere, namely
the principle of non-intervention, Principle A(1), and maintaining international
peace and security, Principle A(3).
3.2.2.2 Resolution 41/65: Principles Relating to Remote Sensing
of the Earth from Space (RS Principles)
Although the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space
(RS Principles) were adopted 4 years later, the discussion on legal principles
pertaining to the remote sensing of the Earth, and in particular to the remote sensing
of natural resources on Earth, began at the same time as the discussion on the DBS
principles. In 1969, the UNGA adopted the first resolution pertaining to remote
sensing.306 Substantial discussion of the issue in the Legal Subcommittee started in
earnest in 1974,307 after Resolution 3182 (XXVIII) recommended the Legal Sub-
committee to consider the legal aspects of remote sensing.308 Working Group III,
responsible for the work on the principles on remote sensing, rather quickly
303UNGA ‘Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the Agenda of the Thirty-Sixth
Session: Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in
Outer Space’ UN GAOR 36th Session UN Doc A/36/192 (20 August 1981).
304UNGA Special Political Committee (36th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 17th Meeting’
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305UNGA Res 37/92 ‘Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting’ (10 December 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/92.
306UNGA Res 2600 (XXIV) (16 December 1969) UN Doc A/RES/2600 (XXIV).
307UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 29th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/9620 (1974), 5.
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established certain common elements.309 Furthermore, a great number of potential
legal issues were discussed in the Working Group.
To a large extent, these topics mirrored the issues discussed with respect to the
DBS principles. In particular, the subject of prior consent of the sensed state came
up, echoing the discussion on the prior consent of the broadcast receiving state. Once
more, a large part of the discussion focused on the conflict between the concepts of
state sovereignty and freedom of information. Similar to the deliberations on the
DBS principles, this issue was partially connected with the use of outer space for
military purposes. Moreover, the positions on this issue followed the same split as
with the DBS principles: the USSR, Eastern European states and developing states
arguing that state sovereignty should have priority and the Western states arguing
that freedom of information should be the leading principle.310 Most relevant for this
research, however, is the discussion on the scope of the principles and prohibition of
the use of remote sensing data to the detriment of the interests of the sensed state.311
These topics are the most relevant for this research because the discussion on the
scope of the principles gives an indication of the topics that COPUOS can and
cannot deliberate on, and the prohibition of the use of the data to the detriment of the
interests of the sensed state can include military use.
The subsequent elaboration of the common principles addressed the scope of the
principles by tentatively adding the phrase ‘of the natural resources of the earth and
its environment’, thus indicating that the scope of the principles was limited to such
remote sensing and excluded the military use of remote sensing (among others).312
The limitation of the scope of the principles also had ramifications for the prohibition
of the use of remote sensing data to the detriment of the interests of the sensed state.
The scope already excluded the applicability of the principles to military remote
sensing and therefore limited the applicability of the prohibition. The inclusion of
this narrow scope in the principles, however, also reduced the relevance of the
principles, and the discussion on these principles, to the development of the mandate
of COPUOS because the scope put the principles clearly within the mandate of
COPUOS. Neither the RS principles nor other discussions in COPUOS around this
time had any bearing on the mandate of COPUOS, at least not with respect to the
boundary between the mandate of COPUOS and the mandate of the CD.
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Looking ahead, the same can be said for the major resolutions adopted after the
RS principles. Resolution 47/68 stipulates the Principles Relevant to the Use of
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space that do not pertain to the military use of outer
space or the mandate of COPUOS.313 Resolution 51/122, the Declaration on Inter-
national Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and
in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing
Countries, supplements the existing treaties and the concept of international coop-
eration within those treaties.314 Likewise, Resolution 59/115 on the application of
the concept of the launching state,315 Resolution 62/101 stipulating recommenda-
tions on enhancing registration practice,316 Resolution 68/74 stipulating recommen-
dations on national space legislation317 and Resolution 62/217 endorsing the Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines318 encompass recommendations, guidelines and prin-
ciples that enhance the existing treaties. They do not, however, consider the military
use of outer space or limit the military use of outer space. Therefore, these resolu-
tions do not inform the mandate of COPUOS because it is clear that the subject
matter falls fully within the scope of COPUOS and does not concern the border
between the mandate of COPUOS and the CD.
Accordingly, it will be necessary to turn to other documents to establish the
development of the mandate of COPUOS. The documents that will be examined are
the yearly UNGA resolutions on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of
outer space, including the mandate specified in those resolutions, and the delibera-
tions in the SPC (and later on the Fourth Committee).
3.2.2.3 COPUOS Mandate After the Addition of the ‘Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space’ to the CD Agenda
Following the adoption of the DBS principles, the UNGA decided that COPUOS,
apart from considering scientific and technical issues, should focus on the legal
313UNGA Res 47/68 ‘Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space’
(14 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/68.
314UNGA Res 51/122 ‘Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
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315UNGA Res 59/115 ‘Application of the concept of the “Launching State”’ (10 December 2004)
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Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects’ (17 December 2007) UN Doc
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317UNGA Res 68/76 ‘Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Explo-
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318UNGA Res 62/217 ‘International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’
(22 December 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/217 | The guidelines are stipulated in: UNGA ‘Report
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aspects of remote sensing, the legal norms applicable to the use of nuclear power
sources and matters relating to the definition and/or delimitation of outer space and
outer space activities.319 These issues are not relevant to the question whether
COPUOS is mandated to discuss the military use of outer space because they clearly
fall within the mandate of COPUOS and are not related to the disarmament of outer
space. Therefore, these issues do not affect or challenge the mandate of COPUOS
(as it relates to the military use of outer space).
In the SPC, however, the potential militarisation of outer space was discussed. It
was recalled that COPUOS itself had already urged states to contribute to the
prevention of an arms race in outer space.320 Chile affirmed this by considering
COPUOS the appropriate forum to consider the elaboration of the OST to curtail the
use of outer space for military purposes.321 Likewise, the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) considered COPUOS the appropriate forum to discuss and prepare
agreements on the prevention of the militarisation of outer space.322 Perhaps most
clear was the USSR, which stated:
COPUOS should continue its useful work in that field and should consider, as a matter of
priority, effective measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space.323
The USSR took this position because it perceived the disarmament framework as
too political and prone to ‘sabotage’. This interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS
was contradicted by the U.S., which accused the USSR of trying to block consensus
on giving to the CD the mandate to discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer
space.324 Moreover, the U.S. saw it as inconsistent that the USSR submitted a draft
treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space to the First Committee
(charged with disarmament) but then regarded COPUOS as the appropriate forum to
discuss such issues.325 Finally, the U.S. argued that including the prevention of an
arms race in outer space in the agenda of COPUOS would gridlock a forum that had
been historically productive.326 In essence, the U.S. thus saw the disarmament
framework as the only appropriate forum to discuss the militarisation of outer
319UNGA Res 37/89 (10 December 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/89.
320UNGA Special Political Committee (38th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 18th Meeting’
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(8 November 1983) UN Doc A/SPC/38/SR.19, 3.
322UNGA Special Political Committee (38th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 19th Meeting’
(8 November 1983) UN Doc A/SPC/38/SR.19, 10–11.
323UNGA Special Political Committee (38th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 21st Meeting’
(11 November 1983) UN Doc A/SPC/38/SR.21, 8.
324UNGA Special Political Committee (38th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 21st Meeting’
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space. This interpretation was even more clearly visible in the following Swedish
statement:
At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly had requested that the Committee on
Disarmament should take action to prevent an arms race in outer space. The Committee on
Disarmament was indeed the proper forum for the negotiation of agreements to that end, and
the process should begin without delay.327
In contrast to these two views that gave the issue to either COPUOS or the CD,
Brazil proposed a joint effort between the two:
A number of proposals had been made recently by France, Italy and the Soviet Union in
connection with the Outer Space Treaty or with regard to the prevention of an arms race in
outer space. COPUOS was the competent United Nations body to consider ways of filling in
the gaps in international legislation concerning outer space. (. . .)
That did not imply that the negotiation of specific instruments relating to disarmament in
outer space should be done in isolation from the Committee on Disarmament, which was the
main multilateral negotiating body for questions of disarmament. The work of the two
bodies should complement each other.328
The inclusion of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the CD agenda
thus resulted in states changing their interpretation or reverting to their previous
interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS. Therefore, compared to the mandate
identified during the negotiations of the UN space treaties, diverging interpretations
of the mandate of COPUOS reappeared. This question was not resolved through
Resolution 38/80, which obfuscated the matter by requesting COPUOS to consider
questions relating to the militarisation of outer space while taking into account that
the CD had been requested to consider the question of preventing an arms race in
outer space and the need to coordinate efforts between COPUOS and the CD.329
This resolution can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be taken as confirming
all three of the aforementioned interpretations simultaneously because no consensus
on the question exists, so the only way to address it in an UNGA resolution is to
acknowledge all diverging interpretations. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a
division of mandate between COPUOS and the CD. The paragraph is clear that the
CD has the mandate to discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer space. By
requesting that COPUOS considers questions relating to the militarisation of outer
space, while clearly acknowledging the mandate of the CD, it is implied that
COPUOS thus has the mandate to discuss other questions relating to the
militarisation of outer space outside the prevention of an arms race.
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Regardless, Resolution 38/80 did not solve the divergence in opinion on where to
deliberate upon the questions relating to the militarisation of outer space, and
managed to lead it back to COPUOS, where it ‘overshadow[ed] the entire twenty-
seventh session’.330 It has been illustrated that the inclusion of questions on the
militarisation of outer space had become part of the discussions in COPUOS during
the negotiations of the space treaties. Nevertheless, the renewed effort to have an
effective disarmament forum and the inclusion of the prevention of an arms race in
outer space in the agenda of that forum made the mandate of COPUOS a point of
debate again. The then Chairman of COPUOS, Mr. Jankowitsch, clearly stated:
Although most members shared concern regarding the prospect of the militarisation of outer
space, there was no common ground as to the more specific role of the Committee in that
regard. There had been very strong disagreement on the mandate of COPUOS in that crucial
area of international relations.331
In general, the different approaches to the mandate of COPUOS and the CD can
thus be divided into three groups: first, the Western group, which regarded the CD as
the appropriate forum to discuss questions relating to the militarisation of outer
space332; second, the USSR, its aligned states and a number of non-aligned states,
which considered COPUOS as the appropriate forum to discuss such questions333;
and, third, some non-aligned states, which deemed it necessary that such questions
be dealt with in a cooperative manner.334 This division is a generalisation to illustrate
the three approaches, as both the division of views and the groups are not absolute.
330UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 39th Meeting’
(28 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.39, 4.
331UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 39th Meeting’
(28 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.39, 4.
332Exemplified by Sweden: ‘The militarization of outer space must be considered in the general
context of disarmament. His country firmly supported General Assembly resolution 38/70, which
reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating
forum, had a primary role in the negotiation of an agreement on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space.’ in UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 42nd
Meeting’ (30 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.42, 10 | U.S. in UNGA Special Political
Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 42nd Meeting’ (30 November 1984) UN Doc
A/SPC/39/SR.42, 9.
333Exemplified by a statement made by Vietnam: ‘Viet Nam shared the view that COPUOS was
competent to consider questions relating to the militarization of outer space and felt that it should
be given a more specific mandate in that regard. The prevention of the militarisation of outer space
and the peaceful uses of outer space were closely connected.’ in UNGA Special Political Commit-
tee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 40th Meeting’ (29 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/
SR.40, 4 | Czechoslovakia in UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record
of the 41st Meeting’ (29 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.41, 8 | Poland in UNGA Special
Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 42nd Meeting’ (30 November 1984)
UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.42, 3 | USSR in UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Sum-
mary Record of the 42nd Meeting’ (30 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.42, 13.
334Exemplified by the earlier statement by Brazil, but also by Austria: ‘Although COPUOS was not
a suitable forum for arms control negotiations, it could eventually make a practical contribution to
the prevention of an arms race in outer space by supporting negotiations carried out in other
88
The USSR, for example, suggested that the CD ‘could take up the questions of a
material nature and COPUOS could examine the question of political and legal
obligations’.335 Although the weight of the questions would then lie with COPUOS,
there would be a role for the CD in the practical execution of the political and legal
obligations.
Following the contentious Resolution 38/80, the yearly resolutions on interna-
tional cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space adopted a more neutral
phrasing on the questions of the militarisation of outer space, namely to consider
‘ways and means of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes’.336 This is a
softening compared to the request to discuss questions relating to the militarisation
of outer space and matches better with the initial mandate of COPUOS to consider
questions on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. It did not, however,
change the division in the interpretation of the mandate.337
In essence, the interpretations of the mandate of COPUOS in the early days of
COPUOS reappeared. The USSR argued that COPUOS was the appropriate forum
to discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer space because outer space had not
yet become an arena of such an arms race.338 It considered international cooperation
in the peaceful use of outer space as closely associated with attainment of the
non-militarisation of outer space. In contrast, the Western states considered the
prevention of an arms race in outer space a disarmament issue but acknowledged
that certain other military uses of outer space were distinct from that issue:
Most satellites launched hitherto had had military purposes but outer space had remained
free from armed conflicts. With the development of specific weapons systems intended for
use in outer space, that situation might well be changing.339
forums.’ in UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 41st
Meeting’ (29 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.41, 4.
335UNGA Special Political Committee (39th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 42nd Meeting’
(30 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/SR.42, 13.
336UNGA Res 39/96 (14 December 1984) UN Doc A/RES/39/96 | UNGA Res 40/162
(16 December 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/162 | UNGA Res 41/64 (3 December 1986) UN Doc
A/RES/41/64 | UNGA Res 42/68 (2 December 1987) UN Doc A/RES/42/68 | UNGA Res 43/56
(6 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/56 | UNGA Res 44/46 (8 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/
44/46.
337UNGA Special Political Committee (40th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 38th Meeting’
(22 November 1985) UN Doc A/SPC/40/SR.38, 3.
338UNGA Special Political Committee (40th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 40th Meeting’
(25 November 1985) UN Doc A/SPC/40/SR.40, 4.
339UNGA Special Political Committee (40th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 37th Meeting’
(22 November 1985) UN Doc A/SPC/40/SR.37, 5 | Also supported by Australia: ‘It was
Australia’s belief that the military use of satellites did not necessarily run counter to the goal of
preserving outer space for peaceful purposes’ in UNGA Special Political Committee (40th Session)
‘Summary Record of the 40th Meeting’ (25 November 1985) UN Doc A/SPC/40/SR.40, 2.
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This is thus a return to the interpretation that there are non-arms military uses
(which are peaceful/non-aggressive) and arms military uses (which are
non-peaceful/aggressive).
Through the discussions in COPUOS and the SPC, however, progress was made
to better define the mandate of COPUOS. By 1989, COPUOS had ‘concluded that
through its work in scientific, technical, and legal fields it had an important role to
play in that area [meaning ways and means of maintaining outer space for peaceful
purposes]’.340 Furthermore, COPUOS concluded that it should focus on the peaceful
applications of the achievements of space technology.341 For all intents and pur-
poses, COPUOS thus chose the approach favoured by the Western states. This
means that it would focus on the peaceful applications of space technology (which
in the non-aggressive interpretation can still be military as long as it is non-arms) and
would support maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes through its work but
would not focus on disarmament issues. Nevertheless, certain delegations, such as
Kenya,342 still saw COPUOS as the appropriate forum to discuss the disarmament of
outer space. The adoption of Resolution 44/112, however, strongly indicates that a
choice in the mandate had been made because in paragraph 5, it states:
Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or
agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its
aspects.343
This does not solve the issue of the mandate pertaining to the non-arms military
uses of outer space but does reveal that at least the arms military uses of outer space
fall outside the mandate of COPUOS, even the limitation of such uses.
Following Resolution 44/112, an obvious change in general international rela-
tions occurred through the end of the Cold War and the subsequent thawing of
relations between the West and the East. While the yearly resolutions in the 1990s
continued to request COPUOS to consider ‘ways and means to maintaining outer
space for peaceful purposes’,344 the discussion on the mandate of COPUOS
340UNGA Special Political Committee (44th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 19th Meeting’
(27 November 1989) UN Doc A/SPC/44/SR.19, 9.
341UNGA Special Political Committee (44th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 19th Meeting’
(27 November 1989) UN Doc A/SPC/44/SR.19, 9.
342UNGA Special Political Committee (44th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 21st Meeting’
(1 December 1989) UN Doc A/SPC/44/SR.21, 2.
343UNGA Res 44/112 (15 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/112.
344UNGA Res 45/72 (11 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/72 | UNGA Res 46/65 (9 December
1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/65 | UNGA Res 47/68 (14 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/68 |
UNGA Res 48/39 (10 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/39 | UNGA Res 49/34 (9 December
1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/34 | UNGA Res 50/27 (6 December 1995) UN Doc A/RES/50/27 |
UNGA Res 51/123 (13 December 1996) UN Doc A/RES/51/123 | UNGA Res 52/56 (10 December
1997) UN Doc A/RES/52/56 | UNGA Res 53/45 (3 December 1998) UN Doc A/RES/53/45 |
UNGA Res 54/67 (6 December 1999) UN Doc A/RES/54/67.
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subsided. It was acknowledged that such a dispute still existed, but certain states
expressed their perspective that Resolution 44/112 had solved the dispute.345
However, a further shift occurred in the late nineties. On multiple occasions, the
U.S. stated that COPUOS was mandated to exclusively deliberate on peaceful uses
of outer space, which excluded non-arms military uses of outer space:
While other United Nations organs, including the First Committee, held mandates to
consider the military uses of outer space, COPUOS offered a forum focused exclusively
on promoting the cooperative achievement of benefits from space exploration.346
In light of the conclusions drawn in the preceding, the U.S. thus tried to narrow
down the mandate of COPUOS. A general understanding had appeared during the
negotiations of the space treaties that COPUOS was mandated to discuss the
non-arms military uses of outer space, an understanding that had been supported
by the U.S. The factual situation, however, seemed quite different. A Chinese
statement recounted that COPUOS had discussed, as per its mandate, ways and
means of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes. During those discussions
‘the question of the prevention of militarization and of the arms race in outer space
had received great attention’.347 Accordingly, China concluded that COPUOS
should continue to devote time to these questions.348
The yearly UNGA resolutions on the international cooperation on the peaceful
uses of outer space in the 2000s kept the phrasing ‘ways and means of maintaining
outer space for peaceful purposes’.349 In general, discussion on the subject was
infrequent. Pakistan, for example, stated that the issue of the prevention of the
weaponisation of outer space lay within the scope of COPUOS350 but later argued
that the CD and COPUOS should cooperate on the issue.351 Malaysia likewise
345UNGA Fourth Committee (49th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 20th Meeting’ (2 December
1994) UN Doc A/C.4/49/SR.20, 2.
346UNGA Fourth Committee (54th Session) ‘Summary Records of the 15th Meeting’ (17 December
1999) UN Doc A/C.4/54/SR.15, 4 | A similar statement was made the year prior in UNGA Fourth
Committee (53rd Session) ‘Summary Records of the 11th Meeting’ (12 November 1998) UN Doc
A/C.4/53/SR.11, 3.
347UNGA Fourth Committee (55th Session) ‘Summary Records of the 12th Meeting’ (21 March
2001) UN Doc A/C.4/55/SR.12, 5.
348UNGA Fourth Committee (55th Session) ‘Summary Records of the 12th Meeting’ (21 March
2001) UN Doc A/C.4/55/SR.12, 6.
349UNGA Res 55/122 (8 December 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/122 | UNGA Res 56/51
(10 December 2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/51 | UNGA Res 57/116 (11 December 2002) UN Doc
A/RES/57/116 | UNGA Res 58/89 (9 December 2003) UN Doc A/RES/58/89 | UNGA Res 59/116
(10 December 2004) UN Doc A/RES/59/116 | UNGA Res 60/99 (8 December 2005) UN Doc
A/RES/60/99 | UNGA Res 61/111 (14 December 2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/111 | UNGA Res
62/217 (22 December 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/217 | UNGA Res 63/90 (5 December 2008) UN
Doc A/RES/63/90 | UNGA Res 64/86 (10 December 2009) UN Doc A/RES/64/86.
350UN Fourth Committee (59th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 8th Meeting’ (11 November 2004)
UN Doc A/C.4/59/SR.8, 9.
351UN Fourth Committee (64th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 13th Meeting’ (24 December
2009) UN Doc A/C.4/64/SR.13, 7.
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expressed that such coordination efforts should take place.352 China acknowledged
the problem of the militarisation of outer space but did not expand on the mandate
issue.353 Finally, Russia drew attention to the Russian/Chinese draft treaty on the
prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT) and alluded that such
issues should also be discussed in COPUOS but did not make an explicit statement
to that effect.354
The enduring discussion,355 with priority, on ways and means of maintaining
outer space for peaceful purposes most recently underwent a change in 2014. The
discussion under the item shows the continued presence of previous positions. First,
COPUOS should not consider disarmament in, or the weaponisation of, outer
space.356 The second perspective held that COPUOS should deal with certain
military uses of outer space.357 The third position held that COPUOS should deal
with disarmament in outer space.358 Finally, the fourth viewpoint regarded it as
necessary that COPUOS cooperates and coordinates with ‘other bodies and mech-
anisms of the United Nations system, such as the First Committee of the General
Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament’.359 These positions are illustrated in
Table 3.3.360
These perspectives were also apparent in the discussion on the future work of
COPUOS.361 Previously, discussion of the agenda item entitled ‘Ways and means of
maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes’ had led to statements about the
inefficiency of the discussions under that item because the Committee’s work mostly
amounted to ‘reaffirmations of allegiance to peace in outer space’ and emphasis on
352UN Fourth Committee (59th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 11th Meeting’ (23 December
2004) UN Doc A/C.4/59/SR.11, 3.
353UN Fourth Committee (59th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 7th Meeting’ (2 December 2004)
UN Doc A/C.4/59/SR.7, 5.
354UN Fourth Committee (64th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 14th Meeting’ (30 November
2009) UN Doc A/C.4/64/SR.14.
355UNGA Res 66/71 (9 December 2011) UN Doc A/RES/66/71 | UNGA Res 67/113 (18 December
2012) UN Doc A/RES/67/113 | UNGA Res 68/75 (11 December 2013) UN Doc A/RES/68/75.
356UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), par. 45 and 49.
357UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), par. 43 | Paragraph 43 states that statements have been
made to the effect that the right of self-defence under the UN Charter as applied to outer space
should be examined, which is clearly a military use of outer space.
358UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), par. 46 and 47.
359UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), par. 48.
360The COPUOS report does not name the specific state(s) that made a statement. Therefore, the
positions cannot be allocated to specific states.
361UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), 49–51.
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the principle of non-militarisation of outer space.362 As a result, the deliberations on
the future work of COPUOS led to the broadening of the agenda item by including as
follows:
[B]roader perspective of space security and associated matters that would be instrumental in
ensuring the safe and responsible conduct of space activities, and of identifying effective
tools that could potentially provide the Committee with new guidance, in a pragmatic
manner and without prejudice to the mandate of other intergovernmental forums (empha-
sis added).363
The inclusion in the agenda item of this broader perspective and the earlier
statements illustrate that, despite the divergent perspectives on the mandate of
COPUOS, military uses of outer space are, at least in some measure, still considered
and deliberated upon in COPUOS. This amended agenda item has been included in
the yearly UNGA resolutions since 2014.364
Although the agenda item also concerns itself with issues that do not necessarily
pertain to the use of outer space for military purposes, such as the long-term
sustainability of outer space (LTS), transparency and confidence-building measures,
adherence to existing space law and the creation of new standards,365 a substantial
part of the deliberations under the agenda item are about the use of outer space for
military purposes and the mandate of COPUOS. The different perspectives on the
mandate of COPUOS are still clearly visible in the statements made.366 Therefore,
Table 3.3 Interpretation of the mandate of COPUOS in 2014
First:
‘Peaceful’ is
non-military
Second:
‘Peaceful’ is
non-aggressive
Third: ‘Peaceful’
includes limiting
arms and
disarmament
Fourth: COPUOS and CD
should co-operate on
military use of outer space
Armed
military
uses
Disarmament
framework
Disarmament
framework
COPUOS Cooperation between
COPUOS and CD
Non-
arms
military
uses
Disarmament
framework
COPUOS COPUOS Cooperation between
COPUOS and CD
Peaceful
uses
COPUOS COPUOS COPUOS COPUOS
362UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), 6–7.
363UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/69/20 (1 July 2014), par. 372.
364UNGA Res 69/85 (5 December 2014) UN Doc A/RES/69/85 | UNGA Res 70/82 (9 December
2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/82 | UNGA Res 71/90 (6 December 2016) UN Doc A/RES/71/90 |
UNGA Res 72/77 (7 December 2017) UN Doc A/RES/72/77.
365UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 72nd Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/72/20 (27 June 2017), par. 42, 43, 44 & 45.
366UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 73rd Session
Supp No 20 UN Doc A/73/20 (5 July 2018), par. 94–97.
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the most recent session of COPUOS illustrates that these issues are still heavily
discussed and in essence have come full circle. The diverging interpretations that
existed at the establishment of COPUOS and seemed to have disappeared during the
negotiations of the space treaties have reappeared along the same lines they existed,
in the first place.
3.3 The Development of the Mandate of the Conference
on Disarmament (CD)
The CD started deliberating on the prevention of an arms race in outer space after it
had been given the mandate by the UNGA. In the first resolution dealing with the
issue, Resolution 37/83,367 Article IV OST was reiterated, and it was reaffirmed that
‘outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not
become an area for an arms race’. Likewise, Resolution 37/99-D reiterated Article
IV OST and emphasised that further effective measures should be adopted.368
It is patently clear that the CD has the mandate to discuss the prevention of an
arms race and other issues pertaining to disarmament in outer space. It is equally
clear that COPUOS has the mandate to discuss issues pertaining to the use of outer
space for non-military purposes. The core question concerns the issues that fall
between disarmament and the non-military uses of outer space—the non-arms
military use of outer space. What has been illustrated in the discussion on the
mandate of COPUOS is that COPUOS has discussed the non-arms military use of
outer space and, on occasion, even extended its mandate to discuss disarmament in
outer space (for example, Article IV OST).
Considering the more specific and more well-described mandate of the CD, it is
unlikely that the CD would formally discuss the non-military use of outer space.
However, the question then remains whether, in practice, the CD does actually
discuss the non-arms military use of outer space. Moreover, might not legal obliga-
tions that are adopted to attain disarmament in outer space have a ‘spill over’ effect
on both the non-arms military use of outer space and the non-military use of outer
space?369 This paragraph will examine the deliberations of the CD, and the disar-
mament framework on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to answer these
two questions.
367UNGA Res 37/83 ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (9 December 1982) UN Doc
A/RES/37/83.
368UNGA Res 37/99-D ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Prohibition of Anti-
Satellite Systems’ (13 December 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/99-D.
369Exemplified by the drafts for the PTBT in the Eighteen-Nation Committee which initially
contained provisions that would affect the use of rockets, not just those used for the delivery of
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
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3.3.1 The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space After
Resolution S-10/2
That the CD quite strictly kept to its mandate is no surprise. The discussion of the
prevention of an arms race in outer space initially considered the stationing of
weapons in outer space and the use of outer space for hostile purposes.370 Although
the term ‘hostile’ is not defined in this context, it leans towards the ‘aggressive’ or
armed military use of outer space. However, there were indications that the mandate
of the CD could be more broadly interpreted, such as the use of the phrase
‘preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects (emphasis added)’ and
the fact that certain states wanted to establish a working group that would determine
the relevant issues that the CD would need to consider.371 Although the former was
iterated in Resolution 38/70, the proposal to establish a working group that would
consider the issues relevant to the CD was not adopted.372 In addition, Mongolia
submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from
space against the Earth,373 which obviously falls within the scope of disarmament
and the arms military use of outer space. However, this draft also emphasised the
militarisation of outer space, an aspect that can be interpreted more broadly than just
the armed military use of outer space.
The emphasis on the militarisation of outer space was reiterated the following
year in the statement of the group of socialist states: ‘that to prevent outer space from
being militarized was a problem of importance of the whole of mankind’.374
However, the issues that would or would not fall within the concept of militarisation
were not clarified. Nevertheless, that the deliberations in the CD did not shy away
from issues outside pure disarmament became clear through the propositions made
by states on the points that should be discussed in the CD. First, there was the
suggestion of strengthening the REG, appealing to states to give more detailed
information to ensure easier and better verification.375 Second, it was proposed to
deliberate on a minimum separation distance for satellites in orbit or in transit to
370UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 38th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/38/27 (6 October 1983), 168–169.
371UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 38th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/38/27 (6 October 1983), 167–168.
372UNGA Res 38/70 ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ (15 December 1983) UN Doc
A/RES/38/70 | UNGA ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: Report of the First Committee’
UN GOAR 38th Session UN Doc A/38/633 (10 December 1983).
373UNGA ‘Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From
Space Against the Earth: Report of the First Committee’UNGOAR 38th Session UN Doc A/38/647
(9 December 1983).
374UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 39th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/39/27 (2 October 1984), 161.
375UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 39th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/39/27 (2 October 1984), 163.
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orbit.376 Further, the idea was advanced that agreement should be sought on
establishing cooperative measures to permit the verification of the orbit and the
general function of space objects.377 Finally, it was suggested that the CD should
deliberate on a prohibition of damage to, disturbance of or harmful interference in
the normal functioning of permitted space objects.378
None of these four proposals are pure disarmament issues. Instead, they are
focused on supporting disarmament efforts, for example, through enhanced regis-
tration practices. Nevertheless, the proposals deal with the non-arms military use of
outer space and even the peaceful use of outer space, as is the case with the proposal
to seek agreement on a minimum separation distance for satellites. The connection
between that suggestion and disarmament in outer space is tenuous. Therefore, just
as COPUOS seems to have encroached on the mandate of the CD by discussing
non-arms military uses of outer space and disarmament issues, so did the CD
encroach on the mandate of COPUOS by deliberating upon peaceful uses of outer
space.
Regardless, none of these proposals gained momentum and much of the debate in
the CD was on establishing a committee focused on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space. This committee was successfully established in 1985 with the mandate
‘to examine, as a first step at this stage, through substantive and general consider-
ation, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space’.379 Despite
this quite narrow mandate, the CD discussed certain issues that were not directly
related to the disarmament of outer space. Although the use of outer space for
military purposes was acknowledged as a fact, such use of outer space was also
criticised, in particular the use of military satellites for reconnaissance and surveil-
lance, and the use of such satellites to support military operations.380 Interestingly,
one of the proposals for the work of the committee was to ‘clarify ambiguities
surrounding the existing legal regimes in outer space in terms of what was permitted,
what was prohibited, what grey areas might exist and what gaps required atten-
tions’.381 Even further, it was explicitly stated that the terms ‘peaceful purposes’ and
‘militarisation’ had no agreed upon meaning. Once more, states referred to treaties
negotiated in COPUOS that could serve the aims pursued in the CD, such as the
implementation of the REG as a confidence-building measure to increase
376UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 39th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/39/27 (2 October 1984), 162.
377UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 39th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/39/27 (2 October 1984), 162.
378UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 39th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/39/27 (2 October 1984), 163.
379UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 40th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/40/27 (3 October 1985), 114.
380UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 40th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/40/27 (3 October 1985), 116.
381UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 40th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/40/27 (3 October 1985), 117–118.
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transparency.382 The discussions within the Committee thus continued where the
discussions in the CD Plenary had left off, discussing not just the disarmament of
outer space but also non-arms military uses of outer space.
This continued in subsequent years with the CD, not just discussing non-arms
military uses of outer space but even issues that fell much more within the scope of
the peaceful use of outer space. With respect to the non-arms military use of outer
space, it was acknowledged that outer space was already used in such a manner.383
Certain states, however, considered the non-arms military use of outer space as
contravening the OST, calling for the complete demilitarisation of outer space,
including the military satellites.384 Where the CD delved into the peaceful uses of
outer space was with respect to the treaties established by COPUOS, in particular the
REG, and in calling for the establishment of an international space agency that
would promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space.385
In addition, the CD discussed the status of outer space as a Common Heritage of
Mankind.386
In the early nineties, the ad hoc Committee still had the same mandate to examine
and identify issues, discuss existing agreements and discuss existing proposals and
future initiatives pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.387
Nevertheless, the CD often deliberated on non-arms military uses of outer space.
Certain states acknowledged the use of outer space for military purposes and stated
that such use of outer space should be disclosed.388 Other states argued that the sole
382UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 40th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/40/27 (3 October 1985), 120.
383UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 41st Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/41/27 (22 September 1986), 100 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN
GOAR 42nd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/42/27 (14 September 1987), 161 | UNGA ‘Report of
the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 44th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/44/27
(22 September 1989), 266.
384UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 41st Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/41/27 (22 September 1986), 100–102 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’
UN GOAR 42nd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/42/27 (14 September 1987), 161–163.
385UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 41st Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/41/27 (22 September 1986), 106 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN
GOAR 42nd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/42/27 (14 September 1987), 167.
386UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 43rd Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/43/27 (3 October 1988), 216 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN
GOAR 44th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/44/27 (22 September 1989), 264.
387UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 45th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/45/27 (21 September 1990), 304 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN
GOAR 46th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/46/27 (30 September 1991), 274 | UNGA ‘Report of
the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 47th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/47/27
(23 September 1992), 66.
388UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 45th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/45/27 (21 September 1990), 306–307 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’
UN GOAR 46th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/46/27 (30 September 1991), 277.
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military use of outer space should be the verification of disarmament.389 In contrast,
other states argued that the CD should work towards the total non-militarisation of
outer space, including prohibiting military satellites.390
Finally, certain states also discussed the mandate of the CD in relation to the
mandate of COPUOS. The argument was put forward that the term ‘peaceful’ should
not be equated with non-aggressive but that it should be interpreted to exclude any
military use.391 This would mean that military uses of outer space fell outside the
scope of COPUOS. Moreover, the argument was made that the mandates of the ad
hoc Committee (and thus the CD) and COPUOS were separate and distinct.392
However, no elaboration followed this argument. Therefore, it did not illustrate
where the non-arms military uses of outer space would fall within the ‘separate
and distinct’ scope of the CD or of COPUOS.
In its last report before the deadlock, the CD discussed a number of issues that
clearly went beyond mere disarmament and also illustrated the interrelation between
the topics discussed in COPUOS and the CD. First, the CD discussed a Code of
Conduct for outer space activities and possible cooperative responses to the prolif-
eration of space debris.393 Although these issues are related to the disarmament of
outer space, they are far from pure disarmament issues. In addition, these issues are
also dealt with by COPUOS. Moreover, the CD discussed the overall
demilitarisation of outer space,394 the REG395 and the concept of ‘“rules of the
road” relating to space debris, manoeuvres in outer space, and the establishment of
keep-out zones’.396
Naturally, most of the deliberations within the ad hoc Committee of the CD on
the prevention of an arms race in outer space focused on true disarmament issues
such as verification and prohibiting the placement of arms in outer space. This
conforms to the yearly UNGA resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in
outer space that designates the CD as having the primary role in the negotiation of an
389UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 45th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/45/27 (21 September 1990), 306.
390UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 46th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/46/27 (30 September 1991), 276.
391UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 46th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/46/27 (30 September 1991), 277.
392UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 46th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/46/27 (30 September 1991), 277.
393UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 49th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/49/27 (26 September 1994), 125.
394UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 49th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/49/27 (26 September 1994), 127.
395UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 49th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/49/27 (26 September 1994), 128.
396UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 49th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/49/27 (26 September 1994), 128.
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agreement on disarmament in outer space.397 However, the preceding has illustrated
that the ad hoc Committee discussed many non-arms military uses of outer space and
even ventured into discussing peaceful uses of outer space.
3.3.2 The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Since
the Deadlock of the CD
In the 1995 session, the CD was not able to come to a consensus on re-establishing
the ad hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.398 Although
the issue was still being discussed in the plenary meeting of the CD, most states just
reiterated their earlier statements.399 The CD was successful in 1996 in negotiating
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).400 Outer space was included
in the treaty because of its broad scope (‘not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such
nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control’ in Article I), but
otherwise outer space was not specifically mentioned. Nevertheless, following the
adoption of the CTBT, the CD remained deadlocked with no substantive discussions
on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.401
397See, amongst others: UNGA Res 41/53 ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’ UN Doc
A/RES/41/53 (3 December 1986) | UNGA Res 42/33 ‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’
UN Doc A/RES/42/33 (30 November 1987).
398UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 50th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/50/27 (22 September 1995), 133.
399UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 50th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/50/27 (22 September 1995), 133.
400Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (adopted 10 September 1996 UNGA Res 50/245,
opened for signature 24 September 1996).
401Wade Boese, ‘CD Deadlock Continues as U.S. and China Square Off’ (2000) 30 Arms Control
Today 26 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 51st Session Supp
No. 27 UN Doc A/51/27 (12 September 1996), 48–49 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on
Disarmament’ UN GOAR 52nd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/52/27 (9 September 1997), 12 |
UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 53rd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc
A/53/27 (8 September 1998), 17 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR
54th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/54/27 (30 September 1999), 9 | UNGA ‘Report of the
Committee on Disarmament’UNGOAR 55th Session Supp No. 27 UNDoc A/55/27 (21 September
2000), 7 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 56th Session Supp
No. 27 UN Doc A/56/27 (13 September 2001), 6 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarma-
ment’ UN GOAR 57th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/57/27 (12 September 2002), 7–8 | UNGA
‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 58th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/58/27
(9 September 2003), 6 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 59th
Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/59/27 (7 September 2004), 7 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee
on Disarmament’UN GOAR 60th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/60/27 (22 September 2005), 6–7
| UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 61st Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc
A/61/27 (15 September 2006), 6 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR
3 The Development of the Mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses. . . 99
During the deadlock, multiple proposals were submitted on how to overcome the
deadlock. However, none of these documents resulted in the end of the deadlock. In
2008, China and Russia submitted a draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space
Objects (PPWT).402 The idea for such a treaty was not new; draft treaties on the topic
had already been submitted by the USSR in the eighties, but the collaboration on the
topic between China and Russia was a new development.
This draft is relevant as it could have implications beyond the disarmament of
outer space and even beyond the use of outer space for military purposes. Although
the draft stipulates that the definitions in Article I are only for the purpose of the
PPWT, the definitions contained within that article can have influence on the further
development of definitions of outer space activities.403 First, the definition of ‘outer
space’ as the ‘space above the Earth in excess of 100 km above sea level’ could lead
to the development of a generally accepted definition of outer space. COPUOS has
discussed the delimitation of outer space since 1957 and has not come to an agreed
upon definition; thus, it is unlikely that the PPWT would create a uniform definition.
Nevertheless, the PPWT could affect this discussion. Likewise, none of the UN
Space Treaties has defined the term ‘space object’. The PPWT’s attempt to do so
could have similar ramifications as for the definition of outer space. Therefore, the
PPWT could have a bearing on all space activities and not just armed activities in
outer space.
At the same time, the European Union (EU) drafted its Draft Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities (EUCoC).404 Although Principle 1.4 explicitly stated that
adherence to the EUCoC was voluntary, it could have had a similar effect as the
PPWT, developing definitions and measures outside the disarmament scope and thus
affecting the peaceful use of outer space. Examples of this are the measures on
minimising accidents in space and collisions between space objects (Principle 4),
space debris control and mitigation (Principle 5) and the notification and registration
of space activities and space objects (Principles 6 and 7).
62nd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/62/27 (13 September 2007), 10–11 | UNGA ‘Report of the
Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 63rd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/63/27 (9 September
2008), 9–10 | UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 64th Session Supp
No. 27 UN Doc A/64/27 (17 September 2009), 13–14.
402UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 63rd Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/63/27 (9 September 2008), 9.
403CD ‘Letter dated 12 February 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federa-
tion and the Permanent Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament Addressed to
the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting the Russian and Chinese Texts of the Draft
“Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of
Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)” Introduced by the Russian Federation and China’ UN
Doc CD/1839 (29 February 2008).
404Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’ 17175/08—
Annex II (17 December 2008).
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Although 2009 saw some success in rekindling the work of the CD through an
agreed upon programme of work to break the deadlock,405 the CD was unable to
implement the programme of work and thus still remained in a deadlock on the
substantive discussion of agenda items in working groups.406 This deadlock remains
until the present with no substantive discussion of the prevention of an arms race in
outer space in an established ad hoc working group.407
However, that does not mean that the prevention of an arms race in outer space
goes wholly undiscussed. Instead, the discussion of the prevention of an arms race in
outer space occurs during the general debate in the plenary meeting of the CD.408 In
general, the statements made in the Plenary pertaining to the prevention of an arms
race in outer space reiterate earlier positions and focus mostly on calling for
negotiations on the topic rather than substantive statements on how to achieve the
prevention of an arms race in outer space. Of course, some statements have been
made that were more substantive, which continues to illustrate that the CD deliber-
ates more broadly than pure disarmament issues. Russia, for example, has stated that
the CD should have as its top priority the prevention of the militarisation of outer
space.409 Likewise, India, on behalf of the Group of 21, has made a statement on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space to the effect that the current legal regime
needs to be consolidated, reinforced and enhanced to ‘deter further militarization of
outer space or to prevent its weaponization’.410
The further discussion of the EUCoC and the PPWT has also included certain
non-disarmament issues. Hungary, on behalf of the EU, for example, has
emphasised the risks posed by space debris and the need to minimise interference,
405Cole Harvey, ‘CD Breaks Deadlock on Work Plan’ (2009) 39 Arms Control Today 42 | CD,
‘Draft Decision on the Implementation of CD/1864 for the 2009 Session of the Conference on
Disarmament’ UN Doc CD/1870/Rev.2 (2 August 2009).
406UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 64th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/64/27 (13 October 2009).
407UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 65th Session Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/65/27 (14 September 2010), 10 | UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’ UN
GOAR 66th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/66/27 (7 October 2011), 11 | UNGA, ‘Report of the
Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 67th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/67/27 (5 October
2012), 10 | UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 68th Session Supp
No. 27 UN Doc A/68/27 (20 September 2013), 10 | UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on
Disarmament’ UN GOAR 69th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/69/27 (30 September 2014), 18 |
UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 70th Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc
A/70/27 (18 September 2015), 20 | UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’UNGOAR
71st Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/71/27 (22 September 2016), 13 | UNGA, ‘Report of the
Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 72nd Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/72/27
(22 September 2017), 17 | UNGA, ‘Report of the Conference on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 73rd
Session Supp No. 27 UN Doc A/73/27 (14 September 2018), 10.
408Ibid.
409CD, ‘Final Record of the One Thousand One Hundred and Sixty-Fifth Plenary Meeting’UNDoc
CD/PV.1165 (2 February 2010), 6.
410CD, ‘Final Record of the One Thousand One Hundred and Eighty-Eights Plenary Meeting’ UN
Doc CD/PV.1188 (6 July 2010), 7.
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collisions, accidents and the creation of space debris.411 Furthermore, Switzerland
has said:
It is therefore crucial that we specify what should be permitted and what should be prohibited
with regard to the military use of space. It is primarily the responsibility of the Conference on
Disarmament to determine how such guidelines should be drafted.412
This statement clearly illustrates that the CD mandate is interpreted, at least by
some states, as including non-arms military uses of outer space. Nevertheless, most
deliberations in the CD have pertained to actual disarmament issues or to the way
forward in the CD.
This is still the current situation; the CD deliberates on the PPWT and other issues
related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but a large part of the
deliberations deal with the procedural issues of how to discuss the prevention of an
arms race in outer space. The most recent development has been the establishment of
the Third Subsidiary Body of the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space
‘tasked with seeking to reach an understanding on areas of commonalities, deepen-
ing technical discussions, and considering effective measures, including legal instru-
ments, for negotiations’.413 It remains to be seen whether the subsidiary bodies will
achieve success in this objective.
3.4 Interim Conclusion on the Mandates of COPUOS
and the CD and the Collaboration Between COPUOS
and the CD
The previous chapter focused on the initial mandates of COPUOS and of the CD at
their respective establishment. The previous two sections in this chapter illustrated
the practical interpretation of those mandates and the development of those mandates
through the actual deliberations in the two forums.
COPUOS was established with the mandate to discuss the peaceful uses of outer
space, where the term ‘peaceful’ was interpreted in two ways. First, peaceful meant
non-military. This interpretation was supported by non-aligned states and, at least at
the start of COPUOS, by the USSR and the other Eastern bloc states. The alternative
interpretation was that peaceful meant non-aggressive. This interpretation was
supported mostly by the U.S. and some of the Western bloc states. These two
interpretations of the term ‘peaceful’ led to different interpretations of the mandate
411CD, ‘Final Record of the One Thousand Two Hundred and Third Plenary Meeting’ UN Doc
CD/PV.1203 (8 February 2011), 3.
412CD, ‘Final Record of the One Thousand Two Hundred and Third Plenary Meeting’ UN Doc
CD/PV.1203 (8 February 2011), 9.
413CD, ‘Decision’ UN Doc CD/2119 (19 February 2018).
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of COPUOS. In essence, three interpretations can be discerned, as illustrated in
Table 3.1, which is illustrated above.
Very broadly, the U.S. stated on numerous occasions in the beginning of
COPUOS that both armed military uses and non-arms military uses of outer space
should be discussed in the disarmament framework, with COPUOS having the
mandate to discuss the peaceful (meaning non-aggressive) uses of outer space.
The USSR was not as consistent in its statements as the U.S. but, in general,
advocated the discussion of armed military uses of outer space in the disarmament
framework, while non-arms military uses and peaceful uses of outer space should be
discussed in COPUOS. This is exemplified by the inclusion of non-arms military
uses of outer space in their drafts before COPUOS, such as the use of satellites for
espionage and intelligence information gathering. The final interpretation, best
exemplified by India, mostly followed the USSR interpretation but added that
COPUOS had the mandate to discuss ways to keep the use of outer space for
exclusively peaceful purposes. This meant that principles and provisions that are
aimed at limiting the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes can be
discussed and negotiated in COPUOS.
The further discussions in COPUOS indicated a shift towards the Indian inter-
pretation of the mandate. After all, COPUOS negotiated the OST, which in Article
IV does exactly what India described as being within the COPUOS mandate, namely
limit the manner in which outer space can be used to ensure that the use of outer
space is exclusively for peaceful purposes. In addition, neither the U.S. nor the
USSR made strong statements to repudiate the interpretation favoured by India and
like-minded states. This interpretation was supported by statements made by Austria,
Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the UAR, Canada, Argentina, Poland and Mex-
ico.414 President Lyndon B. Johnson even stated that the OST was the ‘most
important arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963’,415
thereby reaffirming that COPUOS discussed disarmament matters. The further
examination of the deliberations of the ARRA, LIAB, REG and MOON supports
the conclusion that COPUOS deliberated on non-arms military uses of outer space
and disarmament matters.
414UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee ‘Summary Record of the Fifty-Eight Meeting’
(20 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.58, 4 | UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee
‘Summary Record of the Fifty-Eight Meeting’ (20 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.58, 6 |
UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee ‘Summary Record of the Fifty-Eight Meeting’ (20 October
1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.58, 8 | UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee ‘Summary
Record of the Fifty-Ninth Meeting’ (24 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.59, 2–3 |
UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee ‘Summary Record of the Sixty-Second Meeting’
(24 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.62, 4 | UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee
‘Summary Record of the Sixtieth Meeting’ (20 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.60, 2–3 |
UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee ‘Summary Record of the Sixty-Second Meeting’
(24 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/SR.62, 7 | UNGA COPUOS Legal Sub-Committee
‘Summary Record of the Sixty-Second Meeting’ (24 October 1966) UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/
SR.62, 8.
415UNGA First Committee (21st Session) 1492nd Meeting, 428.
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However, to conclude that COPUOS is mandated to discuss non-arms military
uses of outer space and disarmament issues when those issues are related to limiting
the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes is too blunt. First, COPUOS
discussed these matters within the context of negotiating general treaties for which
they had received a specific mandate by the UNGA, rather than discussing these
matters separately. Second, developments within the disarmament framework need
to be taken into consideration. The analysis of the Ten-Nation Committee, Eighteen-
Nation Committee and the CCD showed that the deliberations and negotiations in
those forums were turbulent with deadlocks being common and years between
substantive negotiations in the forums or their successors. With such inconsistent
discussions within the disarmament framework, it is a natural result that at least some
basic provisions on the disarmament of outer space needed to be addressed in some
manner, in this case in COPUOS.
The overhaul of the disarmament framework following Resolution S-10/2 should
then have led to a clearer distinction between the mandates of COPUOS and the
CD. Instead, following this Resolution, there was a reversal of the apparent consen-
sus within COPUOS back to the positions in the years following the establishment of
COPUOS, with the addition of a fourth perspective. The previous perspectives were
that COPUOS should not consider disarmament in, or the weaponisation of, outer
space416; that COPUOS should deal with certain military uses of outer space417; and
that COPUOS should deal with disarmament in outer space.418 Finally, the fourth
perspective regarded it as necessary that COPUOS cooperates and coordinates with
‘other bodies and mechanisms of the United Nations system, such as the First
Committee of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament’.419
These interpretations have been set out in Table 3.3, which is illustrated above.
Although there are thus different interpretations of the mandate of COPUOS, the
practical discussions within COPUOS illustrate that non-arms military uses of outer
space are definitely discussed, and that within the context of the priority agenda item
‘Ways and means of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes’ certain disar-
mament matters are discussed.
At the same time, the CD did not limit itself to disarmament matters but often
discussed matters pertaining to the non-arms military use of outer space and even the
peaceful use of outer space, for example by discussing the issue of space debris,
which is not a disarmament issue. Of course, the creation of space debris through
416UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No. 20 (1 July 2014) UN Doc A/69/20, par. 45 and 49.
417UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No. 20 (1 July 2014) UN Doc A/69/20, par. 43 | Paragraph 43 states that statements have been
made to the effect that the right of self-defence under the UN Charter as applied to outer space
should be examined, which is clearly a military use of outer space.
418UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No. 20 (1 July 2014) UN Doc A/69/20, par. 46 and 47.
419UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 69th Session
Supp No. 20 (1 July 2014) UN Doc A/69/20, par. 48.
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anti-satellite weapons is a matter that falls wholly within the scope of the CD. The
general matter of space debris, however, is an overarching issue for the use of outer
space and would more obviously fall within the scope of COPUOS. Other issues that
have been discussed in the CD but do not obviously fall within the scope of the
disarmament of outer space are the general militarisation of outer space, the strength-
ening of the REG to ensure better registration practice, minimum separation dis-
tances between satellites to reduce the risk of collision, verification of the general
function of space objects and the so-called rules of the road. Nevertheless, many
states have brought these matters to the attention of the ad hoc Committee on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space of the CD.
As a result, both COPUOS and the CD discuss matters across the range of types
of space activities. Although COPUOS generally deliberates on matters towards the
peaceful use of outer space and the CD generally deliberates on matters towards the
disarmament of outer space, there is no distinct border between the mandates of the
two forums.
In addition to this, the analysis in the preceding sections and chapter illustrated
that many of the issues discussed in COPUOS and the CD are interrelated and that
certain issues are discussed in both forums. Once more, space debris is the clearest
example. It is discussed in COPUOS under agenda item 11 ‘General exchange of
information and views on legal mechanisms relating to space debris mitigation and
remediation measures, taking into account the work of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee’.420 Likewise, the subject of space debris is often discussed in the
CD, for example when it was discussed with respect to the EUCoC or anti-satellite
weapons.421
Thus, the question arises, how much collaboration is there between the forums on
these matters and on space matters in general? When so many of the issues discussed
in the forums affect the peaceful use of outer space, the non-arms military use of
outer space and the disarmament of outer space alike, one would expect a certain
measure of communication and collaboration between the two forums. Such collab-
oration has been supported by many states already, both in COPUOS and in the CD,
for years. For example, Canada states:
In this regard, Canada argues for security guarantees to be considered by the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) and practical safety and sustainability measures for space activities to be
considered in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). To ensure
that these forums do not work at odds with one another, increased co-ordination of the CD
and COPUOS ought to be given favourable consideration by the Member States of both
international bodies.422
420UN COPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Fifty-Seventh Session, Held in Vienna
from 9 to 20 April 2018’ UN Doc A/AC.105/1177 (30 April 2018), 3.
421Council of the European Union, ‘Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities’ 17175/08—
Annex II (17 December 2008) | CD, ‘Canada: Working Paper: On the Merits of Certain Draft
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space Security’ UN
Doc CD/1865 (5 June 2009), 2.
422CD, ‘Canada: Working Paper: On the Merits of Certain Draft Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures and Treaty Proposals for Space Security’ UN Doc CD/1865 (5 June 2009), 4.
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Such collaboration, however, has been nearly non-existent. Cooperation exists on
a broader UN level through the annual Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space
Activities (UN-Space). UN-Space, which has been meeting since the
mid-seventies and is now in its 38th session, was established ‘to promote collabo-
ration, synergy, the exchange of information and the coordination of plans and
programmes between the United Nations entities in the implementation of activities
involving the use of space technology and its applications’.423 This objective is quite
limited because it is restricted to the ‘implementation of activities involving the use
of space technology and its applications’. Therefore, UN-Space does not aim at
having discussions on the way forward on contentious issues such as how to deal
with space debris, space traffic management or keeping the use of outer space for
exclusively peaceful purposes. In addition, although the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is a participating organisation in UN-Space,
the CD is not.424 Thus, although UN-Space is an important collaboration between
UN organisations, in particular through their special reports on issues such as space
weather, climate change and space for agriculture development and food security,425
it is not a collaboration in which COPUOS and the CD participate or a collaboration
in which progress is made towards political or legal consensus on space matters.
A rare collaboration occurred through the joint panel discussion of the First and
Fourth Committees on the possible challenges to space security and sustainability.
However, this was a joint panel between the First and Fourth Committee rather than
COPUOS and the CD and was convened for the 50th anniversary of the OST.426
Although the joint panel discussions allowed for a dialogue between the First and
Fourth Committees on a number of a space matters relevant to both COPUOS and
the CD, it is far from the required collaboration between the two forums that is
necessary to adequately resolve those space matters that affect both forums.
423UN COPUOS, ‘Report of the Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities (UN-Space) on its
Thirty-Seventh Session’ UN Doc A/AC.105/1143 (3 April 2018), 1.
424UNOOSA, ‘Participating Organizations’ <http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/un-space/
po.html> Accessed 19 December 2018.
425UN COPUOS, ‘Space Weather: Special Report of the Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space
Activities on Developments Within the United Nations System Related to Space Weather’ UN Doc
A/AC.105/1146 (28 April 2017) | UN COPUOS, ‘Space and Climate Change: Special Report of the
Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities on the Use of Space Technology Within the
United Nations System to Address Climate Change Issues’ UN Doc A/AC.105/991 (31 March
2011) | UN COPUOS, ‘Space for Agriculture Development and Food Security: Special Report of
the Inter-Agency Meeting on Outer Space Activities on the Use of Space Technology within the
United Nations System for Agriculture Development and Food Security’ UN Doc A/AC.105/1042
(8 April 2013).
426UNGA Res 71/90, ‘International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN Doc
A/RES/71/90 (6 December 2016).
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Chapter 4
The Future of the UN Space-Related
Framework
Annette Froehlich, Vincent Seffinga, and Ruiyan Qiu
Abstract The overlapping mandates of COPUOS and the CD and the demonstrated
need to discuss certain space matters in a cooperative manner, combined with the
fact that the collaboration between COPUOS and the CD is extremely limited, raises
the question of whether the current UN space-related framework is adequate to deal
with current and future space matters. This chapter aims to answer that question.
Therefore, it will first give a short overview of some of the more pressing issues that
affect the peaceful use of outer space and the disarmament of outer space alike,
namely space traffic management (STM), space debris and the long-term sustain-
ability of outer space activities (LTS). Without going into exhaustive detail, this
chapter will outline the essence of the subject matter and the need to discuss these
matters in a more cooperative effort. Thereafter, this chapter evaluates the current
UN space-related framework and how well equipped it is to deal with the three space
matters. In light of the deliberations in the COPUOS and the CD, the interrelatedness
of space matters and the lack of cooperation between the two forums, the conclusion
is drawn that the current UN space-related framework is not able to effectively
discuss the challenges posed by near- to medium-term space issues and challenges.
The overlapping mandates of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the demonstrated need to
discuss certain space matters in a cooperative manner, combined with the fact that
the collaboration between COPUOS and the CD is extremely limited, beg the
question whether the current UN space-related framework is adequate to deal with
current and future space matters. This chapter will aim to answer that question.
Accordingly, it will first give a brief overview of some of the more pressing issues
that affect the peaceful use of outer space and the disarmament of outer space alike,
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namely the ways and means of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes, space
traffic management (STM), space debris and the long-term sustainability of outer
space activities (LTS). None of these issues will be described exhaustively. Instead,
this chapter will outline the essence of the subject matter and the need to discuss
these matters in a more cooperative endeavour (Sect. 4.1). Thereafter, this chapter, as
the conclusion of the research, will evaluate the current UN space-related framework
and how well it is equipped to deal with the described space matters (Sect. 4.2).
4.1 The Major Space-Related Issues Facing
the International Community
4.1.1 Ways and Means of Maintaining Outer Space
for Peaceful Purposes
The use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes is a topic that has been
widely discussed since space matters were first put on the UN agenda following the
successful launch of Sputnik I. Resolution 1148 (XII), for example, already refers to
the use of outer space exclusively for ‘peaceful and scientific purposes’.1 Further-
more, many other resolutions and legal instruments, including Resolution 1962
(XVIII) and the OST, recognise ‘the common interest of all mankind in the progress
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes’.2 The recognised
importance of keeping outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes led to the
inclusion of an obligation under Article IV OST to use the Moon and other celestial
bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes.
This obligation, however, has never been extended towards the rest of outer
space. Nevertheless, the international community still recognises it as an important
objective to maintain outer space for peaceful purposes. Therefore, COPUOS has
been discussing ‘ways and means of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes’,
an agenda item that has been discussed extensively with respect to the development
of the mandate of COPUOS in the previous chapter. It bears repeating, however, that
the first time the agenda item was included in Resolution 38/80, it requested
COPUOS to consider questions relating to the militarisation of outer space while
taking into account that the CD had been requested to consider the question of
preventing an arms race in outer space and the need to coordinate efforts between
1UNGA Res 1148 (XII) Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and
All Armaments: Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Arma-
ments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
(14 November 1957).
2UNGA Res 1962 (XVIII) Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space (13 December 1963) | Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 10 October 1967) 610 UNTS 205.
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COPUOS and the CD.3 The ensuing discussion on the militarisation of outer space
overshadowed the deliberations in COPUOS.4 Therefore, the subsequent UNGA
resolutions requested COPUOS to consider ‘ways and means of maintaining outer
space for peaceful purposes’. Although the agenda item is phrased differently, in
essence it is still a discussion on the militarisation of outer space and limiting the use
of outer space for non-peaceful purposes. This has been demonstrated in the
examination of the agenda item in the previous chapter but is also evident when
considering that outer space can only be maintained for peaceful purposes when
outer space is not used for non-peaceful purposes.
The relation between the discussion in COPUOS on ways and means of
maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes and the discussion in the CD on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space then also becomes apparent. The preven-
tion of an arms race in outer space is an essential component in maintaining outer
space for peaceful purposes because outer space cannot be maintained for peaceful
purposes unless an arms race in outer space is prevented. Simply put, the discussion
and outcome in COPUOS are dependent on the deliberations and outcome in the
CD. Therefore, it is also apparent that these issues cannot be discussed in separate
forums but will need to be dealt with in a cooperative manner.
4.1.2 Space Traffic Management (STM)
Space traffic management (STM) is a concept that is currently in development and
has no agreed-upon definition. In the Legal Subcommittee, the issue has been
discussed since 2016 through the addition of an agenda item on a ‘General exchange
of views on the legal aspects of space traffic management’.5 The inclusion of this
agenda item was suggested by Germany, originally as a single issue/item.6 The
suggested purpose of the item was ‘to reflect on the concept of STM, on what it
entails and on what consequences it would have for the organization and governance
of space activities’.7 The proposal further stressed that the item on STM should not
3UNGA Res 38/80 ‘International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (15 December
1983) UN Doc A/RES/38/80, par. 15.
4UNGA SPC, ‘Summary Record of the 39th Meeting’ (28 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/
SR.39, 4.
5UN COPUOS, ‘Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Fifty-Fourth Session, Held in Vienna
from 13 to 24 April 2015’, UN Doc A/AC.105/1090 (30 April 2015), 33.
6UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, ‘Proposal for a Single Issue/Item for Discussion at the Fifty-
Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee in 2016’ on: ‘Exchange of Views on the Concept of Space
Traffic Management’ UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.13 (14 April 2015).
7UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, ‘Proposal for a Single Issue/Item for Discussion at the Fifty-
Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee in 2016’ on: ‘Exchange of Views on the Concept of Space
Traffic Management’ UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.13 (14 April 2015), 1.
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lead to the elaboration on any legal text but should only offer the opportunity to the
delegations to have an exchange of views on the subject matter.8
Although STM has only recently been added to the agenda of COPUOS, it is not a
new concept. Concepts that are extremely similar have been discussed previously in
the CD, such as the concept of ‘rules of the road’ and the establishment of keep-out
zones.9 Outside the UN, the concept has also been discussed, for example through
the 2006 Study of the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), which defined
STM as ‘the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into
outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free from
physical or radio-frequency interference’.10 This definition was reiterated in a further
2018 IAA study on STM.11 Further studies have been conducted on behalf of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)12 and on behalf of the
European Space Agency (ESA).13
The re-emergence of the concept can be attributed to the worsening congestion of
the space environment and the urgent need for the international community to
mitigate the risks of collision between space objects. The addition of STM as a
single issue/item on the 2016 agenda of COPUOS invited a number of statements on
the concept of STM. For example, the view was expressed that ‘the development of a
space traffic management regime should be approached by looking at the following
elements: the principles contained in the five United Nations treaties on outer space;
the corresponding General Assembly resolutions; additional instruments for keeping
outer space clean; space debris mitigation; real-time collision avoidance; notifica-
tions and confidence-building measures; orbit management and the passage through
airspace; and traffic rules in a narrow sense’.14 Furthermore, the view was expressed
that a wide range of space activities would have to be taken into account to ensure
effective management of space traffic, including the increased number of small
satellites and nano-satellites launched, the initiatives on mega-constellations and
8UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, ‘Proposal for a Single Issue/Item for Discussion at the Fifty-
Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee in 2016’ on: ‘Exchange of Views on the Concept of Space
Traffic Management’ UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.13 (14 April 2015), 2.
9UNGA ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament’ UN GOAR 49th Sessions Supp No. 27 UN
Doc A/49/27 (26 September 1994), 128.
10C Contant-Jorgenson, P Lála, K-U Schrogl, Space Traffic Management (International Academy
of Astronautics 2006), 17.
11K-U Schrogl, C Jorgenson, J Robinson and A Soucek, Space Traffic Management: Towards a
Roadmap for Implementation (International Academy of Astronautics 2018).
12O Brown and others, Orbital Traffic Management Study: Final Report (Science Application
International Corporation 2016).
13R Tüllmann and others, On the Implementation of a European Space Traffic Management System
(DLR GfR 2017).
14UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, ‘Draft Report’ UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.298/Add.1 (7 April
2016), 6.
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the active removal of space debris.15 Other statements were made on STM, but the
outcome of the 2016 session of the Legal Subcommittee was that the growing
importance of STM was acknowledged and that continuous discussion on this
item was necessary.16
The discussion on STM continued in 2017, with Germany even stating that the
negotiation of a new binding UN treaty might be considered to regulate STM.17
However, it was also called into question whether it made sense to discuss STM in
the Legal Subcommittee because the Legal Subcommittee was perhaps not fully able
to analyse major indicators shaping the concepts underlying STM.18 Nevertheless,
the discussion within COPUOS demonstrates that STM is a near- to medium-term
future discussion point that will need to be addressed. The statements also illustrate
that it is not just an issue that pertains to the civil or peaceful use of outer space but
that it also affects the military use of outer space and even the disarmament of outer
space, first, because issues such as space debris are indiscriminate whether a space
object is used for civil or military purposes and second, because traffic rules and orbit
management will be less effective if only non-military space objects are regulated.
Thus, because STM is relevant to space security, the CD has also recognised the
urgency of having a regulatory framework for STM. The Deputy Secretary-General
of the CD delivered a speech in 2012, asserting that, ‘common efforts are urgently
needed to address the growing risks and challenges in space security’, and there is a
‘need to intensify efforts to develop and agree upon common legal standards and
rules governing pre-launch notifications, space traffic management and manoeuvres
in orbit, and communication between satellite operators’.19 Furthermore, the CD has
a history of discussing matters that are akin to STM, such as the earlier mentioned
‘rules of the road’ initiative and elements of the EUCoC.
Therefore, it is apparent that STM should be dealt with by COPUOS and the CD
in a cooperative manner, first, because STM is already being discussed in both
COPUOS and the CD. Second, both COPUOS and the CD have acknowledged the
importance and urgency of establishing an STM regime. Finally, an outcome on the
topic in COPUOS will have ramifications for the deliberation on the topic in the CD
and vice versa.
15UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, ‘Draft Report’ UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/L.298/Add.1 (7 April
2016), 7.
16UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN Doc A/71/20
(28 June 2016), 34.
17UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee, ‘Responses to the set of Questions provided by the Chair of
the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer
Space’ UN Doc A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.6 (23 March 2017), 5.
18UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN Doc A/72/20
(27 July 2017), 29.
19Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Space Security 2012: Laying the Groundwork for Progress (Delivered
by Jarmo Sareva on 29March 2012 at the Annual UNIDIR Conference on Space Security)<https://
www.unog.ch/80256EDD006AC19C/(httpSpeechesByYear_en)/
5503B6BDA5BA20C2C1257C2200486BA4?OpenDocument> (Accessed 20 December 2018).
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4.1.3 Space Debris
Another matter that will have to be addressed by both COPUOS and the CD is the
issue of space debris. Space debris has been discussed at length in COPUOS. The
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) began discussing the issue following
UNGAResolution 48/39 as a specific agenda item, after years of discussing the issue
under the general discussion in the Subcommittee and the Committee.20 Many
scientific and technical aspects of space debris were discussed in the STSC with
the aim of establishing voluntary space debris mitigation measures.21 Following the
adoption of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) Space
Debris Mitigation Guidelines, the STSC shifted its focus to the review of those
measures.22 The efforts of the STSC culminated in the adoption of revised space
debris mitigation guidelines, adopted by UNGA Resolution 62/217.23 After the
adoption of these guidelines, the STSC continued considering the issue of space
debris in light of the relevant developments.24
In addition, the Legal Subcommittee added the single issue/item ‘General
exchange of information on national mechanisms relating to space debris mitigation
measures’ to its agenda in 2009.25 Therein the Legal Subcommittee considers the
legal aspects of space debris in relation to the established technical and scientific
measures because ‘the consideration of legal aspects of the undesirable effects of
space activities, (. . .) would become warranted sooner or later’.26 Since then it has
been an annual agenda item of the Legal Subcommittee as a ‘General exchange of
information and views on legal mechanisms relating to space debris mitigation and
remediation measures, taking into account the work of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee’.27
20UNGA Res 48/39 ‘International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN Doc
A/RES/48/39 (10 December 1993) | UN COPUOS, ‘Report of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee on the Work of Its Thirty-First Session’ UN Doc A/AC.105/571 (10 March 1994),
12.
21UNOOSA, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UN 2010), iii.
22UNOOSA, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (UN 2010), iv.
23UNGA Res 62/217, ‘International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN Doc
A/RES/62/217 (22 December 2007), 6.
24UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 73rd Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/73/20 (5 July 2018), 21–22.
25UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 63rd Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/63/20 (20 June 2008), 32.
26UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 64th Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/64/20 (1 July 2009), 29–30.
27UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 73rd Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/73/20 (5 July 2018), 33–34.
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The issue of space debris has also been considered by the CD. The deliberations
pertaining to space debris carried out in the CD can be split into two discussions.
First are the deliberations carried out with respect to initiatives such as the EUCoC.
In this regard, the discussion in the CD has focused on avoiding collisions between
space objects to minimise the creation of space debris and the general mitigation of
space debris. Second, the CD deliberates on space debris in the larger framework of
anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) systems. Such weapons, which are aimed at destroying
space-based assets, can create an enormous amount of space debris. In the last
decade or so, all three major space powers have carried out such tests. China
conducted such a test in 2007 by destroying their Fengyun-1C weather satellite.28
The U.S. conducted a similar operation by shooting down a defunct reconnaissance
satellite in 2006 to protect the public from the toxic fuel present in the satellite.29
Finally, Russia has also shown that it has ASAT capabilities.30 The CD has delib-
erated upon treaties limiting ASAT but has never come to conclude such a treaty.
However, the discussion on limiting or banning the use of ASAT weapons is still
relevant. For example, the absence of provisions adequately addressing ASAT
systems in the PPWT is one of the reasons for the U.S. to not accommodate further
negotiations on the PPWT.31
The fact that space debris affects all uses of outer space indiscriminately deter-
mines that it is an issue for both COPUOS and the CD. It is possible for the issue of
space debris to be isolated into separate elements that can then be considered by just
COPUOS or just the CD, for example the creation of space debris through ASAT
tests. As an ‘arms military’ use of outer space, a prohibition on ASAT tests falls
within the mandate of the CD and could be negotiated within that forum. However,
there are other aspects of space debris that do not clearly fall within the mandate of
either forum, for example active space debris removal or the mitigation of space
debris created by military space objects in their normal. Therefore, cooperation
between the two forums to resolve the issue comprehensively seems essential.
28Gene Milowicki and Joan Johnson-Freese, ‘Strategic Choices: Examining the United States
Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test’ (2008) 6 Astropolitics 1 | Leonard David,
‘China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth’ (Space.com, 2 February 2007)
<https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.
html> accessed 21 December 2018.
29Eric Hagt, ‘The U.S. satellite shootdown: China’s response’ (Bulleting of the Atomic Scientists,
5 March 2008) <https://thebulletin.org/2008/03/the-u-s-satellite-shootdown-chinas-response/>
accessed 21 December 2018.
30Ankit Panda, ‘Russia Conducts New Test of ‘Nudol’ Anti-Satellite System’ (The Diplomat,
2 April 2018) <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/russia-conducts-new-test-of-nudol-anti-satellite-
system/> accessed 21 December 2018.
31Jeff Foust, ‘U.S. Dismisses Space Weapons Treaty Proposal as “Fundamentally Flawed”’
(SpaceNews, 11 September 2014) <https://spacenews.com/41842us-dismisses-space-weapons-
treaty-proposal-as-fundamentally-flawed/> accessed 21 December 2018.
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4.1.4 Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities
A final issue, which in a sense encompasses issues such as STM and space debris, is
the long-term sustainability of outer space activities (LTS). Simply put, the goal of
LTS as an agenda item of COPUOS is to achieve the sustainability of outer space so
that outer space can keep being used and explored. With this goal in mind, it
becomes obvious that issues such as space debris and STM are inherent within
achieving the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.
Similar to the consideration of space debris, LTS was first added to the agenda of
the STSC in 2009.32 In line with the decision to consider LTS in the STSC, a
working group on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities to discuss the
issue was established.33 The working group on LTS had four expert subgroups:
(a) Sustainable Space Utilization and Sustainable Development on Earth, (b) Space
Situational Awareness (SSA), (c) Weather and (d) Regulatory Regime and Guidance
for Actors in Space. A first set of LTS guidelines was agreed in 2016,34 with
consensus being found on a preamble and nine additional guidelines in 2018.35
Nevertheless, the mandate of the Working Group came to an end without COPUOS
coming to a consensus on the LTS guidelines.36 Considering the importance of the
long-term sustainability of outer space activities, it is unlikely that this will be the
end of the discussion in COPUOS.
The discussion on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities has mostly
been confined to COPUOS. Nevertheless, it is an issue that is a concern not just for
COPUOS but for the CD as well, first, because military uses of outer space and in
particular arms used in outer space heavily contribute to the non-sustainability of
outer space activities through the creation of space debris and interference with outer
space activities. Second, the degradation of the space environment and the
non-sustainability of outer space activities heavily affect the military use of outer
space. Similar to the issue of space debris, the degradation of the space environment
is indiscriminate and will pose the same problems to the military use of outer space
as it will to the non-military use of outer space. The uses of outer space considered in
the CD thus both contribute to the non-sustainability of outer space activities and are
affected by the consequences of the degradation of the space environment. There-
fore, it seems sensible that the long-term sustainability of outer space activities is not
32UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 64th Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/64/20 (1 July 2009), 21.
33UN COPUOS, ‘Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its Forty-Seventh
Session, Held in Vienna from 8 to 19 February 2010’ UN Doc A/AC.105/958 (11 March 2010), 26.
34UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 71st Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/71/20 (28 June 2016), Annex.
35UN COPUOS, ‘Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on its Fifty-Fifth Session,
Held in Vienna from 29 January to 9 February 2018’ UN Doc A/AC.105/1167 (6 April 2018),
Annex III.
36UNGA, ‘Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ UN GOAR 73rd Session
Supp No. 20 UN Doc A/73/20 (7 July 2018), 27.
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just discussed in COPUOS or in the CD. Instead, it seems necessary to discuss the
subject in a more cooperative manner.
4.2 The Future Relevance of the UN Space-Related
Framework
In light of the aforementioned, it is apparent that there are issues in outer space that
need to be addressed on an international level (e.g. space debris, STM and LTS).
These issues affect the military and non-military use of outer space alike. Space
debris is indiscriminate as regards the general function of the space object it hits,
STM will need to take into consideration all space objects to be effective and the
long-term sustainability of outer space activities cannot be achieved if only
non-military space activities adhere to the guidelines. Furthermore, it is evident
that decisions taken in one forum will have consequences for the deliberations in
the other forum. For example, an obligation for states to mitigate the creation of
space debris negotiated in the CD will have ramifications for non-military space
activities and alter the discussion on that subject in COPUOS. COPUOS will need to
take the obligation created under the auspices of the CD into consideration in its
further deliberations on the subject and might be limited in creating further obliga-
tions on space debris mitigation. Likewise, an instrument on STM negotiated in
COPUOS will have ramifications for the discussions on a minimum separation
distance between satellites or ‘rules of the road’ undertaken in the CD.
This then leads to the question of whether space matters are currently being
discussed effectively internationally and whether changes are necessary to improve
the discussion of issues pertaining to the use of outer space. Of course, this also leads
to the question of what it means for COPUOS and the CD to effectively deliberate on
space matters. Is it sufficient that the forums can annually discuss space matters in a
cooperative manner, or is it necessary that the forums come to some manner of
conclusion on the issues discussed, whether that is in the form of an international
agreement, UNGA resolution, or guidelines? Considering that the objective of both
the CD and COPUOS is to achieve tangible success in their respective purposes,
effectiveness must be seen as the latter; a conclusion or result should be reached on
the matters discussed in the forum. That result does not have to be reached within a
certain period of time or in a certain form, but it is evident that a forum that does not
achieve any modicum of success in producing a result is not effective.
In the current situation, it is a fair assessment that the deliberations on the
prevention of an arms race in outer space in the CD have been far from effective
since the deadlock in the mid-nineties. No tangible results have been achieved in
developing legal, binding or non-binding, instruments to ensure the prevention of an
arms race in outer space. Although China and Russia have submitted the PPWT
draft, substantive discussions on that draft have been scarce, if not completely
absent. The absence of political will to re-establish the ad hoc committees of the
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CD, including the committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, has
resulted in hardly any substantive discussions at all.
In contrast, COPUOS has always been a fairly successful international forum. It
has demonstrated its success through the negotiation of the five UN Space Treaties,
and, in the subsequent absence of consensus on having legally binding instruments,
has continued to successfully negotiate resolutions on a variety of issues. One can
argue that the non-legally binding resolutions are a step back in the effectiveness of
the forum because they lack a legally binding character and might therefore not be as
persuasive and efficient in achieving their purposes. The fact remains, however, that
states discuss a variety of space matters annually in COPUOS. Although they often
disagree on the approach, development and necessary outcome on the matters,
progress is made, compromises are reached and results are achieved.
How does this reflect on the discussion of the aforementioned space matters? In
its current form, the UN space-related framework consists of the CD, which is in a
deadlock, and COPUOS, which adopts non-legally binding instruments. As long as
the CD remains in a deadlock, it is unlikely that any effective progress will be made
in that forum. Moreover, the length of the deadlock in the CD and the limited
progress that has been made in resolving the deadlock suggest that a breakthrough
of the deadlock is an unlikely event. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that any
progress on the issues of space debris, LTS and STM will need to come from
COPUOS. Considering the diverging interpretations on the mandate of COPUOS,
however, it is unlikely that COPUOS will address the military aspects of space
debris, LTS and STM. The current UN space-related framework thus cannot ade-
quately deliberate on these space matters.
Therefore, it is necessary that changes are made to the UN space-related frame-
work. Although some progress could be made if states were to agree to re-establish
the committees of the CD, this would be only limited progress, given that results in
one forum affect the deliberations in the other forum and that space matters cannot
simply be divided between COPUOS and the CD.
Instead, what is necessary for the effective discussion of space matters interna-
tionally, with the aim of achieving tangible results, is consistent cooperation between
the two forums. This is made apparent by the inherent dual use nature of space
technology and the demonstrated interrelated nature of the issues. Cooperation
between COPUOS and the CD would allow the international community to discuss
all facets of space matters and not be limited to the discussion of one facet when the
issue cannot be resolved effectively without discussing them all. However, two
important notes need to be placed. First, this cooperation can only effectively exist
when the CD resolves its deadlock. Second, such cooperation runs the risk of falling
in the same pitfall as the CD, namely that states cannot agree on how to proceed with
the discussion of the disarmament aspects of certain space matters, which will then
lead to a deadlock. This is a reasonable expectation because cooperation between the
CD and COPUOS will bring with it the history of the discussions conducted in those
two forums. The difficulties encountered in having effective discussions in the CD
will thus be carried over to the cooperative effort. In addition, the military use of
outer space has proven to be a difficult, political topic to discuss. When COPUOS
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was requested by the UNGA to discuss the militarisation of outer space and the need
to coordinate efforts between COPUOS and the CD,37 the topic overshadowed the
entire session and prevented COPUOS from having effective substantive discus-
sions.38 Historic evidence thus indicates that a cooperative effort between COPUOS
and the CD could grind to a halt because of the contentious and political nature of the
topic of the military use of outer space.
An alternative approach would be to take the example of the deliberations on the
OST. Within the context of the OST, COPUOS deliberated on the limitation of the
use of outer space to ensure that the use of outer space is for exclusively peaceful
purposes. Essentially, Article IV OST is a disarmament measure negotiated in
COPUOS. Likewise, the UNGA could bestow a specific mandate on COPUOS to
discuss disarmament matters within the context of certain space matters, for example
by giving a specific mandate to COPUOS to discuss anti-satellite weapons within the
context of space debris mitigation. However, the same problem arises as with having
stronger, consistent cooperation between the two forums. The space matters to be
discussed will bring with them the complications faced in the CD, which can then
taint the discussions in COPUOS and even lead to a deadlock in COPUOS.
The solutions are thus not without their problems. Nevertheless, one thing
remains certain: space technology will continue to develop, and this development
will bring with it new legal problems that will need to be addressed in a more timely
and effective manner than is currently the case.
37UNGARes 38/80, ‘International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’ (15 December
1983) UN Doc A/RES/38/80, par. 15.
38UNGA SPC ‘Summary Record of the 39th Meeting’ (28 November 1984) UN Doc A/SPC/39/
SR.39, 4.
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